Demand response status in EU Member States by ZANCANELLA PAOLO et al.
Paolo Bertoldi 
Paolo Zancanella 
Benigna Boza-Kiss 
 
Demand Response status in EU 
Member States 
2016
EUR 27998 EN 
This publication is a Science for Policy report by the Joint Research Centre, the European Commission’s in-house 
science service. It aims to provide evidence-based scientific support to the European policy-making process. 
The scientific output expressed does not imply a policy position of the European Commission. Neither the European 
Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use which might be made of this 
publication. 
Contact information 
Paolo Bertoldi 
Joint Research Centre, Via E. Fermi 2749. Ispra 21027. Italy. 
Email: paolo.bertoldi@ec.europa.eu 
Tel.: +390332 78 9299 
JRC Science Hub  
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc 
JRC101191 
EUR 27998 EN 
PDF ISBN 978-92-79-59818-0 ISSN 1831-9424 doi:10.2790/962868 
Print ISBN 978-92-79-59817-3 ISSN 1018-5593 doi:10.2790/354290 
© European Union, 2016 
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. 
Demand Response Status in EU Member States; EUR 27998 EN; How to cite: Bertoldi P, Zancanella P, Boza-Kiss B.; 
doi:10.2790/962868 
All images © European Union 2016 except those used on the front page which were taken from the following website 
www.flickr.com   
Abstract:  
This report reviews the current status of European Member States’ regulation supporting Demand Response and 
Aggregation in the wholesale, balancing and ancillary electricity markets, as stipulated in Article 15 of the Energy 
Efficiency Directive.  
Demand Response is able to increase the system’s adequacy and to substantially reduce the need for investment in 
peaking generation by shifting consumption away from times of high demand. It can act as a cost effective balancing 
resource for variable renewable generation. Adding stability to the system, it lowers the need for coal and gas fired 
spinning reserves – most running power plants burn fuel continuously in order to be ready to supply power at short 
notice. It furthermore decreases the need for local network investments, as it shifts consumption away from peak hours 
in regions with tight network capacity. Demand Response delivers these benefits by providing consumers – residential, 
commercial or industrial – with control signals and/or financial incentives to adjust their consumption at strategic times. 
New insights on key success criteria for Demand Response which are in line with and benefit from, Europe’s competitive 
market design are discussed in the report. A unique European Model begins to emerge. Positive developments in 
Member States have been evaluated and those who have looked to enable Demand Response are succeeding, despite 
continued barriers and remaining issues. 
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Executive summary 
The European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC) reviewed the progress of Member States 
toward opening markets for Demand Response as of the beginning of 2016, as part of its support to 
DG ENER in the frame of the Energy Efficiency Directive, to assess the transposition and 
implementation of specific Articles of the Energy Efficiency Directive (2012/27/EU) 1.  
The Energy Efficiency Directive constitutes a significant step towards the development of Demand 
Response in Europe. 
 
Art. 15. 4 requires Member States to: 
- “Ensure the removal of those incentives in transmission and distribution tariffs that are 
detrimental to the overall efficiency (including energy efficiency) of the generation, 
transmission, distribution and supply of electricity or those that might hamper participation 
of Demand Response, in balancing markets and ancillary services procurement”. 
- “Ensure that network operators are incentivised to improve efficiency in infrastructure design 
and operation, and, within the framework of Directive 2009/72/EC, that tariffs allow retailers 
to improve consumer participation in system efficiency, including Demand Response, 
depending on national circumstances”. 
 
Art. 15.8 of the Directive establishes consumer access to energy markets, either individually or 
through aggregation. In detail the Article states: 
- “Member States shall ensure that national regulatory authorities encourage demand side 
resources, such as Demand Response, to participate alongside supply in wholesale and retail 
markets.” 
- “Subject to technical constraints inherent in managing networks, Member States shall ensure 
that transmission system operators and distribution system operators, in meeting 
requirements for balancing and ancillary services, treat Demand Response providers, 
including aggregators, in a non-discriminatory manner, on the basis of their technical 
capabilities.” 
- “Member States shall promote access to and participation of Demand Response in balancing, 
reserves and other system services markets, inter alia by requiring national regulatory 
authorities […] in close cooperation with demand service providers and consumers, to define 
technical modalities for participation in these markets on the basis of the technical 
requirements of these markets and the capabilities of Demand Response. Such 
specifications shall include the participation of aggregators.” 
 
The 5th of June 2014 marked the end of the transposition period of the EED.  
Article 15.8 therefore requires that regulators, TSOs and DSOs, adjust the technical modalities and 
requirements for market participation in line with participants capabilities and the needs of the 
market.  These modalities fall into 3 general categories.  Though they usually are developed in cycles, 
they are all required for healthy market growth.  
                                           
 
1
 Directive 2012/27/EU, on energy efficiency, amending Directives 2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EU and repealing Directives 
2004/8/EC and 2006/32/EC, 25 October 2012. 
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Technical modalities which:  
1. Authorise Demand Response, allowing consumer load to compete alongside generation assets 
in all markets; 
2. Legalise and enable aggregation in all markets; 
3. Adjust technical modalities in all markets, in line with consumer capabilities and market 
requirements.  
 
Member State reviews 
In reviewing the progress of Member States according to these three modalities, a uniquely 
European Model emerges.  In successful cases, TSOs and regulators are using the deregulated and 
competitive market structures to empower providers and encourage market entry for consumers.  
Therefore, while a significant portion of EU Member States have yet to begin their regulatory review 
with any seriousness, those who have looked to enable Demand Response are succeeding despite 
continued challenges.  This bodes well for the future of the market, particularly when we consider 
the overcapacity of generation in some Member States. The fact that consumer load is still able to 
compete successfully and reliably under these conditions is positive. 
However, further direction and clarity is required on the part of the Commission. A main finding of 
this report is that many national regulators see the process of opening markets to Demand 
Response, as complex and confusing.  For example, two repeated questions were:  
 Is it enough that Demand Response is not specifically forbidden?  
 Is it enough that retailers can aggregate consumer load?  
As one regulator from an inactive Member State remarked ‘But Demand Response is not illegal here, 
and no one wants it anyway – why bother with all these little technical changes? They are a lot of 
work.’  
 
The status of Member States regulation concerning Demand Response can be divided into three 
groups. 
First are those who have yet to seriously engage with Demand Response reforms. Obligatory 
provisions of the relevant EU Directives may have been transposed in name but not in fact. 
Therefore while Demand Response may be ‘legal’, the Member States have not for example, 
adjusted their regulatory structures to enable demand side resources to participate in the markets, 
begun the process of defining the role of the independent aggregator and DR service provider, or 
adjusted critical technical modalities.  The result is that though Demand Response may be ‘legal’, 
there is no defined means for aggregators to offer the demand side resources, no way to measure or 
pay for the resources and no markets in which consumers or aggregators can sell the resources.   
Regulators in Portugal, Spain, Italy, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Hungary, the 
Baltics, Cyprus and Malta are in this group. However, Italy is aware of the issue and is undergoing a 
regulatory review, and the status may change within 2017-18. Greece has created one auction-based 
program for large consumers and intends to open the market further. Poland has created two 
programs, however these are not successful due to the low and controlled prices offered by the TSO.  
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The second group of Member States are in the process of enabling Demand Response through the 
retailer only. They limit aggregators to the role of service providers to retailers rather than 
independent parties providing independent offerings to consumers. This is an important choice – as 
this limits market offerings to those that are positive for the retailers in a given country – which may 
not be the same as those which would benefit the consumer. It also means the customer will not be 
offered a clear value for their flexibility - rather they will receive this bundled with their electricity 
bill.  They either need to reject the entire package or accept. However it is difficult or impossible for 
them to know what they are rejecting/accepting as they will very rarely (if ever) have a fully 
transparent offer2. Germany, the Nordics, the Netherlands and, to a certain degree Austria, are in 
this group.  Germany is undergoing a regulatory review and this situation may change in 2017-18. 
Austria has not defined the role of the aggregator but has made some significant progress in 
adjusting technical modalities. 
 
The third group of Member States enables both Demand Response and independent aggregation. 
This includes Belgium, France, Ireland and the UK. Belgium and France have both defined the roles 
and responsibilities around independent aggregation.  These markets have also made progress 
adjusting technical modalities and market entry requirements in order to facilitate consumer 
participation.  Therefore though further work is required, the number of MW of demand side 
resources more than tripled between 2013 and 2015 (according to available data).   
  
 
Conclusions and recommendations 
Despite the barriers remaining today, in 2013 Europe was almost entirely shut to Demand Response 
and today consumers have the opportunity to participate in Demand Response programs in multiple 
Member States in accordance with the requirements of the EED.  Europe’s energy market is unique, 
and there is the opportunity to create unique solutions, combining competitive market structures 
with the decarbonisation agenda.  
  
Three main sets of regulatory initiatives would significantly facilitate this development:  
 
1. The roles and responsibilities of the independent aggregator should be defined: Regulation 
should ensure the consumer’s right to freely choose their service provider. The standardised process 
between BRP/retailer and the aggregator is a significant enabler as it creates the framework by 
which aggregators can have a clear path to market. This framework includes3:  
o Volumes: Standardised processes for assessment of the traded energy4.  
                                           
 
2
 This is not because the retailer will be looking to ’hide’ value – rather the customer’s engagement in DR impact’s several 
aspects of the retailer’s business model, their balancing costs, their company earnings from generation, network [retailer 
do not generate nor distribute] tariffs.  The DR offering is therefore joined to the cost of the customer’s electricity.  It is not 
transparent and separated.   
3 
A similar model was proposed by the Smart Grids Taskforce EG3  
4 
i.e. the transfer of energy between the BRP’s and the aggregator’s balancing groups following a Demand Response 
dispatch. 
 vi 
 
o Data Exchange: A clear definition of what data needs to be provided to the BRP 
through the TSO, to ensure both the aggregator and the BRP can fulfil their 
obligations whilst not having to share commercially sensitive information. 
o Governance structure: An appeals process and an appeals body, in case any issues 
need to be resolved. 
A second important consumer enabler is to define and allow full Aggregation of 
Consumer Load:  Qualification for participating in a market should be prequalified and 
measured at the aggregated pool level, rather than for each consumer individually. This 
is an important enabler as it allows the aggregated pool of consumer load to be treated 
as a single resource, maximising the group’s joint potential. It also allows the aggregator 
to act as mediator for the consumer, protecting them from onerous and complex 
technical pre-qualification measures. It is questionable that some TSOs in Europe are 
capable of accepting pre-qualification of the pooled load and others are not. If 4-5 can 
do it the others can as well, and this critical barrier could be removed from all Member 
States. 
 
 
Analysis of compensation of retailers for sourcing costs: The payment of sourcing costs are 
demanded by utilities and accepted by many aggregators. Sourcing cost refers to the energy the 
retailer bought, which the consumer does not consume because they are participating in Demand 
Response. There is widespread acknowledgement that the retailer loses income through their 
balance responsibilities during a Demand Response activation by an independent aggregator.5  
However the implementation of the sourcing cost payment mechanism in France the past 2 seasons, 
left less than €2,000 total for the participating aggregators and consumers. This indicates that 
particularly in markets where there is a significant energy component (such as wholesale markets) 
this mechanism may do significant damage to consumer’s ability to earn from Demand Response.  
They will have to pay the majority of earnings back to their retailer. Careful review of this issue is 
therefore appropriate.  
 
2) Market design should enable the participation of Demand Response and other distributed 
resources. European market design should enable the participation of Demand Response and other 
distributed resources such as Virtual Power Plants (VPP), to the same degree they now facilitate 
centralized generation units. Design elements include frequent auctions, short time durations (such 
as 15-30 minutes), small minimal bid sizes, and the acceptance of asymmetrical bids.   There is now 
good knowledge of best practice concerning this market design and this should be implemented.  
 
3) Technical modalities enabling Demand Response should be defined: Due to positive 
developments in multiple Member States, the technical modalities needed to enable consumer 
entry into a market are now known and tested.  They should be standardised and replicated across 
Europe. These include registration, prequalification and risk assessment requirements, which are 
proportionate to the resource, appropriate tested baseline methodologies, and appropriate 
measurement and verification requirements.    
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No single Member State has succeeded in incorporating all the elements listed above in their 
markets. However these elements complement each other and bring about a constructive unity. 
They are in fact a repeatable template for realistic and positive enablers of Demand Response and 
Aggregation in Europe.  Together, they use the competitive and dynamic deregulated market 
structures to enable consumer participation.  What is now needed is for these solutions to be 
unified, communicated and replicated across Member States. The European Commission will play a 
critical role in this process.  
 
  
  
 
Chapter 1. Introduction to Demand Response 
 
This report reviews the current status of European Member States’ regulation supporting Demand 
Response and Aggregation in the wholesale, balancing and ancillary electricity markets, as stipulated 
in Article 15 of the Energy Efficiency Directive.  
Demand Response is able to increase the system’s adequacy and to substantially reduce the need 
for investment in peaking generation by shifting consumption away from times of high demand. It 
can act as a cost effective balancing resource for variable renewable generation. Adding stability to 
the system, it lowers the need for coal and gas fired spinning reserves – most running power plants 
burn fuel continuously in order to be ready to supply power at short notice. It furthermore 
decreases the need for local network investments, as it shifts consumption away from peak hours in 
regions with tight network capacity. Demand Response delivers these benefits by providing 
consumers – residential, commercial6 or industrial – with control signals and/or financial incentives 
to adjust their consumption at strategic times. 
 
The Energy Efficiency Directive (2012/27/EU) 7  constitutes a significant step towards the 
development of Demand Response in Europe. 
 
Art. 15. 4 requires Member States to: 
- “Ensure the removal of those incentives in transmission and distribution tariffs that are 
detrimental to the overall efficiency (including energy efficiency) of the generation, 
transmission, distribution and supply of electricity or those that might hamper participation 
of Demand Response, in balancing markets and ancillary services procurement”. 
- “Ensure that network operators are incentivised to improve efficiency in infrastructure design 
and operation, and, within the framework of Directive 2009/72/EC, that tariffs allow retailers 
to improve consumer participation in system efficiency, including Demand Response, 
depending on national circumstances”. 
 
Art. 15.8 of the Directive establishes consumer access to energy markets, either individually or 
through aggregation. In detail the Article states: 
- “Member States shall ensure that national regulatory authorities encourage demand side 
resources, such as Demand Response, to participate alongside supply in wholesale and retail 
markets.” 
- “Subject to technical constraints inherent in managing networks, Member States shall ensure 
that transmission system operators and distribution system operators, in meeting 
requirements for balancing and ancillary services, treat Demand Response providers, 
including aggregators, in a non-discriminatory manner, on the basis of their technical 
capabilities.” 
                                           
 
6
 The term “commercial” is used here to mean all buildings and businesses which are not directly industrial or residential. 
In other words, municipal buildings, SMEs, businesses such as hotels, office spaces, etc.   
7
 Directive 2012/27/EU, on energy efficiency, amending Directives 2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EU and repealing Directives 
2004/8/EC and 2006/32/EC, 25 October 2012. 
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- “Member States shall promote access to and participation of Demand Response in balancing, 
reserves and other system services markets, inter alia by requiring national regulatory 
authorities […] in close cooperation with demand service providers and consumers, to define 
technical modalities for participation in these markets on the basis of the technical 
requirements of these markets and the capabilities of Demand Response. Such 
specifications shall include the participation of aggregators.” 
 
The 5th of June 2014 marked the end of the transposition period of the EED.  
 
This report therefore provides a regulatory review of all 28 EU Member States and their application 
of Article 15 concerning Demand Response.   
 
The requirements of Art 15 can be broken down into four areas:  
1) Demand Response should be encouraged to participate alongside supply within the wholesale, 
balancing and ancillary services markets; 
2) TSOs and DSOs must treat demand response providers, including aggregators, in a non-
discriminatory manner and on the basis of their technical capabilities; 
3) National regulatory authorities should define technical modalities for the participation in these 
markets on the basis of participants’ capabilities; 
4) These specifications should include enabling aggregators. 
 
Member State regulation and practices have therefore been reviewed on the basis of these four 
criteria, 1. Is Demand Response encouraged to participate in the wholesale market, 2. Are balancing 
and ancillary services markets open, 3. Have TSOs, DSOs and regulators adjusted technical 
requirements in accordance with participants’ capabilities - in order to allow them to participate, 4. 
Do these technical adjustments include enabling aggregators?  
 
 
Demand response definition and types 
Demand response is a tariff or programme established to incentivise changes in electric 
consumption patterns by end-use consumers in response to changes in the price of electricity over 
time, or to incentivise payments designed to induce lower electricity use at times of high market 
prices or when grid reliability is jeopardised.  
 
Demand Response programmes can be categorised into two groups: 
 
A) Explicit Demand Response is the type of DR referred to in Article 15. In this program, demand 
competes directly with supply in the wholesale, balancing and ancillary services markets through the 
services of aggregators or single large consumers. This is achieved through the control of aggregated 
changes in load traded in electricity markets, providing a comparable resource to generation, and 
receiving comparable prices.  
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Consumers receive direct payments to change their consumption upon request (i.e., consuming 
more or less). Consumers can earn from their flexibility in electricity consumption individually or by 
contracting with an aggregator. The latter can either be a third-party aggregator or the customer’s 
retailer.  
 
B) Implicit Demand Response (sometimes called “price-based”) refers to consumers choosing to be 
exposed to time-varying electricity prices or time-varying network tariffs (or both) that partly reflect 
the value or cost of electricity and/or transportation in different time periods and react to those 
price differences depending on their own possibilities (no commitment). These prices are always 
part of their supply contract.  Implicit DR does not therefore allow a consumer to participate 
alongside generation in a market.  
 
It is important to note that neither form of Demand Response is a replacement for the other. 
Many customers participate in Explicit Demand Response through an aggregator, and at the same 
time, they also participate in an Implicit Demand Response programme, through more or less 
dynamic tariffs, such as a day/night tariff. The requirements and benefits of each are different and 
build on each other. The two are activated at different times and serve different purposes within the 
markets. They are also valued differently. While consumers will typically receive a lower bill by 
participating in a dynamic pricing programme, they will receive a direct payment for participating in 
an Explicit Demand Response programme.  
 
Explicit Demand Response provides a valuable and reliable operational tool for system operators to 
adjust load to resolve operational issues. Implicit Demand Response, (dynamic pricing) does not 
allow a customer to participate in the balancing or ancillary services markets, or in most existing 
capacity markets. It will also not allow for regional demand-side services for TSOs and DSOs, and it 
does not provide the system as a whole with a dispatchable resource.  
 
For this – it is critical that Demand Response activation is separated from the supply contract. This 
means that the offering is separated from the customer’s electricity price.  
 
On the other hand, Explicit Demand Response does not have the same market reach as a retailer-
enabled dynamic pricing programme. Both forms are therefore required to allow all consumers to 
fully participate and benefit from their flexibility. However, the focus of this paper is on Explicit 
Demand Response as outlined in Article 15.8. 
 
The role of the aggregator 
The separation of the supply contract – or the customer’s electricity price requires a new role – the 
role of the aggregator.  
 
An aggregator is a service provider who operates – directly or indirectly – a set of demand facilities 
in order to sell pools of electric loads as single units in electricity markets.  The service is provided 
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separately from any supply contract8. The aggregator – a service provider who may or may not also 
be a retailer of electricity – represents a new role within European electricity markets, but is well 
established in the USA, Australia, South Korea and Japan.  
 
Most consumers do not have the means to trade directly into the energy markets because, for 
example, they are too small to manage the complexity. They require the services of an aggregator to 
help them participate. Aggregators pool many different loads of varying characteristics and provide 
backup for individual loads as part of the pooling activity, increasing the overall reliability and 
reducing risk for individual participants. They create one “pool” of aggregated controllable load, 
made up of many smaller consumer loads, and sell this as a single resource. These loads can include 
electric heating and cooling, fans, water boilers, grinders, smelters, water pumps, freezers, etc.  
 
 
The Retailer Business Model and Demand Response 
Aggregation services provided by an independent player or a retailer are a necessity for creating 
explicit DR programs. However, there are certain business model factors which can make it difficult 
for many retailers to provide these services.  These can be broken into two categories, the retailer’s 
potential conflict of interests concerning DR and the required changes in business model.   
 
Demand Response is outside the expertise area of a retailer. It is a highly specialised service offering 
centred largely on knowledge of heating and cooling systems, industrial process, and marketing.  To 
be successful, retailers must either outsource this expensive expertise or hire and train new staff - 
they will not have these resources in-house.  Added to this, Demand Response disturbs their existing 
revenue streams from generation and balancing. For example, retailers who own generation assets, 
may earn an important part of their annual returns when prices are high. They also charge the large 
(and small) consumers for taking on their balancing risk – if they provide demand response they 
lower their income from generation, as well as the income from providing protection against 
balancing costs9.  
 
Some retailers do rollout Demand Response programs, (and do this well, EDF, E.ON, Dong Energy 
and Helsinki Energy being three examples). As in other competitive markets, such as Victoria, 
Australia and New York, there are also small independent retailers - who do not own generation 
assets - now emerging in Europe. A portion of these have made Demand Response a core part of 
their business model10. However, truly independent retailers, which are not owned by municipalities 
                                           
 
8
 An exception: A retailer may aggregate and automate their consumer’s load in order to manage their own balancing risk, 
along with generation assets.  The consumer may therefore not receive a direct payment but only a lower electricity cost.  
That said their load will be used in the same way by the retailer as a generation asset.   
9
 When a customer receives a flat electricity price- they do so because the retailer has taken on the balancing risk (the risk 
that wholesale prices may go higher than planned). This is a form of insurance for the customer.  Just as an insurance 
company will not want their clients and competitors to know what they earn off of the insurance premiums, the retailer 
may not want consumers to know what they earn from taking on the balancing risk.   
10
 The wholesale market structures (except in the Nordics), insurance requirements, balancing requirements, data 
requirements, registration requirements plus most of the technical barriers that face aggregators, also face small retailers 
providing DR. A retailer business is also more expensive to establish, an aggregation business requires €5-7 million, a 
retailer at least €15-€20 million and they will continue to have issues of scale. Today, they do not have a single group 
representing their interests in Brussels, likely due to their small size and the difficult business model. This is unfortunate as 
their needs would require support. 
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and do not own their own generation assets, serve a tiny proportion of European load (estimated at 
less than 2%).   
 
To date, the activity of these retailers alone has not created market momentum or a positive cycle 
of investment in any competitive market globally. Without aggregators, the programs stay small and 
subordinate to generation assets. This is why the role of the independent aggregator is important.  
 
The upfront costs, the risk of failure and the decrease in known and trusted revenue streams means 
that a retailer will not engage in Demand Response easily. Established retailers who do engage 
seriously in Demand Response do so because they face at least one of three challenges:  
1. A total collapse of wholesale market price, removing the value of their generation portfolio. 
However, this involves destroying the market signal. (A situation faced by E.ON).  
2. Ownership of an inflexible generation fleet, such as nuclear or wind, which drives up balancing 
costs and does not provide the retailer with a means of earning from exceptionally high prices. 
(A situation faced by EDF and Dong Energy)  
3. Threats from outside independent aggregators, who create market momentum, a sense of 
competition over services and who raise consumer awareness.  
 
When a retailer states that, dynamic tariffs, feedback programs or Demand Response programs 
provide no positive business model – this is probably accurate. There may be no viable business 
model for the retailer. What may not be accurate is that these same programs would create no 
benefit for industrial, commercial or residential consumers.  
 
Clarifying the role of the independent aggregator is therefore an important enabler of consumer 
engagement and the healthy growth of market competition around Demand Response services in a 
Member State. An aggregator can only succeed when their customers succeed and benefit from 
Demand Response. Competition between participants, aggregators and retailers, therefore spurs 
healthy competition in Demand Response services for customers and creates substantial volumes of 
flexibility. For example, the latest PJM Market Activity Report on Demand Response (from August 
2015) shows that 82% of Demand Response capacity in PJM comes from independent aggregators11. 
This trend has been increasing over the last few years. The shares are similarly high in other 
jurisdictions that have mature Demand Response markets, such as Western Australia, New Zealand 
or other US interconnections (e.g., New England and New York). 
  
                                           
 
11
 PJM, 2015, Demand-Response Operation Market activity report August 2015; PJM calls aggregators Curtailment Service 
Providers (CSPs). 
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Chapter 2. Methodology  
 
Below is an overview of the elements used to analyse the current status of Member State regulation 
concerning the application of Article 15.8. 
The technical modalities required for Demand Response 
Article 15.8 requires that regulators, TSOs and DSOs, adjust the technical modalities and 
requirements for market participation in line with participants capabilities and the needs of the 
market.  These modalities fall into 3 general categories.  Though they usually are developed in 
cycles, they are all required for healthy market growth.  
 
Technical modalities which:  
4. Authorise Demand Response, allowing consumer load to compete alongside generation assets 
in all markets; 
5. Legalise and enable aggregation in all markets; 
6. Adjust technical modalities in all markets, in line with consumer capabilities and market 
requirements.  
This report has reviewed the following modalities within each Member State. 
 
1. Authorization of demand-side resources to compete alongside supply 
Authorisation is provided through a specific set of rules for each market, delineating how load 
participates. This condition is far from being fulfilled in the majority of EU Member States. In fact, in 
the majority of national electricity markets, demand-side resources are not allowed to participate, or 
they are allowed to participate in only one programme.  
 
Delineation Elements:  
Generators providing resources are pre-qualified, measured and paid. They also pay penalties if 
they do not supply according to contract. These same structures are required for Demand Response 
resources as well, if they are to participate alongside supply.  
 
A. Prequalification, measurement and verification protocols must be defined. 
They need to ensure reliable delivery of demand-side services in a manner that will still enable 
strong resource development.  Several Member States claimed that they had legalised Demand 
Response but they had not developed any methods for pre-qualifying, measuring, communicating 
with or paying providers. 
 
- Fair and transparent baseline methodologies should be publicly available. The volume of 
demand variation being sold into the market is assessed against a baseline. Volumes of 
demand-side flexibility are calculated as the difference between what the consumers normally 
consume (the baseline) and their actual measured consumption during the dispatch, measured 
using appropriate metering.  If no baseline methodology is developed, consumers cannot be 
paid for what they provide.  
- Pre-qualification, measurement and verification processes should be defined and take place 
at the aggregated level. It is important that the pre-qualification and communication protocols 
imposed are between the system operator and the aggregator.  This saves the individual 
consumer from having to sustain the same administrative and measurement burden of a 
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centralised generator and is a key element of adjusting technical modalities in accordance with 
the capabilities of participants.  
- Payment criteria, volumes and values should be transparent and based on open and fair 
competition. For similar services delivered to the system, meeting the requirements of the 
market, compensation for Demand Response payments should be commensurate with those 
services delivered by generation12.  
- The market structures should reward and maximise flexibility and capacity in a manner that 
provides investment stability. The market structures should value and pay for flexibility. This 
may entail availability payments, a guaranteed number of activations during the year or some 
other form of reliable payment. These should create investment stability to allow for the 
building of new resources designed to be available at short notice and for short periods of time. 
Ideally, market participants should be paid according to the Pay as Cleared (PAC) principle, to 
allow for the most competitive outcomes, as stated today within the European Network Codes. 
- Penalties for non-compliance should be defined, fair and should not favour one resource over 
the other. Penalties needed to ensure reliability, so both supply-side and demand-side 
resources should be penalised for non-compliance. That said, penalty calculations for each may 
need to be differentiated depending on the market and the risk posed.  
 
B. Enable Aggregators  
In order to allow aggregators to participate, a Member State must define roles and responsibilities 
around aggregation providers.  Several Member States have allowed aggregated load to be sold in 
the market but have not defined the roles and responsibilities of those selling them.  This by default 
means that only retailers are able to provide these services to consumers.   To enable independent 
aggregators to enter the market in a safe and scalable manner, it is critical that the role and 
responsibilities of these new entrants are clarified. In particular, it is important that the relationships 
between retailers, BRPs, and independent aggregators are clear, fair, and allow for fair competition.  
 
Main principles and starting point of clarification of roles and responsibilities:13  
First principle of competitive market design: To promote demand-side flexibility, a market design 
should guard consumer interests and create a level playing field for all competitors. Consumers that 
wish to generate revenue from their flexibility should be able to choose freely between all market 
options and available service providers. They should not be restricted to using a service provider that 
is tied to or approved of by their retailer. 
 
For this to happen, the aggregation service provider must be able to operate independently from the 
consumer’s BRP/retailer, which is potentially its competitor who may block their market entry14. 
                                           
 
12
 An added issue: In many European Member States today, generation resources have access to the markets at an 
embedded guaranteed cost through a longstanding bilateral agreement with the TSO or retailer.  This can result in 
suppressing the price for new entrants both retailers and aggregators. 
13
 The Smart Grids Taskforce, EG3 has also developed a similar model.  
14
 The French competition authority, in its opinion 13-A-19, declares that the prior agreement to be given by a BRP for the 
participation on a market by an aggregator was not compliant with article 14.6 of the directive “Services” 2006.123/EC (12 
December 2006). This article prohibits “the direct or indirect involvement of competing operators, including within 
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Therefore, standardised frameworks and processes should be put in place to enable the smooth 
functioning of the market and at the same time protect the customer-aggregator relationship. Below 
is a short overview of the structure of this standardised process between the consumer’s BRP and 
the independent aggregator.  
 
Content of the standardised framework: There are four elements to be defined through a 
standardised framework to allow the market to function reliably while allowing consumers to 
choose their aggregation service provider. Standardisation sets out “the rules of play”:  
 
- Volumes: Standardised processes for assessment of the traded energy between the BRP and the 
aggregator15.  
- Compensation: The retailers’ BRP is required to buy, or source, electricity in advance in order to 
maintain balance.  When Demand Response activation takes place, they may lose this 
purchased energy, as the consumer will not consume as planned.  This may not be significant in 
a balancing market but it will be in the wholesale markets. Some Member States such as France 
have decided that the aggregator should pay the BRP for this energy.  Others are still looking for 
other solutions.  However, a solution is absolutely critical to allow independent aggregation 
and it should be fair to both the retailer, who is fulfilling its required role, and the consumer or 
aggregator looking to enter a market. Any price formula should reflect as closely as possible the 
average sourcing costs of the energy transferred.  
- Data exchange: A clear definition of what data needs to be exchanged between BRP, aggregator 
and TSO to ensure all can fulfil their obligations whilst not having to share commercially 
sensitive information. 
- Governance structure: An appeals process and an appeals body, in case any issues need to be 
resolved. 
 
Different adjustment mechanisms to address the above situation have been trialled in a few EU 
member states and implemented in international markets. It is important that settlement 
procedures are fair, standardised and well defined by the regulator and TSO in order to protect 
the financial interests of all parties16 
 
C. Adjust technical modalities in-line with participants’ capabilities 
The third set of criteria assesses whether the participation requirements (technical modalities) in the 
electricity markets enable access by a range of resources, including demand-side resources. 
 
                                                                                                                                   
 
consultative bodies, in the granting of authorisations or in the adoption of other decisions of the competent authorities, 
with the exception of professional bodies and associations or other organisations acting as the competent authority; this 
prohibition shall not concern the consultation of organisations, such as chambers of commerce or social partners, on 
matters other than individual applications for authorisation, or a consultation of the public at large”. It is also important to 
note that if the consumer’s retailer owns generation assets, the consumer’s demand side flexibility is also a competitor to 
the retailer’s supply side generation. 
15
 Transfer of energy between the BRP’s and the aggregator’s balancing groups following a Demand Response dispatch. 
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While genuine system constraints and security concerns must be respected, many different 
product/programme participation requirements were historically designed around the specifics of 
generators by necessity. Today these narrow criteria are no longer justifiable because they block 
low-cost demand-side resources, and hence artificially inflate procurement costs. For example, a 
system’s physical need for reserves typically requires the resource to be available for between ½-2 
hours. However, the market participation requirements may state that load must be available for 12 
to up to 16 hours. This fits the requirements of coal-fired generation, which operates most 
efficiently for extended periods of time at minimal incremental cost once the start-up costs have 
been incurred, but it does not reflect the actual system need. Markets should be designed in a 
granular manner, in order to enable the full range of resources to enter.   
 
The technical modalities reviewed in this research reflect the elements, which constitute product 
design. They also capture the main barriers facing Demand Response in markets today:  
 
- Competitive framework: the market becomes significantly more competitive when auctions are 
held often encouraging participation in a transparent manner.  This also supports demand side 
resources as a consumer may be available one month or one week but not be able to guarantee 
availability for an entire year.  
- The required size of a bid: bidding size requirement should be small in order to open markets 
to new entrants. A consumer or aggregator may need to provide up to 50 MW to participate in 
a market (a total barrier) – rather than the more realistic 3-5 MW or less.  
- Duration of the call: Extended duration or availability requirements are a barrier for consumers 
and do not represent the technical requirements of markets. Therefore the length of time a 
participant should be required to adjust consumption should be as short as possible.  
- Frequency of activations/short recovery periods: depending on the type of market, consumers 
require time to rest between activations.  
- Provide the option of asymmetric bidding: few consumers can increase and decrease 
consumption equally. A requirement for symmetrical bids acts as a significant market barrier to 
consumer participation. In Member States where the TSO is willing to enable Demand 
Response, asymmetrical bids are allowed. 
 
The technical modalities describing participation rules of the different products/programmes should 
allow a range of technologies to participate, taking into account their different characteristics, while 
ensuring that the system’s needs are met. In a competitive market, the TSO and regulator have the 
responsibility to enable a range of resources to compete on an equal footing – not only selected 
forms of generation. Each Member State has individual market structures and therefore there is not 
a one-size-fits-all set of perfect market products.  
 
As can be seen from the list above, enabling Demand Response is a significant development in any 
Member State’s regulatory framework. It requires that the regulator and TSO decide to make 
consumer participation and market liquidity a priority.  It also requires respect for providers and the 
willingness to engage with their representatives. It will take time to bring political theory in line with 
regulatory reality.  
 
The results of the Member State analysis are provided in Chapter 2’s Member State reports.   Within 
the Conclusions a synopsis of the results is provided, including an overview of best practices and 
suggestions for next steps.   
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Clarification of market structures 
The wholesale markets are by far the largest and (theoretically) most liquid markets in any given 
Member State. Here Retailers look to buy sufficient energy either from their own generators or from 
the market, to supply their customers.  In order to maintain balance they should buy the same 
amount of energy for any given time period, as their customer’s will consume.   
This is part of their balance responsibility and each retailer will therefore have such a balance 
responsible party (BRP)17.  Wholesale markets include futures markets but also intra-day and spot 
markets, where energy is bought and sold 15-60 minutes prior to the time of consumption.  After 
this point there is ‘gate closure’. The wholesale market activity is at an end and the TSO is 
responsible to maintain balance from the time of gate closure to the micro second prior to 
consumption.  This is done through balancing markets and ancillary services.   
Retailers may be required to pay the TSO for these services according to the amount that they were 
off in their balancing calculations. However the company’s generators may also earn from providing 
balancing and ancillary services to the TSO. This mechanism is different in different Member States, 
but the principle remains the same.  
ENTSO-E writes: ‘Balancing refers to the situation after markets have closed (gate closure) in which a 
TSO acts to ensure that demand is equal to supply, in and near real time. 
Efficient balancing markets ensure the security of supply at the least cost. An important aspect of 
balancing is the approach to procuring ancillary services. Ancillary services markets provide a range 
of capabilities ‘which TSOs contract so that they can guarantee system security. These include black 
start capability (the ability to restart a grid following a blackout); frequency response (to maintain 
system frequency with automatic and very fast responses); fast reserve (which can provide 
additional energy when needed); the provision of reactive power and various other services.’ 
Explicit Demand Response is first established within the balancing and ancillary services markets.  
These provide the best investment security and prices.  The types of services required by the TSO 
also fit a consumer’s capabilities well.  Therefore this paper pays close attention to these markets.  
 
Information gathering 
Information was collected through desk research of regulation and market results, and expert 
interviews with the respective National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs), TSOs, DSOs, retailers, 
aggregators, technology providers, consulting firms, research organisations and universities. The 
findings therefore reflect the experience of the players on the ground.  
 
Information concerning the technical modalities for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, the UK, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and Sweden were sourced primarily 
from the SEDC’s (Smart Energy Demand Coalition) Demand Response Map of 2015. This information 
and information for the other Member States was updated through expert interviews, the JRC 
survey, presentations given by market participants and complimentary desk research. 
  
                                           
 
17
 An independent aggregator must also contract with a BRP in order to maintain their own balance.  
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Chapter 3. The status of Demand Response in 2014: a 
summary of the JRC report 
 
The European Commission Joint Research Center (JRC) has been active in the preparation and 
monitoring of the Energy Efficiency Directive since 2008. A number of reports, workshops and 
trainings have been organised in support of the Directive. In this line, the JRC also contributed to the 
supervision and monitoring of Article 15 of the EED, in particular through workshops in 2010 and 
2013, and reports, such as the report in 2014: “Demand Response status in Member States: 
Mapping through real case experiences” (hereinafter referred to as “DR status report 2014”), a JRC 
Technical Report, authored by Isabella Maschio, Paula Rey Garcia, and Paolo Bertoldi. 
 
The DR status report 2014 drew a picture of the status of DR in the MS as of 2014 building on 
information collected at the workshop “Demand Response status in Member States: mapping 
through real case experiences” co-organised by DG ENER.C3 and DG.JRC.F7 in Brussels on 15 
October 201318, the “Symposium” organised by RAP and SEDC in Brussels on 6 November 2013, and 
extended with further collection of open source information by the authors. 
The report aimed at understanding the success and future scenario of Demand Response in Europe 
based on the analysis of a few representative case studies. The study focused on relevant barriers 
and achievements, and provided recommendations to further support the deployment of Demand 
Response. 
The study looked at 14 European Member States, some of which were identified as frontrunners, 
while others also had started the process of integrating DR in the electricity system and markets by 
2014, even before the transposition deadline. The reviewed countries were: Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, 
Poland, Spain and Italy 
The recommendations covered three main areas:  
 Integrating more DR in national electricity markets at all levels, keeping in mind the 
ongoing construction of the IEM; 
 Building a positive business case for all the actors involved in the DR value chain; 
 Ensuring a smooth transition toward a new market scheme that fully integrates all DR 
potential. 
 
Integrating DR in national markets and in the IEM 
At national level, few Member States clearly engaged in the process of a wide integration of Demand 
Response in the electricity markets as of 2014. Some markets were fully open, in others some DR 
products were allowed to participate.  
To enhance this situation, the following recommendations were formulated in the report:  
1. As it appears from the UK experience, an open and competitive market is a prerequisite to more 
integration of DR. Therefore enforcing the full implementation of the Third Energy Package is seen 
as a precondition. 
                                           
 
18
http://iet.jrc.ec.europa.eu/energyefficiency/workshop/workshop-demand-response-status-member-states-mapping-
through-real-case-experiences 
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2. As of 2014, none of the Member States had fully integrated DR in all national electricity 
markets, including wholesale, balancing and ancillary services: either the regulation did not allow for 
it, or the regulation allowed DR to participate, but the roles and rules were not clearly defined, or 
the business case for DR was not sufficiently attractive. Recommendations for improvement 
included:   
 adapting market products to DR: this could be carried out in two phases. In a first phase, 
specific DR products are developed, with requirements on size, duration and availability that 
are adapted to DR; in a second phase, products could be neutral and adapted to the generation 
as well as the demand side. Leverage on DR products that were used in past DR programmes 
also appears to be a valid option. 
 adapting the regulation to DR products: this implies removing barriers, and eventually 
introducing quotas to (artificially) increase DR participation in a first phase.  
 enabling and empowering the demand side: in order to enhance the active participation of final 
customers, the roll out of smart meters will be key for a diffuse participation of all sectors; 
additionally, clear and simple modalities for participation and a positive business case for end 
users are needed.  Empowering intermediaries such as aggregators and service providers will 
also be a powerful means for reaching out a maximum number of customers. Finally, regulatory 
measures should be complemented with pilot project or information campaigns for the 
targeted groups. 
3. While progressing toward the integration of DR in the national electricity markets, the European 
dimension and the IEM should be taken into account. This implies referring to ENTSO-E network 
codes when defining specific products (e.g. the network balancing codes for products in the 
balancing market). Furthermore, research into convergence trend of national regulations and 
network tariffs could benefit the DR integration process at EU level. Similarly, investigating common 
definitions for electricity market products, including DR products, could bring benefits toward 
integrating DR at European level.  
 
A business case for DR 
Very often the unclear definition of roles and rules and of a concrete business case was perceived 
as obstacle to the wide involvement of DR in the market in 2014. The overall business community, 
and in particular private and public financing institutions, should join the DR community in outlining 
the economic benefits that DR can bring to the whole value chain.  
To overcome the above, the following recommendations were spelt by the DR status report 2014: 
1. More research is needed to define a business case that is positive for all the actors involved in the 
DR value chain, who should first of all be able to make independent decisions, including DR 
"providers", in the residential, commercial and industrial sector; DR beneficiaries, that need to be 
clearly identified, and intermediaries, such as aggregators, service providers, and others. 
2. The business case shall be solid but flexible, as it may need to adapt to a rapidly evolving context 
where regulation, tariff schemes, other programmes incentivising RES or infrastructure expansion, 
could have an impact, in addition to expected or unexpected  technological changes (smart meters 
roll out) and their consequences (data handling issues e.g.)  
3. Transnational considerations should also be taken into account as the building of the IEM will 
imply more cross-border exchanges at all levels. 
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The approach to a new market design 
The market (re)design that allows for accommodating all the flexibility potential of DR, needs to be 
planned with attention. Parties involved shall include NRAs, the DR community and it might also 
involve as suggested "an ad hoc technical entity". The whole process shall: 
1. Ensure a wide participation of parties involved and stakeholders, include consultations and be 
transparent  
2. Be based on a far-reaching forward-looking planning guaranteeing a regulatory stability that 
attracts financial partners and allows for long term planning of resources. 
3. Adopt a pragmatic and gradual approach, based for example on pilot projects followed by a wider 
deployment. The selected approach should be adaptive and ready to change with the fast evolving 
economic, regulatory and technological environment. European energy systems are undergoing 
substantial adjustments, with for example ageing or nuclear plants being phased out, increased 
renewable energy plants, more distributed energy sources, self-producers, new actors like 
prosumers, EV or storage systems. 
A two-phase approach could firstly encourage the participation of DR in all the markets, with 
dedicated products or quotas and secondly reach a product-neutral market, fully compatible with 
DR. 
4. The design phase shall be coordinated with other programmes in order to reveal synergies, e.g. 
with energy infrastructure or RES support programmes, EE in all sectors. 
5. A smooth integration of all resources, on the demand side as well as on the generation side, and 
at national as well as at European level should be the long term aim. 
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Findings of the DR status report 2014 in respect of Art. 15.4 and Art. 15.8 were summarised in 
Table 1 and Table 2 below. 
 
Table 1. Summary of MS implementation of Art 15.4
19
 (Note: status of 2014) 
N: network 
T: transmission 
D: distribution 
HH: households 
I. industrial 
G: generation 
L: load 
Art 15 (4):  Removal of incentives 
in T and D tariffs that are 
detrimental to efficiency of the 
system and DR 
Network tariffs and regulation 
do not prevent shifting or 
reducing demand (must reflect 
reduction for EE and DR) 
Art 15 (4):  Removal of incentives that might 
hamper participation in balancing market and 
ancillary services provision 
Austria 
NRA: e.control;  
TSO: APG 
Share of Network tariffs paid by: 
20% Generation, 80% Load 
DR is providing Balancing at  Balancing group 
level 
Electricity Market Code fix strict 
prequalification requirements for participation 
of DR in balancing and reserve system. 
 
> APG is  investigating into improved payments 
for negative activations which do not penalise 
demand side resources 
Belgium 
NRA: CREG 
(autonomy is 
questioned); 
TSO: Elia 
Share of Network tariffs: 9% 
generation, 91% load 
TSO contract DR under a reserve programme 
(R1).  
Germany 
NRA: Federal 
Network Agency 
(BNetzA) for larger 
utilities and Regional 
Regulatory 
Authorities for 
smaller utilities;  
TSO: 
Share of Network tariffs: 100% 
load 
 
 
> no penalties should be charged (such as extra 
grid fees) if a provider produces negative 
reserve. 
                                           
 
19
 Sources used: 
[1] SEDC, Demand Response in Europe Today and fulfilment of the Energy Efficiency Directive Art. 15.8 (in press) 
[2] ENTSOE Overview of Transmission Tariffs in Europe: Synthesis 2013; 
[3] ACER-CEER Annual Report on the Results of Monitoring the Internal Electricity and Natural Gas Markets in 2012 
  
15 
 
Denmark 
NRA: Danish Energy 
Regulatory 
Authority;  
TSO: Energinet.dk 
Share of network tariffs: 4% 
generation, 96% load 
Participation of (aggregated) DR is not clear on 
balancing markets. 
DR to compensate wind, DR on Elbas 
(balancing) ; BRP must sign agreement with 
TSO;  
Balancing regulation is  generation-centric but 
not excluding DR 
Demand can be aggregated in a balancing 
group 
Finland 
NRA: Energy Market 
Authority 
TSO: Fingrid 
Share of network tariffs: 15% 
Generation, 85% load 
(Aggregated) DR participates in Balancing 
market (Secondary and Tertiary reserve). Pre-
qualification for Primary Reserve is too 
restrictive 
Ancillary service open to DR and aggregation 
France 
NRA: CRE 
TSO: RTE 
Share of network tariffs: 2% 
Generation, 98% load 
Tertiary Reserve market: requires availability 
24/7 (typical for generation, not adapted to DR) 
 
Ancillary services: Demand Side Replacement 
Reserves, Replacement Reserves and 
Frequency Restoration Reserves are open to DR 
and aggregated DR     
 
Aggregators cannot bid as one single block 
(combining loads) in the Balancing market, but 
separately yes  
Ireland 
NRA:  CER 
Commission for 
Energy Regulation;  
TSO: Eirgrid 
Share of network tariffs: 25% 
Generation,75% load 
Ancillary services not open to DR 
Netherlands 
NRA: Dutch Office of 
Energy Regulation 
(Authority for 
Consumers and 
Markets);  
TSO: Tennet 
Share of network tariffs: 0% 
Generation, 100% load 
DR and aggregation allowed and active in 
balancing market: Secondary Reserve 
(Frequency Restoration Reserve) and Tertiary 
reserve (Replacement reserve in Intraday 
market). Complementary FRR (=Emergency 
power) contracted by TSO Tennet (rarely used) 
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Sweden 
NRA: Sweden Energy 
Agency ;  
TSO: Svenska Krafnet 
Share of network tariffs: 25% 
Generation,75% load 
DR aggregation is allowed, but cannot 
participate independently in the market.  
Aggregated DR present in Peak Load Reserve 
PLR only; non aggregated DR participates in 
Tertiary Reserve and in Regulating Power 
Market (limited). Requirement for Primary and 
Secondary reserve too tight for DR. 
UK 
NRA: OFGEM ;  
TSO: National Grid 
Share of network tariffs:  
TNUoS:  27% Generation,73% 
load 
BSUoS: 50% generation, 50 Load  
 
Poland 
NRA: URE - Energy 
Regulatory Office 
(ERO);  
TSO: PSE 
Share of network tariffs: 0% 
Generation, 100% load 
DR can participate only in Emergency Demand 
Side Reserve (EDSR) programme: BSP must sign 
contract with TSO (no need for contract with 
BRP); min bid 10 MW (barrier);  barriers = 
measurements at individual level and baseline 
definition inadequate; payment is for 
availability and is not incentivising DR 
participation; penalties are not excessive    
Spain 
NRA:CNE Comision 
Nacional de Energia ;  
TSO: REE 
Share of network tariffs: 13% 
Generation, 87% load 
DR has access only to Interruptible Load 
Programme.  
Does not have access to any other ancillary 
services 
Italy 
NRA: AEEG 
TSO: Terna 
 Interruptible Load Programme run by TSO (only 
industrial loads) 
 
DR allowed in Ancillary Services (sheddable 
loads, 15 min), energy remuneration 
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Table 2. Summary of MS implementation of Art 15.8
20
 (Note: status of 2014) 
N: network 
T: transmission 
D: distribution 
HH: households 
I. industrial 
G: generation 
L: load 
Art 15 (8) - 1 
MS>NRA encourage 
DR to participate in 
wholesale and retail 
markets 
Art 15 (8) – 2 
TSO and DSO treat DR, 
including aggregators, in 
a non-discriminatory 
manner; 
Art 15 (8) – 3 
MS promote participation of DR in 
balancing, reserves and services 
markets; TSO and DSO and 
Demand service providers and 
consumers define technical 
modalities for participation in 
markets 
Austria 
NRA: e.control;  
TSO: APG 
DR  is not 
participating in Spot 
Markets  
 
 
 
 
> new regulation 
(2014?) will allow 
(aggregated) DR in: 
day-ahead, intraday, 
capacity 
procurement  
Aggregators not 
considered by regulation 
now. 
 
No different TSO 
treatment between final 
customer and distributor 
 
> 2014, new rules will: 
- allow aggregators to 
become BRP (with 
reasonable 
requirements); BSP will 
need to contract with 
BRP  
-  ensure that high grid 
tariffs for demand are 
not applied on negative 
activation  
- in auctions, contracts 
will be allowed with 
third party (for risk 
transfer) 
 
 
 
 
> 2014, technical modalities will be 
adapted to DR:  
-new auctions of short-term 
products, low competition but 
increasing volumes (and increasing 
balancing costs) 
- minimum bid size reduced from 
10 to 5 MW and activation time 
from 16 to 4h. 
- capacity market 
- new monitoring rules will be 
adapted to DR aggregators 
Belgium 
NRA: CREG 
(autonomy is 
questioned); 
TSO: Elia 
DR contracted by 
TSO. No access to 
Spot Market.  
 
 
 
No access for 
aggregators to the spot 
market (complex 
contracting with 
DSO/BRP) 
> new Bid Ladder 
platform (TSO) should 
> new products will open to DR and 
aggregators the Primary Reserve 
(R1) and the Tertiary Reserve (R3),  
> However, no access for DR to 
Secondary Reserve (R2) and Spot 
Market 
> Some Reserve markets will be 
                                           
 
20
 Sources used: 
[1] SEDC, Demand Response in Europe Today and fulfilment of the Energy Efficiency Directive Art. 15.8 (in press) 
[2] DG ENER-DG JRC, Workshop on Status of Demand Response in Member States, Brussels, 15.10.13 at 
http://iet.jrc.ec.europa.eu/energyefficiency/workshop/workshop-demand-response-status-member-states-mapping-
through-real-case-experiences 
[3] RAP-SEDC, Demand Response Symposium 2013, Meeting Europe's Decarbonization Objectives for 2030, Brussels, 
06.11.13 at http://sedc-coalition.eu/events-2/ 
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> 2014, access to 
specific reserve 
market (R1). 
> Next step will be 
allowing aggregators 
to participate 
allow more market 
players to bid for 
generation and demand 
as well. Simpler. Will 
give access for 
(diffused?) DR to 
Ancillary Services. 
capped for DR 
  
Germany 
NRA: Federal 
Network Agency 
(BNetzA) for 
larger utilities 
and Regional 
Regulatory 
Authorities for 
smaller utilities;  
TSO: 
(Aggregated) DR 
allowed in the 
IntraDay market. 
Minimum bid for all 
reserve programmes 
reduced to 5 MW 
 
> regulation should 
reduce the 
availability period 
required in the 
reserve market from 
12h. 
> prequalification 
requirements should 
be set at the 
aggregated level 
(rather than at 
individual) 
> long acceptance 
process from the 
TSO, could be 
reduced 
(standardization) 
Aggregators can operate 
in balancing market in 
Germany; but barriers 
exist on the retail market 
(getting approval by the 
BRP and also signing 
contracts with Tso, DSO, 
BRP, retailer, consumer) 
 
No different treatment 
between final customer 
and distributor 
DR and aggregated DR allowed in 
Balancing markets. Secondary 
reserve and Tertiary reserve: 
generation-oriented, barriers to 
DR. Interruptible Load programme: 
aggregation is considered, but 
minimum size is 50 MW (barrier). 
Reserves availability requirement is 
12h (barrier). Prequalification 
requirement at consumer level 
(barrier). Baseline methods are not 
standardised, long process to 
measure (barrier). All programmes 
pay for capacity and energy. 
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Denmark 
NRA: Danish 
Energy 
Regulatory 
Authority;  
TSO: Energinet.dk 
DR is allowed, on Day 
Ahead and Intra Day 
market. However, DR 
does not participate 
in Spot Market 
(although allowed) 
BSP cannot access 
the markets 
independently.  
 
>  Products 
requirements could 
be revised 
> participation 
should be 
independent of BRP 
no clear definition of 
roles and responsibilities 
of BSP and BRP 
 
No different TSO 
treatment between final 
customer and distributor 
Aggregated DR is allowed, on Day 
Ahead and Intra Day market.  
On the balancing market, no clear 
definition of roles and 
responsibilities of BSP and BRP for 
DR. 
On the tertiary reserve market: DR 
participates, but not aggregators, 
as DR aggregator (BSP) should 
become a BRP or contract with a 
BRP (that can refuse) 
Tertiary reserve: minimum bid is 
too high (10MW) and manually 
activated 
 
On the Primary Reserve, some heat 
storage (electric boilers at district 
heating plants) participate   
in DK1, Primary reserve: 
requirements are too tight for DR 
(short delivery time and number of 
activations); Secondary Reserve: 
products are not adequate for DR 
(symmetrical bids are market 
barriers) 
in DK2, Primary Reserve 
requirements disqualify DR 
Finland 
NRA: Energy 
Market Authority 
TSO: Fingrid 
(Aggregated) DR 
participate in Spot 
Market  
Aggregator can 
provide service to 
retailer by pooling 
loads in the retailer's 
balancing group, with 
bilateral agreement 
with the retailer.  
Contractual relationship 
aggregators-BRP 
problematic. 
Aggregators play as a 
pool of loads (not 
individual loads): 
enables all size to 
participate. 
Good cooperation 
although no fully clear 
distribution of roles and 
responsibilities BRP-BSP 
 
SEAM and Energia 
Kolmio are only 
2aggregators in FIN 
Ancillary service open to DR and 
aggregation: good participation in 
Frequency Control Reserve and in 
Strategic Reserves. Contract BRP-
Fingrid must be signed to access 
balancing market, paying 
reasonable fees; or aggregator can 
provide service to retailer pooling 
loads in the retailer's balancing 
group. Some products are 
adequate (on Spot MArket, 
Balancing market and Frequency 
Control reserve programme) to DR 
and aggregation; on other 
programme (Primary reserve) not.  
France 
NRA: CRE 
TSO: RTE 
No DR on wholesale 
market, but pilot 
project can lead to 
Different treatment 
between final customer 
and distributor:  
Ancillary services: Limited 
participation because business case 
is not completely clear and 
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opening Day Ahead 
market  
- A DSO directly 
connected to the lowest 
voltage level of a 
transformer that belongs 
to the TSO can use the 
tariff of the highest 
voltage level of this 
transformer. 
- A DSO owning lines of 
the same voltage level as 
the lines of the TSO it is 
connected to benefits 
from a discount. 
- When the actual 
temperatures are very 
low compared to 
average temperatures, 
DSOs may benefit from a 
discount on their 
capacity overrun. 
 
Aggregators cannot bid 
as one single block 
(combining loads) in the 
Balancing market                         
Aggregators: EnergyPool, 
Voltalis, Smart Grid 
Energy, Dalkia and more. 
investments cannot be planned; DR 
must know in advance how much it 
will offer and markets pay for 
energy rather than for capacity                                             
Tertiary Reserve market: requires 
availability 24/7 (typical for 
generation, not adapted to DR) 
 
Legal difficulties between BRP-BSP 
(BSP can aggregate load from only 
one BRP area, and needs bilateral 
agreement with BRP), will be 
clarified with entry into force of 
new law. Consumers with 
curtailment clause in contract 
cannot participate to other DR 
programmes 
 
> 2014: (Aggregated) DR will have 
larger access to markets. 
Frequency Control Reserves and 
Frequency Restoration reserves will 
be open to (aggregated) DR in 
2014; with bid size adapted to DR 
> capacity market open to 
generation and demand (2016).  
Ireland 
NRA:  CER 
Commission for 
Energy 
Regulation;  
TSO: Eirgrid 
Spot Market is open 
to DR: Demand Side 
Unit (DSU) must fulfil 
requirements 
 
DR programme with 
Eirgrid was switched 
off in 2013 to 
incentivise 
participation of DR to 
Spot Market. 
Ancillary services 
closed to DR.  2 DR 
Schemes: Short Term 
Active Response and 
Powersave     
Multiple loads can pool 
to fulfil requirements as 
aggregator 
Aggregators operate as 
service providers for 
Demand side gathered 
to fulfil DSU 
requirements; no need 
of authorization from 
retailer or BRP. DR 
treated as customer's 
unpredictable behaviour. 
Roles and 
responsibilities of 
BRP/BSP need to be 
defined (and risks and 
costs of all parties are 
mitigated and shared). 
Retailer is not charged 
for load curtailment, not 
Ancillary services not open to DR. 2 
DR schemes: STAR and Powersave 
(both only utilisation payment).  
DSU requirements can be 
problematic (size of capacity, ramp 
up and ramp down rates, min and 
max down time, min off time, 
response time). Large potential cut 
off. Multiple loads can pool to fulfil 
requirements as aggregator. 
Payment for availability not for 
utilisation                
 
> review open to allow DR in 
balancing market (Services being 
technology-neutral) 
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required to plan in 
advance.           
2 aggregators registered: 
Activation Energy and 
Dalkia (+ 4 in 
application) 
Netherlands 
NRA: Dutch 
Office of Energy 
Regulation 
(Authority for 
Consumers and 
Markets);  
TSO: Tennet 
Aggregators active in 
Day Ahead and 
Intraday  
Aggregators active in 
Day Ahead, Intraday and 
Balancing markets 
(Secondary and Tertiary 
Reserve).  
Offer services to BRP to 
balance portfolios. Can 
act as BSP and optimize 
imbalances through real 
time dispatch.                                         
4 aggregators: 
Powerhouse, Agro 
energy, Energie Data 
Maarschappij, NL 
Noodvermorgenpool. 
In Secondary Reserve, min bid is 4 
MW (favourable to DR) max 
duration set in bid (generally 10 
min to 5 h).  
In contracted FRR 10 MW min 
(barrier) 
Sweden 
NRA: Sweden 
Energy Agency ;  
TSO: Svenska 
Krafnet 
 In order to participate in 
the balancing market, 
aggregators can: become 
a BRP or contract with 
BRP (BRP can refuse).  
Not independent 
(barrier) 
In Ancillary Services, product 
requirements for Primary and 
Secondary Reserve are too tight for 
DR. Tertiary Reserve has high 
minimum bid (10 MW and 5 MW). 
Low prices and availability 
payments + hydro power 
dominating ancillary services.  
Balancing Markets: measurement 
and verification mechanisms not 
sufficiently defined.  
UK 
NRA: OFGEM ;  
TSO: National 
Grid 
Triad system 
penalising 
consumption in 
peaks; 3 triad periods 
in the year when 
consumers can earn 
money by reducing 
consumption (or 
generating their own) 
Aggregator does not 
require permission of 
retailer to access 
customer; no limitation 
in area. For the BRP: no 
obligation of maintaining 
consumption profile,.5 
DNOs are running trials.  
> Rules will be needed 
for management of 
Ancillary services open to DR:  
Short Term Operating Reserve 
(STOR) no longer for DR, availability 
requirement 24/7 is a barrier; Firm 
Frequency Response and 
Frequency Control Demand 
Management: limited DR. Fast 
Reserves programme require 50 
MW min bid and 2 min response 
time (barrier). Mandatory 
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relationship BRP/BSP.  
 
20 (active?) aggregators 
listed on Ofgem website 
Frequency response and non-
tendered Fast reserve not open to 
DR. 
> Capacity market in 2016; rules 
under definition: no plans for DR, 
rules delayed for 2 years, no limit 
on call and call frequency (barrier), 
very high penalties (twice the 
revenues); Frequency Response 
(FFR, FCDM) require 2-10 sec 
(barrier). Fast Reserve require IT 
system adapted to DR (high cost 
for aggregator) 
Poland 
NRA: URE - 
Energy 
Regulatory Office 
(ERO);  
TSO: PSE 
 
 
 
 
 
> retailers plan to use 
DR to correct 
purchasing errors 
(Intraday trading is 
limited) 
There is no 
differentiation from the 
TSO between final 
consumers and 
distributors but between 
different Points of 
Delivery (PoD). 
 
Aggregation is legal. But 
aggregator must be 
retailer (not 
independent).  
 
 
> Balancing market will be open to 
DR with new rules by Energy 
Regulatory Authority and TSO 
(PSE); min bid 1 MW and 
requirements compatible with DR. 
Pull of loads (with no 
requirement)as an aggregate) 
Spain 
NRA:CNE 
Comision 
Nacional de 
Energia ;  
TSO: REE 
DR cannot access 
wholesale and retail 
market 
Aggregation is allowed.  
No definition of roles 
and rules for BRP-TSO.  
 
 
No different TSO 
treatment between final 
customer and distributor 
DR has access to Interruptible Load 
programme only: 150 participants, 
availability payment, attractive 
(large customers participate), no 
utilization payment, minimum size 
(5MW in peak)  
 
 
> proposal to open balancing 
market to DR (2104-2015) and new 
scheme for emergency power 
> could become auction system led 
by REE (TSO).  
Italy 
NRA: AEEG 
TSO: Terna 
DR can access the 
day ahead and 
intraday market 
Smart meters rolled out 
but business case for 
aggregation (and 
aggregators) not clear 
DR in the form of Interruptible 
Load programme 
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Chapter 4. EED Art. 15 and MS implementation according to 
NEEAPs 
In order to accelerate the pace towards the full deployment of the Demand Response's potential, 
the recent Energy Efficiency Directive (EED) 2012/27/EU, include specific provision and significant 
actions in support to Demand Response.  
Art. 15.1 requires that technical or contractual modalities, in particular network tariffs and 
regulations are adapted or changed if necessary in order to allow energy efficiency measures and 
services to be implemented: this implicitly allows the development of Demand Response 
participation in the energy market (without affecting the security of the system). 
Network tariffs and dynamic pricing (Annex XI) can be considered to give clear market signals. 
Art. 15.4 requires that network tariffs and regulation do not prevent TSOs, DSOs or energy retailers, 
from offering measures to shift demand from peak to off-peak or measures inducing customers to 
reduce demand. Moreover, network tariffs must reflect the reductions in network costs brought by 
Demand Response 
Art. 15.8 contains dedicated provisions for effective relationships between different stakeholders, 
allowing for the engagement of the various actors including Demand Response alongside supply in 
wholesale and retail markets. In meeting requirements for balancing and ancillary services, TSOs and 
DSOs must treat Demand Response providers, including aggregators, in a non-discriminatory way: 
Member States engage in the definition of technical modalities to promote access and participation 
of Demand Response in balancing, reserve and other system services markets. By promoting 
dialogue and coordination between the parties, National Regulatory Authorities should also 
guarantee that clear technical rules and operational requirements (tendering, contractual 
arrangements, etc.) are disclosed, based on which DR can take part in the balancing market and in 
other system services. 
Based on the information provided in the NEEAPs, this chapter will illustrate how the provisions on 
Demand Response dictated by Art. 15 of the EED (relevant for energy transformation, transmission, 
distribution & demand response) have been implemented in the EU28 Member States highlighting 
the main actions to support the full deployment of Demand Response. 
Austria 
An overview of the legal basis regarding the network tariffs for electricity and gas is given in the 
report however, Art. 15 is not well covered in the NEEAP. The Austrian Action Plan indicates there is 
no quantity discounts in the tariff system, i.e. customers drive no "benefit" for consuming more 
energy in order to receive "cheaper" network tariffs. Regarding facilitation and promotion of 
Demand Response, all producers and consumers are entitled to take advantage of all supply-side 
and demand-side possibilities in electricity sector. However, no specific measures are mentioned in 
the NEEAP. 
Belgium -Brussels Capital Region 
According to the NEEAP, a study concerning Demand Response opportunities is being performed in 
Belgium and will be concluded in 2015. EED relevant requirements concerning Demand Response 
seems to have been transposed in the regulations in place in the Brussels Capital Region.  Energy 
network tariffs are Federal competence but are currently being moved to the regional level. 
Concerning this point, in the EEAP (Energy Efficiency Action Plan) it is pointed out that the previously 
mentioned project for a Regional Plan on Air, Climate and Energy (PACE) envisages the adoption of 
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progressive energy tariffs aiming at stimulating the efficient use of energy and investments on 
energy efficiency and renewable energies. 
Belgium -Flanders 
The Flemish NEEAP indicates that the authority to determine distribution system tariffs lies currently 
at federal level. For this reason, planned or adopted measures to ensure the removal of barriers to 
efficient generation, transmission, distribution as well as to Demand Response participation are not 
indicated. This same reason is used to justify the fact that planned or adopted measures concerning 
energy tariffs are not indicated. The NEEAP also mentions that system operators are obliged to 
provide an assessment of the energy efficiency potential of their gas and electricity infrastructures. 
Concerning measures specifically enabling Demand Response, a recently approved decree requiring 
VREG to provide incentives for participation of demand-side resources in the supply on the Flemish 
electricity and gas market is just mentioned in the NEEAP.  
Belgium – Wallonia  
The NEEAP mentions that energy tariffs are a Federal competence and that this competence is 
currently being moved to regional level. Measures are foreseen with respect to implementing the 
relevant requirements of the directive. Nevertheless, no details are communicated yet.  The NEEAP 
also states that the Government can only issue guidelines concerning tariff incentives, improved 
efficiency through infrastructures and operation, improved customers participation in systems 
efficiency including Demand Response. The government seems to be willing to implement measures 
related to Demand Response probably also due to the fact that three nuclear plants are currently 
out of service in this region and there is hence a risk for a black-out.  Specific Demand Response 
measures addressing energy intensive industries should however be already in place, for example 
for industries which are requested to reduce their demand through electricity price signals. 
Despite no specific information is provided in this respect, awareness raising campaigns seem to 
have been implemented on this subject. Some information is also provided in the NEEAP concerning 
a decree currently being modified to enable Demand Response. Concerning energy efficiency in 
network design and regulation, general points about the electricity infrastructure and the 
obligations of DSOs are reported in the NEEAP.  
Bulgaria 
Art. 15 is not well covered in the NEEAP.  Only general information is provided, without description 
of the measures and targets. 
Croatia 
There is no special part for measures related to Energy Efficiency Criteria in Designing Network 
Tariffs and Regulations as well as for Facilitating and Stimulating Demand Response.  
Cyprus 
A number of measures which contribute towards a more energy efficient supply sector are 
mentioned in the Cypriot NEEAP. An upgrade of the operating voltage of overhead lines and 
transmission substations from 66 kV to 132 kV has led to a reduction of thermal losses during energy 
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transmission by 75%.  According to the Transmission and Distribution Rules drawn-up by the CTSO21, 
the capacity limit for connection to the medium voltage system is set at 20MW/MVA, beyond which 
connection to the high voltage system is mandatory. The CTSO is obliged by law to encourage the 
penetration of RES in the electricity grid and has also promoted/adopted measures with the aim to 
reduce the distance and/or quantity of the reactive power circulating in the system. Reduction of 
energy losses during energy transfer was also achieved as a result of restriction of the charge on 
transmission lines and power transformers with regard to their charge acceptance capacity.  
Czech Republic 
The Czech Republic is preparing a smart grid action plan that will include further measures to 
facilitate Demand Response. At the present time, the ripple control system is being used for many 
years now as a Demand Response measure. This ripple control system consists in a one-way 
communication system where customers, through a contract authorization, allow the control of 
specific appliances by the distribution system operator allowing this way a very effective load 
management. The ripple control is closely linked to the dual tariff system mentioned above. 
Presently, approximately 46% of the overall household electricity consumption and 31% of the 
overall small-business electricity consumption takes place in the ripple-controlled low tariff. 
Denmark 
Art. 15 is well covered in the NEEAP. Many measures are included in the NEEAP tackling Demand 
Response. In order to promote the use of efficient network and security of supply, price 
differentiation will be permitted from October 2015. A wholesale model has been developed 
where electricity trading companies will buy network services from the grid operators and will sell a 
packaged product 'supplied electricity' to consumers who will not be billed by the grid operators but 
by the electricity trading companies once a month for a total amount.22  Electricity trading 
companies can set their own tariffs without approval from the authorities. Hence consumers can 
freely choose their supplier based on the products they offer.   
Additionally by 2020 grid operators will be obliged to install hourly reading remote electricity 
meters to all electricity end-users.  
Estonia 
Art. 15 is only briefly covered in the Estonian NEEAP, and the extent of the provided information is 
limited. It is generally stated that art. 15 provisions (i.e. Demand Response, analysis of possibilities 
for increasing the energy efficiency of gas and electricity infrastructure) will be transposed in the 
national legislation through the law that is under discussion (OEMA). 
Finland 
The provisions of the Finnish Electricity Market Act from 2013 have been adjusted in 2014 in order 
to accommodate the EED principles so that tariffs cannot include incentives that can alter the overall 
efficiency of electricity generation, transmission, distribution and supply or incentives that can 
compromise the application of Demand Response. The Finnish NEEAP also states that Finland has 
                                           
 
21 Cyprus Transmission System Operator (CTSO) 
22
 Electricity trading companies are not obliged to pass on the grid operators' tariffs to the consumers 
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already implemented clauses a) and c) of Annex XI of the EED regarding the shifting of the load 
from peak to off peak times and real time pricing. However it is not clear what was implemented to 
satisfy these criteria. 
France 
Art. 15 is not well covered in the NEEAP. There is only a small paragraph about smart grids.  No 
information on the transposition of the mandatory elements of the EED are provided. 
Germany 
Art. 15 is not well covered in the NEEAP. It is generally stated that the legal and regulatory 
conditions in the country are not opposed to the use of load management measures and that 
controllable loads form part of the balancing energy market. None of the measures mentioned seem 
to target small consumers and are of little relevance to Demand Response.  
Greece 
For dynamic pricing, it is stated that smart meter installation, which is underway, is a pre-
requisite, while it is possible to manage peak demand by providing multi-band tariff (day/night 
rates). With regard Art. 15 EED the NEEAP indicates that for dynamic pricing, smart meter 
installation which is underway, is a pre-requisite, while it is possible to manage peak demand by 
providing multi-band tariff (day/night rates).  
Hungary 
The currently used tariff systems are in line with Annex XI. The tariff system is cost-reflective of cost-
savings at the demand side because – according to the NEEAP – the investment needs and 
amortisation rate reduces according to the reduction of demand. The tariff system cannot 
incentivise network operators. Based on the current rules, the network operators are not interested 
in increasing demand beyond 1 year timeframe. Time based tariff is hindered by the lack of 
intelligent meters, however a wide scale roll-out of these meters would probably not be cost 
effective. As a future measure, Hungary plans to support intelligent networks and thus distribute 
energy production from renewables. 
Ireland 
The NEEAP indicates that Demand Side Management (DSM) has been a feature of the Irish and 
Northern Irish transmission systems for a number of decades. The types of DSM in operation at 
the moment are: Demand Side Units-DSU23 (consists of one or more individual demand sites that 
can be dispatched by the TSO as if it was a generator), Powersave (scheme encouraging large and 
medium sized customers to reduce their electricity demand on days when total system demand is 
close to available supply), Short Term Active Response (STAR) (electricity consumers are contracted 
to make their load available for short term interruptions). With the advent of smart meters and 
                                           
 
23
 The focus of DSU aggregators is on large scale industrial customers. Dispatch instructions are issued by the Transmission 
System Operator (TSO) at an aggregate level and the DSU Aggregator then coordinates the reduction from the Individual 
Demand Sites. 
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home energy management systems towards 2020 the scope of DSUs to include smaller industrial 
and domestic customers will increase24.  
There are no elements of network tariffs which support the development of Demand Response 
services, although the Transmission Grid Code and Distribution Grid Code working parties are 
considering the issue. 
Italy 
The on-going implementation of policy measures for the elimination of progressive electricity tariffs 
for households is described in the NEEAP as a measure to remove tariff incentives that are 
detrimental to energy efficiency. This policy measure, however, could at most be considered as a 
measure promoting end-use energy efficiency. It is not a measure promoting efficient generation, 
transmission, distribution or supply of energy. The NEEAP makes also a general reference to energy 
tariffs established by taking into account end-users participation in the networks load during peak 
hours. These measures however could only be considered as measures promoting efficiency through 
infrastructure design and operation, as apparently assumed in the NEEAP. NEEAP parts concerning 
measures addressing energy transformation, transmission and distribution are probably the weakest 
parts of the Italian NEEAP. The Italian Authority for Electricity and Gas (AEEG) has a mandate to 
propose possible measures that can be implemented in these sectors. Measures for the promotion 
of Demand Response do not seem to have been described in the NEEAP, either. Apparently, Italian 
policy makers do not yet have a clear picture about possible measures that can be implemented to 
enable Demand Response. Also in this case, the AEEG has received a mandate to investigate how 
this aspect could be addressed. 
Latvia 
Art. 15 is not well covered in the Latvian NEEAP. It is just generally stated that, Network operators 
are incentivised to improve efficiency in infrastructure design and operation by means of a project 
named “Kurzeme Ring, 2nd Phase: 330 kV Transmission Line Grobiņa – Ventspils”, which is intended 
to strengthen the transmission grid in the western region of Latvia. Moreover, it is also planned to 
improve grid links to Europe’s energy backbone through active absorption of the Connecting Europe 
Facility.  
Specific measures for the promotion of Demand Response are not mentioned in the NEEAP. 
Lithuania 
It is generally stated that the legal and regulatory conditions in the country are not opposed to the 
use of load management measures and that controllable loads form part of the balancing energy 
market.  
The National Control Commission for Prices and Energy will lay down the technical modalities for 
Demand Response measures, including the consumer access to such measures and participation of 
providers of Demand Response measures in the electricity market. 
Luxembourg 
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 A major program of smart meters technology and user trials, National Smart Metering Programme (NSMP), showed that 
a National rollout of Smart Meters could lead to reductions in overall electricity and gas consumption, as well as an 8.8% 
reduction in peak-time electricity consumption. The Commission Electricity Regulation is currently evaluating the 
development of time of use tariffs. 
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For the transposition of Art.15 and requirements of the EED in relation to EE in Energy 
transformation, transmission, distribution and Demand Response, Luxemburg is currently 
undertaking amendments of the Law of 1st of August 2007 on the Organization of the Electricity 
market as well as the Law of 1st of August 2007 on Organization of the Gas market. Both laws have 
been in legislative procedure since mid-2014. The Law on Organization of the Electricity market will 
enable the end users to participate on EE of the systems including through the use of Demand 
Response tariffs.  Demand response will be also introduced for wholesale and retail sectors. 
Malta 
In terms of energy efficiency in the retail tariffs, a set of ‘principles’ which inter-alia deal with energy 
efficiency will apply to tariff proposals that Enemalta25 submits for approval. Enemalta has no fixed 
roadmap for the adoption of a smart grid at the moment. Shifting customers’ electricity demand to 
off-peak has not been considered in detail as experience with dual tariff facility offered to industry 
showed no shift of industrial activities to off-peak hours. Energy efficiency in Network Design and 
operation is currently pursued through on-going programmes such as a transformer de-rating 
programme to reduce copper and iron losses where it is found a lower rated transformer suffices, a 
load balancing program, an increase in the number of Low Tension feeders, a low voltage feeder 
load balancing programme and the replacement of corrosion prone aluminium lines by copper leads 
to avoid resistivity losses. 
The Netherlands 
The Electricity and Gas Acts already promote network tariffs that are related to the most effective 
operation and quality of the electricity chain and it is stated that no additional requirements are 
needed due to the lack of distinction between providers of balancing and ancillary services in the 
network tariffs.  It is also stated that dynamic electricity and network tariffs for Demand Responses 
is already implemented and the electricity transmission tariffs depend on the voltage of the 
network to which the customer is connected as well as the capacity of the electricity connection. 
Poland 
In the Polish NEEAP, no measures regarding Energy transformation, transmission, distribution and 
Demand Response were mentioned.  
Portugal 
Art. 15 is not considered in the Portuguese NEEAP and there is no reference to the assessment to be 
realized regarding the energy efficiency potentials in the network and infrastructures nor in Demand 
Response. 
Romania 
Romanian NEEAPs provides an analysis of the electricity market structure, outlining the role played 
by the National Energy Regulator Agency in defining the tariffs and the regulation of the market. 
Concerning Demand Response measures, the Romanian NEEAP provides some information on the 
flexibility of the energy networks, however, mainly on the network side. 
Slovenia 
                                           
 
25
 Enemalta is the only licenced electricity supplier in the country. There is no case for tariffs for third party access to the 
distribution network, no possibility of switching suppliers, and no balancing or ancillary services procurement. 
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The introduction of intelligent metering is outlined as a key factor for the participation of consumers 
in network efficiency in the Slovenian NEEAP. Grants will be provided from OP EKP 2014–2020 funds 
for the promotion of the development of intelligent distribution networks by upgrading the existing 
electricity infrastructure (smart metering, ICT support for smart services, etc.). Under this measure, 
the introduction of remote metering by actual consumption with two-way digital communication 
between supplier and consumer is expected as well as the introduction of dynamic innovative tariffs. 
These are expected to be important for the facilitation and encouragement of Demand Response 
services. 
Spain 
The Spanish NEEAP reports that in the current regulations for the electricity sector, the government 
is responsible for establishing network remuneration methods, while the National Markets and 
Competition Commission is responsible for establishing a methodology for the allocation of costs of 
access tolls taking into account the remuneration of such activities. In regard to measures adopted 
or envisaged to facilitate and promote Demand Response, specific provisions are included in the 
recently-enacted Law 24/2013 of 26 December 2013 of the Electricity Sector26 and in the Royal 
Decree 216/2014 of 28 March 2014 which improves the participation of small consumers in system 
efficiency and Demand Response27. With respect to large electricity consumers, the NEEAP 
generally indicates that measures have been taken with the approval of two orders (in 2013 and 
2014) regulating competition mechanisms for the allocation of interruptibility demand management 
service. 
Sweden 
Art. 15 is not well tackled in the Swedish NEEAP. It is generally stated that the Swedish legislation 
does not contain any explicit prohibition of tariffs that have a detrimental impact on total efficiency 
and there is stated to be some doubt as to whether the Swedish regulations provide a direct 
incentive for network enterprises to make system services available to network users. Provisions 
regarding such an incentive may therefore be introduced. 
Slovakia 
In what concerns the compliance with Article 15 of the EED, Slovakian NEEAP does not report 
measures regarding the regulatory work to be done in order to introduce energy efficiency criteria in 
network tariffs.  
On the other hand, Slovakia has already in place some Demand Response measures that were 
previously introduced. E.g.: the reductions in electricity consumption during peak load; load 
management and off-peak electricity sales and the balancing of the load curve by promoting the 
night load. A new act from 2012 establishes compulsory throughput meters at all levels of the grid 
and at large consumers. This will allow expanding demand side management to all consumers with 
an annual consumption of more than 4 MWh making it possible to track information required to 
manage the load, thus facilitating adjustments to the daily load curve. The Regulatory Office for 
                                           
 
26
 On demand management, it provides that 'electricity companies, consumers and the system operator, in coordination 
with other agents, may draw up and apply measures which promote a better management of electricity demand and help 
optimise the load curve and/or energy saving and efficiency'. The law gives consumers the possibility to participate, either 
directly or through sellers, in the services included in the electricity production market in accordance with the applicable 
regulations. 
27
 This royal decree provides that electricity production cost shall be determined based on the hourly price of the daily 
market during the billing period in question, raising consumer awareness of wholesale market prices deriving from the 
system demand curve and thus encouraging consumption outside peak hours. 
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Network Industries published a methodology in 2013 guiding electricity undertakings to create and 
make available systemic services for the management of consumption by: the shifting of the load 
from peak to off-peak times by final customers, taking into account the availability of renewable 
energy, energy from cogeneration and distributed generation; energy savings from demand 
management; demand reduction from energy efficiency measures undertaken by energy service 
providers, including energy service companies; the connection and dispatch of generation sources at 
lower voltage levels and by the connection of generation sources closer to the consumption site and 
by the storage of energy. 
UK 
Concerning measures aiming to remove possible detrimental tariff incentives, in the NEEAP it is just 
mentioned that transmission and distribution tariffs in Great Britain and Northern Ireland are not 
detrimental to overall efficiency or the participation of Demand Response in relevant markets. 
Concerning planned or adopted measures to incentivise network operators to improve efficiency 
through infrastructure design and operation, the Ofgem’s RIIO price control framework applied in 
Great Britain and the distribution and transmission tariff systems applied in Northern Ireland are 
indicated as existing measures fulfilling the relevant requirements of Art. 15(4).  
Concerning measures to ensure that tariffs allow suppliers to improve consumer participation in 
system efficiency including Demand Response, in the NEEAP it is just mentioned that for both 
electricity and gas, there are no provisions contained within the use of system tariffs for electricity 
transmission and distribution that prevent suppliers from improving consumer participation in 
achieving sustainable development objectives. 
Based on information in the NEEAP, promotion of Demand Response seems to be mainly addressed 
by network tariffs. Smart meters are also described as a means to support Demand Response in the 
future.  
  
  
31 
 
Chapter 5. Analysis of the JRC 2015 DR survey and updated 
MS fiches 
The following chapters provide a national level analysis of Demand Response in the individual 
Member States. All chapters review the currently running practices, the background, and the 
regulatory framework, that results either from the transposition of the EED or established for other 
reasons. 
 
Austria  
Context 
Starting in 2013, the Austrian TSO, APG, opened the Balancing Market to aggregation and Demand 
Response with the active support of E-Control.  Though Austria has significant over capacity within 
the wholesale markets, and the balancing market prices were seen as unnecessarily high, Demand 
Response was understood as a means of increasing market liquidity and lowering costs.  Though 
significant historical regulatory barriers remain, today there are over 5 aggregators in the country. In 
2014 several amendments in the preconditions for the prequalification were implemented to ease 
the aggregation of demand resources. In particular, it is now possible to pool loads and the 
reduction of minimum size of a technical unit contributes to this. Retailers are not paid sourcing 
costs within the balancing markets.  
The wholesale market remains closed to aggregated demand, though in principal Demand Response 
could access the EPEX day-ahead market. Practically, however, no such activity is currently 
registered. There are also unjustified historical barriers which remain, such as that each consumer 
participating in a balancing market may be required to install a dedicated telephone line, costing 
several thousand euros.  These will take time prior to being removed.  
Table 3. Status of technical modalities and market opening
28
 
ENTSO-E’s 
terminology 
APG’s 
terminology 
Tot. Capacity 
Contracted 
Aggregated Load Accepted 
FCR 
Primary Control 
Symmetric 
+ / – 67 MW No (symmetrical) 
FRR 
Secondary 
Control 
+ 200 MW Yes 
– 200 MW Yes 
RR 
Tertiary Control 
A-symmetric 
 
+ 280 MW Yes 
– 125 MW Yes 
 
Wholesale Market 
Currently there is no Demand Response participation on the EPEX spot market from Austria, 
although in principle Virtual Power Plants (VPP), (including demand-side flexibility), could participate 
in the day-ahead market.   
 
                                           
 
28
 Source : SEDC DR Map 2015 
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Ancillary Services 
Primary control is tendered on a weekly basis. However, only symmetric bids with a minimum size 
of 2 MW are accepted, making consumer participation difficult, a customer will often not be able to 
change their consumption pattern in a perfectly symmetric manner. Markets open to consumers do 
not require symmetric bids. Tertiary control is tendered on a weekly basis, with separate tenders for 
weekdays and weekends, both split into 6 four-hour windows. In addition, a day-ahead auction for 
the same time window is held, with however only an utilisation payment and no availability payment 
included. 
Secondary Control: This market is one of the few short term, auction-based markets open to 
demand side resources in Europe. The market is split into 3 products from 8:00 to 20:00 on 
weekdays, 20:00-8:00 weeknights and weekends.  The duration of each call is up to 4 hours, with a 
10-hour rest period between calls (to allow consumers a guaranteed break in activations). A 
customer can offer asymmetrical bids, which means they can either increase or decrease 
consumption but do not have to be able to do both.  Weekly bids are held which set the price for the 
customer’s availability. The separation of positive and negative regulation supports demand-side 
participation as does the 3 time windows. This allows a consumer/aggregator to choose and bid into 
the time window appropriate for them.  It should be noted that a 4-hour duration requirement, 
though a significant improvement over 16 hours, is still not optimal. Consumers can be fully engaged 
when the requirement is lowered to 1-2 hours. 
Daily energy auctions are held for the energy component of the call as customers are paid both to be 
available for the week and for the energy they shift. One Austrian aggregator indicated that in the 4 
months he has been activated 140 times29, indicating a fluid and successful market design.    
 
Status of regulation concerning aggregators 
Aggregation is legal, however the role of the independent aggregator is not yet protected from 
potential entry barriers. 
An independent third-party aggregator needs to inform and contract with the BRP/retailer in order 
to use the flexibility of Demand Response resource (for the balancing market). The delays and 
increase in costs slows the deployment and lowers the participation of aggregated Demand 
Response in the balancing markets.  There is no compensation mechanism in place for retailers’ 
revenue losses caused by a third party aggregation; however, as consumers are only active in the 
balancing markets almost no energy is displaced. The cost of calculating, measuring, and 
communicating the sourcing cost could potentially be higher than the costs themselves.   
Prior to opening the wholesale market where more energy is shifted or saved however, this issue 
would require review. 
 
Network Charges 
In Austria, efficiency is encouraged by not penalising consumers for participating in Demand 
Response, and changing their consumption profile.  The Austrian DSOs separate balancing energy 
from normal consumption when calculating network charges, and charging for balancing energy at a 
much lower rate. 
                                           
 
29
 Frequency response requires small, automated adjustments in consumer consumption patterns. Therefore 140 
activations is possible due to the fact that these adjustments will not be noticeable to the consumer.   
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This is a straightforward solution that could be adopted in other Member States such as Germany. 
Better still would be to transition to tariff designs which are more cost-reflective. A customer’s 
individual peak demand is rarely a strong driver of network costs, as it only affects the sizing of 
dedicated connection assets. Tariffs based on the customer’s contribution to peak demand on the 
network are more cost-reflective and less likely to discourage the provision of flexibility. 
 
Conclusions  
While Demand Response and aggregation is legal, the business case is relatively weak. Aggregators 
can only attract customers with large amounts of flexible load and/or backup generation (e.g. 
industry) to contribute to a pool. This is due to the cumbersome rules surrounding market entry, the 
cost of prequalification and other historical regulations designed for centralised generation units.  
That said, important progress has been made in bringing the market design in line with demand side 
capabilities, in a manner which is relatively unique in Europe.  In order to progress further it will be 
necessary to: simplify surrounding processes, protect the access of independent aggregators to 
consumers, open the wholesale markets to demand side resources and clarify issues surrounding the 
sourcing costs for the retailer.  
Main Market Enablers 
The auction process and market design of the Secondary Control market enable Demand Response. 
Main enablers include:  
 Market design: 
o availability payments auctioned on a weekly basis,  
o the daily auction process for energy,  
o the asymmetrical bids allowed in the secondary control market, and  
o the three bidding periods. These are all important enablers and could be used as a 
template within other Member States, or within the standardised products within 
the European Network Codes.  
 DSO Ruling:  
o In Austria efficiency is encouraged by not penalising consumers for participating in 
Demand Response, and changing their consumption profile.  The Austrian DSOs 
separate out balancing energy from normal consumption when calculating network 
charges, and charging for the balancing energy at a much lower rate 
Main Market Barriers 
 Technical modalities –  
o Prequalification requirements: Prequalification is carried out at the level of the 
individual consumer.   
o Risk assessment is not adjusted to the participant: it is important that 
prequalification, insurance and other procedures are proportional to the risk posed 
by a single consumer to system security. Without this, each consumer is treated as if 
they are a centralised generation unit and the procedural and administrative 
burdens become arduous.   
o The procedure is expensive and slow: The official prequalification process of APG 
requires a minimum of 3 months. However, the process can also last longer due to 
additional questions, the need for clarification or an error/gap in the APG’s own 
rules.  
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o The requirement that each consumer install a dedicated telephone line costing 
between 10,000-20,000 euros.   
o A remaining barrier is the 4-hour availability requirement. 
The length of the process, the fact that each programme must be pre-qualified separately and the 
complexity of the paperwork, all add to the cost of each consumer’s participation and ensures that 
only the largest customers have access to the markets either alone or through aggregation. This is an 
example of the process itself shrinking the size of the available pool of resource.  
 
Belgium 
Context 
Belgium has suffered from periods of severe capacity shortages due to technical issues with multiple 
nuclear power plants over the last 3 years. In response, efforts have been made to enable Demand 
Response and the entry of independent aggregators. As part of this effort, Elia has opened 5 of its 8 
ancillary services programs to aggregated demand (load).  Demand Response participates in the 
Primary and Tertiary Reserves, as well as in the Interruptible Contracts programme, classified under 
the Tertiary Reserve. However, the Secondary Reserve is not yet open. Additionally, a share of 
demand-side capacity is participating in the Strategic Reserve, introduced in 2014 to ensure a 
sufficient level of security of supply during the winter periods.  
There are least three sharply differing views concerning the status of Demand Response in Belgium. 
In interviews and within the JRC Survey, a consumer representative states that they continue to 
have difficulty accessing the ancillary services markets and those they are unable to participate in 
the wholesale market, even after repeated requests for access.  They view the ancillary services 
market opening as too limited and point out that it does not reflect or solve the full needs of the 
Belgian market for improved capacity. Indeed, participation in the spot market, Belpex, is currently 
limited only to a few large industrial consumers. The aggregators interviewed point to the opening 
of the ancillary services market as an important step forward and enabler of Demand Response 
within Belgium.  However they also note that they are blocked from full participation in the 
balancing markets and from the wholesale markets, due to the fact that they must have the 
retailer’s permission to enter these markets with a given consumer. Elia, the Belgium TSO, states 
that all markets are open to Demand Response in Belgium, including wholesale.  They point out that 
consumers are able to access the wholesale and balancing markets through their retailer contracts 
with their retailer. They indicate that this should be sufficient.   
The market entry issue is due to the fact that any demand side participant (consumer or aggregator) 
must have the retailer’s permission prior to accessing markets, (as Elia states, a customer can 
participate through their supply contract).  This consistently causes entry barriers, as retailers may 
not have the same incentives as consumers/aggregators for market entry. 
Status of technical modalities and market opening 30 
Elia has opened the ancillary services markets, setting limitations on how much load may participate 
to allow for controlled growth. The latest market opening is Primary Frequency Control R1 Down, in 
2015. Tertiary Frequency Control (R3), for example, started with a 60 MW limitation in 2013.  Each 
year the ceiling has been reached and in 2016, the R3 market size will be 200 MW of Demand 
Response (50% of the market).  
                                           
 
30
 Source: SEDC DR Map 2015 
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To expand further and participate in the wholesale and balancing markets it will be necessary to 
complete negotiations surrounding the standardised process designed to allow consumers and 
aggregators free access to the market.  The Belgian Demand Response market will be unable to grow 
further without these processes in place. The negotiations have been underway for over a year but 
have not progressed further.  Regulatory and policy intervention may be required to compete as the 
incumbent players lack the motivation for ensuring a successful conclusion to the discussions.  
Table 4. Ancillary Services Markets open to aggregated demand
31
 
 
ENTSO-E’s 
terminology 
Elia’s 
terminology 
Market size Load Access & 
Participation32 
Aggregated 
Load 
Accepted 
FCR 
Primary 
frequency control 
(R1) 
R1-200mHz 28 MW   
R1-Down 
100-200 
27 MW Yes  
R1-Load -
100 -
200(Up) 
27 MW 27 MW 
 
FRR 
Secondary 
reserve (R2) 
R2-Down 
140 MW 
  
R2-Up   
FRR-M 
Tertiary 
frequency control 
(R3) 
  
R3-Prod 
400 MW 
  
R3-DP 
60 MW 
200MW 2016-  
FRR-M 
Tertiary frequency control 
Interruptible clients (R3 ICH) 
 
261 MW 261 MW 
 
RR 
Voltage control and reactive 
power control 
2700 MVAr   
RR Black start n/a   
RR 
Strategic Reserve 
(SR) 
SGR 750 MW   
SDR 97 MW* 97 MW* 
 
 
Ancillary Services and Balancing Market 
Primary and Tertiary Reserves allow Demand Response participation, whereas Secondary Reserve 
does not. In addition, Demand Response represents about one tenth of the capacity involved in the 
Strategic Reserve. This reserve has been introduced in 201433 to ensure a sufficient level of security 
of supply during the winter periods, (in the context of an important reduction of nuclear generation, 
due to the recent simultaneous breakdown of nuclear reactors. Finally, load flexibility is provided 
through the Interruptible Contracts programme, which is dedicated to Demand Response. 
                                           
 
31
 Source : SEDC DR Map 2015 
32
 Elia (2015a): “Required total volumes of ancillary services for year 2015, for R1, R2, R3 and R3-ICH”, available at: 
http://www.elia.be/en/retailers/purchasing-categories/energy-purchases/Ancillary-Services-Volumes-Prices (retrieved on 
15
th
 April 2015) 
33
 Belgian Government (2014): Law of 26 March 2014, art. 5, published on the Official Gazette n. 97/2014 
  
36 
 
DSO-connected consumers can participate in R3-DP (since 2014) and SDR as from 2015-16. Other 
products might open to DSO consumers in the future, though the remaining issues with the lack of 
transparency concerning DSO blocking of a given consumer’s access put this into question. DSOs 
have gained the right to block consumer access to Demand Response to avoid regional capacity 
issues.  This in itself may be acceptable, however they are not required to measure or prove a 
potential issue.  They are also not required to reimburse the TSO, aggregator or consumer for this 
decision.  This lowers the interest of service providers to engage with DSO connected customers as it 
adds an extra element of project risk in an already difficult market.  
Wholesale Market 
Electricity consumers can enter demand bids with indication of price in the power exchange Belpex 
Spot. The participation remains low, due to remaining barriers, such as the requirement for 
aggregators to sign agreements with the consumer’s retailer/BRP or becoming a BRP. Furthermore, 
the share of the electricity traded in the spot market is still low in comparison with the total market 
volume due to the fact that retailers tend to make bi-lateral agreements with generators, who they 
may also own.  
 
Status of Regulation Concerning Aggregators:  
Aggregation is legal but not enabled outside the ancillary services market, due to remaining barriers.  
In the wholesale market the consumer may only participate if there is a direct agreement with his 
retailer, and in the balancing market they require the Retailer’s/BRPs permission. If a retailer wishes 
to provide aggregation services to their customers, they may do so within their own balancing 
perimeter. In order for this issue to be solved, it will be necessary for Belgium to establish 
standardised processes enabling market access for consumers/aggregators, which is fully 
independent of the retailer.   These should include a process for the assessment of volumes, data 
exchange, a governance structure and (if desired) a compensation methodology to be used between 
the BRP and aggregator/consumer. Without these standardised methodologies in place – 
aggregation is not fully enabled in a market.  
 
Conclusions  
This market is an example of a market design which is moving away from a generation-centric model 
and endeavouring to capture the strengths of both resources. 
Main Market Enablers 
Elia has been pro-active in enabling Demand Response within the ancillary services markets.  
 Innovative, appropriate market design: Primary Frequency Control was re-designed to 
maximise the capabilities of both the generation and demand side resources.   
o The market was divided into three parts; part 1 is a symmetrical program – suitable 
for generators.  Part 2 and 3 are asymmetrical programs, one for increasing and the 
other for decreasing consumption.   
o These are activated between + / - 100-200mHz allowing consumers to balance the 
larger changes in frequency.  This solves two issues – 1) consumer load is well suited 
for following large changes in frequency, often at a lower cost than generation 2) 
the larger shifts means that the consumer is activated less often.   
Main Market Barriers 
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 Market design: Tenders to participate in the Markets are Held Annually, therefore a 
significant up-front sales and marketing investment is required to secure customers with the 
risk that no contract will be won. This limits Demand Response potential and some 
improvements might be studied.  For example in Austria the auction for the same markets 
takes place on a weekly basis, allowing for much more granular participation. 
 Inappropriate technical modalities: Measurement Provisions currently do not enable full 
access of customer load to market. Volatility of local energy production (e.g. from locally 
installed wind turbines) or inflexible consumption, at one site cannot be isolated from the 
available flexible power/load potential at that same location, and a large amount of the 
available Demand Response potential remains inaccessible for aggregation. As such, there is 
a need for “meter behind meter” provisions in the settlement process, allowing full 
measurement of available load (except R1). 
 Network issues - DSO connected consumers incur extra investment risk -For R3-DP and in 
the forecast for SDR 2015-2016, the prequalification process required by the DSO limits the 
available Demand Response potential and hinders Demand Response sourcing efficiency. 
This is due to the fact that the DSOs have difficulty evaluating the potential congestion 
issues linked to market driven behaviour of DSO consumers and therefore tend to be 
cautious and discriminating towards allowing Demand Response. Currently the DSO is able 
to block or refuse consumer access to Demand Response without taking responsibility for 
the costs incurred by the consumer, aggregator and TSO, or even providing transparent 
measurement and risk calculation (in fact the DSO is not required to take accurate 
measurements of the risks involved). This lack of transparency and measurement 
requirements will become a significant barrier to Demand Response development if the 
issue remains unsolved.  
 Shut Markets: The Wholesale and Balancing Markets are still shut to demand side resources, 
unless the retailer offers aggregation services to their customers. However it is important 
that those who wish to provide Demand Response or participate in a program, are able to 
do so.  In order for the market to be opened to large consumers and aggregators, it will be 
necessary for Belgium to establish standardised processes enabling market access for 
consumers/aggregators, which is fully independent of the retailer.   These should include 
processes for: for the assessment of volumes, data exchange, a governance structure and (if 
desired) a compensation methodology to be used between the BRP and 
aggregator/consumer.   Without these standardised methodologies in place aggregation has 
not been fully enabled in a market.  
o Negotiations have been underway for over a year.  Regulatory and policy 
intervention may be required to resolve the remaining issues, as the incumbent 
players lack the motivation for ensuring a successful conclusion.  
 
The Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Sweden 
Context 
Though they have separate TSOs, Norway, Finland, Sweden and Denmark share a single electricity 
market and regulation.  This includes the regulation concerning Demand Response and aggregation.  
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The Nordics have enabled Demand Response to varying degrees within their ancillary services 
markets and consumers can participate in Demand Response through their supply contracts within 
the Nordic Spot Market and national balancing markets – assuming these are offered by their 
retailer.   There are successful examples, such as Helsinki Energy, but overall Demand Response 
requires significant resources, re-training of staff and an engagement level unfamiliar to retailers – 
uptake is therefore slow.   
Nordic Regulation does not define a role for independent aggregators. Aggregators must have the 
retailer’s permission to aggregate load and may only pool resources within a given balancing 
parameter (therefore they can only aggregate the retailer’s customers in a given balancing region, 
severely shrinking the size of the available pool).   
However, Nordic regulation does allow Prequalification for participating in a market to be carried 
out at the aggregated pool level, rather than for each consumer individually. This is an important 
enabler as it allows the aggregated pool of consumer load to be treated as a single resource, 
maximising the group’s joint potential. It also allows the aggregator to act as mediator for the 
consumer, protecting them from onerous and complex technical pre-qualification measures.   
The Nordics are balanced largely by Norwegian hydropower. The high water levels in recent years 
have lowered the spot market price below the marginal cost of coal-fired generation.  Yet within the 
next 5-6 years over 6,000MW of new inflexible capacity will be built – wind generation in Sweden 
and nuclear in Finland.  At the same time, Norway is exporting more of its hydropower to central 
Europe.  The balance in the market is therefore changing, while prices in the wholesale and spot 
markets remain low – less and less of the generation available is flexible.  The Nordic TSOs have a 
project to review the Reserves allocation in the Nordics - a portion of these reserves will be Demand 
Response.   
 
Denmark 
The use of Demand Response in Denmark remains quite limited. In theory, electricity consumers are 
allowed to participate in every ancillary service market. However, due to the regulatory 
environment, participation remains limited. Demand Response aggregation takes place only through 
retailers, and there are no independent aggregators in the Danish market today. The balancing 
programmes are mainly designed around the characteristics of generators, leading to a situation 
where only the largest consumption units are able to participate.   The lack of access to programs is 
highlighted within the JRC survey; an industry representative points to the fact that Demand 
Response is possible within a given balancing area and in most markets, whereas a consumer 
representative states that no programs are offered as there are no aggregators, no service 
providers.  
 
Finland 
Active market participation of demand and aggregation are possible, but limitations still exist. The 
contractual relationship between aggregators and BRPs remains an important barrier. Moreover 
aggregating loads under different BRPs’ area is not allowed, even if the aggregator is able to provide 
BRPs the adequate information to mitigate their balancing risks. Today, aggregators operate in the 
frequency control, in the tertiary reserve and in the spot market, while only pilot projects are 
underway in the secondary reserve and in the frequency normal reserve. The large minimum bid size 
for some products limit the full potential of Demand Response. The payments are quite attractive 
for the ancillary products, but with some penalisation compared to the generation ones. The TSO 
Fingrid has also contracts with the largest industrial consumers to provide emergency reserves. 
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Sweden 
Flexibility is provided by hydropower plants in the north of Sweden (SE1 and SE2), while thermal 
plants are sometimes activated in the south of Sweden, in case of congestion or in case of peak 
demand. Demand Response participation and aggregation of demand-side resources are legally 
possible in Sweden. However, wider Demand Response participation could be triggered with the 
definition of appropriate roles and responsibilities between players, which would allow for 
consumers to freely choose their Demand Response service provider, while protecting all market 
participants. 
Product requirements limit the possibility for Demand Response to participate as they remain 
generation centric. In the Secondary, Tertiary Reserve and the RPM, the minimum bid size 
represents a significant barrier for wide participation, for example. Demand-side resources also 
participate in the spot market; however, prices are currently too low to make this interesting for 
retailers (the only actors with free access).  
 
Status of technical modalities and market opening34 
 
Denmark 
The Danish transmission system is divided into two areas (Western-DK1 & Eastern-DK2). DK1 is 
synchronous with Germany and the Continental grid, whereas DK2 is coupled with the Nordic one. A 
connection exists between them, called “Storebælt HVDC” (the Great Belt Power Link). This situation 
influences the structure and use of Demand Response in Denmark as some programmes are 
separate for each area.  The substantial share of Danish ancillary services is procured from 
neighbouring countries. As a result, it is less feasible to assess the exact volumes contracted in 
Denmark. The table below presents the total volumes, contracted from Denmark or neighbouring 
countries. 
Table 5. Ancillary Services Markets open to aggregated demand
35
 
ENTSO-E’s 
terminology 
TSO’s 
terminology 
Tot. Capacity 
Contracted 
Load Access & 
Participation 
Aggregated 
Load Accepted 
FCR Primary Reserve (DK1) ≈23 MW * *(23 MW36) 
FRRa Secondary Reserve (DK1) ≈100 MW * * 
FCR Frequency-controlled 
normal operation reserve 
(DK2) 
≈22 MW 
* * 
FCR Frequency-controlled 
disturbance reserve (DK2) 
37 MW 
* * 
FRRm Tertiary (Manual) Reserve 
(DK1 and DK2) 
≈868MW 
* (555 MW) * 
RR Short-circuit power, 
reactive reserves and 
voltage control (DK1 and 
DK2) 
0 MW 
* * 
- Strategic Reserves (DK2) 200 MW * * 
                                           
 
34 SEDC, DR Map 2015 
35
 Source : SEDC DR Map 2015 
36
 Electrical boilers cover all demand for negative primary reserves (i.e. down regulation) 
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Finland 
All products are legally open to Demand Response, with some limitations. However, only pilot 
projects are underway in the Primary Reserve normal (FCR-N), and Secondary Reserve (FRR-A). The 
following table presents an overview of the different programmes and their respective sizes, where 
public data are available. 
Table 6. Ancillary Services Markets open to aggregated demand
37
 
ENTSO-E’s 
terminology 
TSO’s 
terminology 
Market size Load Access & 
Participation38 
Aggregated 
Load Accepted 
FCR 
Frequency controlled 
normal operation reserve 
(FCR-N) 
140 MW 39,40 *(pilots) * 
Frequency controlled 
disturbance reserve (FCR-D) 
260 MW *70 MW * 
FRR -A 
Automatic frequency 
restoration reserve (FRR-A) 
70 MWError! 
ookmark 
not 
defined.
,
Err
or! 
Bookmark 
not defined. 
* (pilots) * 
FRR-M 
Fast disturbance reserve 
(FRR-M) 
1.614 
MWError! 
ookmark 
not 
defined.
,
Err
or! 
Bookmark 
not defined. 
*385 MW * 
RR Strategic reserves 365 MW *40 MW * 
 Balancing Market (RPM) 300 MWh41 * 100-400 MW * 
 
Sweden 
The following table shows the electricity market product or sub-products and underlines where 
Demand Response and aggregated loads can participate, including related market sizes.  
                                           
 
37
 Source : SEDC DR Map 2015 
38
 Fingrid (2014a): “Demand-side management”, available at: http://www.fingrid.fi/en/electricity-market/Demand-
Side_Management/Pages/default.aspx (retrieved on 15
th
 April 2015) 
39
 Fingrid (2014b): “Reserves”, available at: http://www.fingrid.fi/en/powersystem/reserves/Pages/default.aspx (retrieved 
on 15
th
 April 2015) 
40
 Fingrid (2014c): “Tilannekatsaus varavoimalaitoksiin, nopeaan häiriöreserviin sekä kysyntäjoustoon (Status of fast 
reserves and elasticity of demand)”, available at: 
http://www.fingrid.fi/fi/asiakkaat/asiakasliitteet/Kayttotoimikunta/2014/21.5.2014/Tilannekatsaus%20varavoimalaitoksiin
%20nopeaan%20h%C3%A4iri%C3%B6reserviin%20kysynt%C3%A4joustoon.pdf (retrieved on 15
th
 April 2015) 
41
 NordPool Spot (2014a), Market values in Finland, calculated at sum between up-regulation and down-regulation 
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Table 7. Ancillary Services Markets open to aggregated demand
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Status of regulations concerning aggregators 
Retailers are allowed to become aggregators or they may outsource this service.   
The role of the independent aggregator is not defined within Nordic regulation.  In order to be an 
independent third-party aggregator, the company should register as a BRP. In Finland, to obtain this 
status, the fee is a reasonable € 200/monthly, but a bank deposit of minimum € 200.000 is required 
in case of bankruptcy. In Sweden, registering as a BRP requires an annual fee of about € 2500 per 
year, and the installation of an electronic reporting system connected to the exchange platform 
Ediel (or signing a contract with an agent that has such equipment).  Even in that case the 
aggregator would have to sign an agreement with the consumer’s BRP in order to engage them. 
Otherwise, the aggregators can also operate as service providers for a retailer. In this case, the 
aggregator reaches a contractual agreement with the retailer and pools loads from his balancing 
group according to the contract.  
                                           
 
42
 Source : SEDC DR Map 2015 
43
 ENSTO-E (2006): “System Operation Agreement” Ibid. par. 4.1.1 
44
 ENSTO-E (2006): “System Operation Agreement” Ibid., par. 4.1.2 
45
 ENSTO-E (2006): “System Operation Agreement” Ibid., par. 4.2 
46
 Elforsk (2014): “Rapport 14:29, Demand Response in the strategic reserve, The Case of Sweden”, p. 31, resources for the 
year 2014/2015, available at: www.elforsk.se/Documents/Market%20Design/projects/ER_14_29.pdf  
47
 NordPool Spot (2014), RPM 2014 value, available at: http://www.nordpoolspot.com/Market-data1/Regulating-
Power1/Regulating-Power--Area1/NO11/Norway/?view=table (retrieved on 30
th
 April 2015) 
ENTSO-E’s 
terminology 
SVK’s 
terminology Market size 
Load Access & 
Participation 
(MW) 
Aggregated 
Load 
Accepted 
FCR 
Frequency Containment 
Reserves for normal operating 
band (FCR-N) 
230 MW43 *≈0 * 
Frequency Containment 
Reserves for disturbances (FCR-
D) 
412 MW44 *≈0 * 
FRR-A 
Automatic Frequency 
Restoration Reserves (FRR-A) 
still limited *≈0 * 
FRR-M 
Fast disturbance reserve (FRR-
M) 
1.290 MW45 *≈10 MW * 
RR 
Strategic Reserve / Peak Power 
Reserve46 
1.500 MW *626 MW * 
 Balancing Market (RPM) 1,6 TWh47 * * 
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In Denmark there are no aggregators while in Sweden and Finland, thus far, the third-party 
aggregators have been able to protect the retailers from financial losses on lost energy sales, 
through efficient and timely communication. However, the bilateral agreement requirement 
severely limits the ability of the consumers to choose service providers, since it gives the possibility 
to the retailers/BRPs to decide with whom and under which conditions they are allowed to engage 
with an aggregator. 
Therefore, to the extent aggregation is defined in the Nordics, it is done so as a means of 
protecting/maintaining the current market structure and does not focus on enabling consumer 
access to service providers or Demand Response.  Regulators assume that retailers will provide 
these services, when in fact there are significant business model issues in place for retailers which 
hamper their ability to create a positive business case (see Introduction).  This consistently causes 
entry barriers, as retailers may not have the same incentives as consumers/aggregators for market 
entry. 
The Nordic have focused on enabling implicit Demand Response through smart meter rollout and 
dynamic tariffs. These tariffs enable consumers to lower their energy bills in the short to medium 
term. First, the customers, by accepting volatility in prices, no longer pay the retailer’s risk premium, 
which lowers retail energy prices when averaged over an extended period of time (even without any 
consumer reaction to price).  
Consumers also have the opportunity to adapt their energy consumption over time to choose 
cheaper periods. That said, the programs are not always directed toward providing consumer 
feedback or encouraging demand-side flexibility, which would require communication technology 
and/or some form of home/business automation. These automation offerings are currently being 
developed and deployed in limited areas, such as the Helsinki region.  Dong Energy, Vattenfall and 
Fortum have conducted pilots but are finding it difficult to create a viable business model- on 
average prices are low and the upfront cost of the programs are relatively high.  That said, as 
balancing costs rise over the next 5 years, with the introduction of further inflexible generation, this 
situation may change.  
 
Conclusions   
Main Market Enablers  
All Nordic countries allow retailers to carry out aggregated Demand Response in partial fulfilment of 
Article 15 in the Energy Efficiency directive.  Sweden and Denmark have as yet to create viable 
products, while the Finnish TSO has made progress in adjusting the ancillary services market to 
optimise demand side capabilities. 
 Technical Modality for aggregation:  
o In Denmark, Finland and Sweden, Prequalification for participating in a market is 
measured at the aggregated pool level, rather than for each consumer individually. 
This is an important enabler as it allows the aggregated pool of consumer load to be 
treated as a single resource, maximising the group’s joint potential. It also allows the 
aggregator to act as mediator for the consumer, protecting them from onerous and 
complex technical pre-qualification measures.  
o No minimum required size for consumer participation  
o No technical requirements for the single unit.  
 Open Markets to aggregated demand: Ancillary service markets are open to Demand 
Response.  
 Adjusted technical modalities for residential and Commercial Industrial Consumers:  
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o Fingrid has worked actively with national consumers (household to industrial) to 
enable participation.  
o They are also looking to expand these capabilities through automating residential 
heating controls.  
o Finland and the UK are therefore two of the first countries where residential load is 
used in the Ancillary services markets.  
Main Market Barriers 
 Enabling independent aggregation: Aggregation is legally possible in Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden, however the lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities between aggregators and 
BRP/retailers represents an important competition issue.  
 Onerouse remaining technical modalities:  
 Barriers remain in place in many Nordic market which have already been successfully 
removed elsewhere in Europe.  Program requirements are still largely generation centric. 
This blocks all participants from entry – including retailers and large consumers.  
 Denmark:  
o The market barriers remaining in Denmark indicate that while open in name, the 
requirements have not as yet been reviewed to ensure they provide a level playing 
field between generation and demand. Examples are below: 
 
 The rules for ancillary services are mainly designed around generation-
standards. For example the requirement to have an online metering system 
constitutes a substantial cost for any entity willing to provide its services. 
 Primary Reserve. In DK1, the primary reserve is an automatically operated 
reserve for frequency containment. It requires very short delivery time and 
too frequent activations for traditional Demand Response to cope with – 
except for some MW-scale electric boilers.  
 In DK2 primary reserve, the TSO requires delivery of 50 % within 5 seconds 
and 100 % within the next 25 seconds, thus most of Demand Response units 
are disqualified. For example, some back-up generators can provide 50% in 
6 seconds, but this is not accepted. This requirement may change with the 
adoption of the European Network Codes.  
 The frequency restoration reserve requires symmetric bidding48. In markets 
such as the UK, Belgium, Austria, France, and Switzerland, the requirement 
for symmetric bidding was removed in order to enable consumers to 
participate.  
 Secondary Reserve. Today, the Secondary Reserve Market requires upward 
and downward regulation/symmetrical bids33. Furthermore, the whole 
volume of Secondary Reserve is currently contracted from Norway. 
 
                                           
 
48
 A requirement for symmetrical bids acts as a market barrier to consumer participation. Consumers can rarely generate 
and consume in equal measure. In Member states where the TSO is willing to enable Demand Response asymmetrical bids 
are allowed. 
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o Tertiary Reserve. Common rules apply to both DK1 and DK2. The main barrier 
consists in the high minimum bid (10 MW), this reserve being still manually 
operated.  
o The participation in the Tertiary Reserves Market requires a control centre operating 
24/7, which represents a cost barrier for a large consumer, aggregator or small 
retailer49. 
o The Strategic Reserves are procured through a one-off tender with participation of 
both consumption and production units.  
 Finland  
o The markets are either in the pilot phase or are made up of bi-lateral contracts with 
large consumers at this stage.  
 Sweden  
o Onerous remaining technical modalities: With the current structure, Demand 
Response cannot cope with the product requirements for Primary (FCR-N, FCR-D) 
and Secondary (FRR-A) Reserves.  
o Demand Response could participate with provisions that would make these 
Reserves more technically accessible (e.g. activation only for deviations above 100 
MHz – which leads to limited times of activation, and thus to less impact in the 
industrial/commercial/domestic processes).  
o With regard to the Tertiary Reserve (FRR-M), the main barrier is the high minimum 
bid50.  
France 
Context 
France is the only Member State in Europe, which has opened both the ancillary services markets 
and wholesale market to Demand Response and independent aggregators. This is made possible 
because the relationship between aggregators and retailers/BRPs has been regulated in 2013 and a 
standardised framework is put in place. It is also one of only 3 Member States (Finland, GB and 
France) where residential consumers are also engaged51. However the high mandated cost of the 
retailer’s sourcing costs will continue to block market growth within the wholesale markets, as 
almost all revenues earned must be paid back to the retailer by the aggregator and consumers.  
Since 2003, large industrial customers been participated in the balancing mechanism, and from 
2007, the first pilots were run in order to introduce aggregated residential load to the mechanism. In 
2014, for the first time an industrial consumer provided its energy reduction as a FCR or Primary 
                                           
 
49
 EURISCO ApS (2013): “Activating electricity demand as regulating power. Flexpower – testing a market design proposal”, 
p. 8, available at: 
http://www.eurisco.dk/images/1027_flexpower_activating_electricity_demand_as_regulating_power.pdf (retrieved on 10 
June 2015). 
50
 Since 1st November 2011, the Swedish electricity market has been divided into four distinct price areas (i.e. S1, S2, S3, 
S4). 
51
 Residential consumers are most often provided with dynamic pricing programs only through dynamic tariffs.  
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Reserve52. This programme, together with Secondary Reserve (FRRa), has been accessible to load 
participation since 1 July 2014.  
The NEBEF (“Notification d’Échange de Blocs d’Effacement”) was launched in 2014, creating a 
mechanism that allows curtailed load to bid as energy directly into the wholesale electricity market. 
During the first year, the volume amounted to a modest figure of 313 MWh.  Between 2014 and 
2015 volumes decreased further, and in 2015 the market generated only €1,783 for aggregators.  
The low wholesale market prices and requirements for payment of sourcing costs to the retailer are 
the main issues here.  
The capacity market for 2017 and beyond should also open new possibilities for Demand Response.  
 
Status of technical modalities and market opening53 
RTE’s products are adapted to Demand Response and have been improved further to be 
aggregation-friendly, i.e. to allow aggregation irrespective of the type of network, metering, 
electricity retailer, BRP, etc. However, certain consumers with a curtailment clause in their retailer 
contract are blocked from participating in forms of Demand Response. 
The charts below show ancillary services and other mechanisms where Demand Response 
participation is allowed: 
 
Table 8. Ancillary Services Markets open to aggregated demand
54
 
ENTSO-E’s 
terminology 
TSO’s 
terminology 
Tot. Capacity 
Contracted55 
Load Access & 
Participation 
Aggregated 
Load Accepted 
FCR Primary Control (Réglage 
Primaire de Fréquence) 
600 – 700 MW 
 
*(≈40MW) 
 
* 
FRRa Secondary Control (Réglage 
Secondaire de Fréquence) 
600 – 1000 MW 
*(0 MW) *(0 MW) 
FRRm Fast Reserve (Réserves 
rapides) 
Max. 1000 MW 
* * 
RR Complementary Reserve 
(Réserves complémentaires) 
Max. 500 MW 
* * 
DSR - RR Demand Response Call for 
Tender (Appel d’Offres 
d’Effacement) 
2014: max. 750 
MW 
2015: max. 
1800 MW 
* 
(2014: 750MW, 
2015: 1800MW) 
* 
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 RTE (2014) : “Les consommateurs industriels désormais fournisseurs de services pour la fréquence du système électrique 
français”,  available at : http://clients.rte-
france.com/lang/fr/clients_producteurs/services/actualites.jsp?id=9693&mode=detail (retrieved on 20 May 2015) 
53
 SEDC, DR Map 2015 
54
 Source : SEDC DR Map 2015 
55
 RTE (2009), “Documentation Technique de Référence, Chapitre 4 – Contribution des utilisateurs aux performances du 
RPT, Article 4.1 – Réglage Fréquence/Puissance”, available at:  
http://www.rte-france.com/uploads/Mediatheque_docs/offres_services/reftech/24-04-09_article_4-1__v3.pdf (retrieved 
on 10 June 2015) 
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Wholesale Market 
The test phase of the Demand Response mechanism called NEBEF took place from December 2013 
to December 2014 on the wholesale market. The final rules of the NEBEF mechanism were issued on 
19 December 201456. The volume activated during the experimentation phase was quite modest 
(310 MWh), partially due to a mild winter. In 2014, the total volume traded on the Epex Spot day 
ahead market amounted to 67,8 TWh. Between 2014 and 2015 volumes decreased, and in 2015 the 
market generated only €1,783 for aggregators.  The low wholesale market prices are the main issue 
here.  However the energy payments for the retailer’s sourcing costs also drove down revenues.   
In addition, Demand Response based on retail prices has been valued based on wholesale electricity 
market prices for more than 40 years. France has a history of retail Demand Response programmes 
lead by EDF, the French incumbent utility. The programmes were based on variable retail price 
schemes, and EDF runs both residential and industrial load management programmes. 
Capacity Market 
The prices on the balancing market do not reveal the full value of flexibility and capacity services 
provided through Demand Response. The capacity market could help address this issue, assuming it 
truly enables demand-side participation. It is based on a decentralised market structure with an 
obligation for the retailer to buy capacity certificates up to the level of their portfolio peak 
consumption.  
The market, due to start delivering in 2017, will be open to both generation and demand-side 
participation. The final rules applicable to the mechanism were issued on 22 January 2015. The 
product exchanged being “capacity”, it will reflect only the availability of DR in the market57. Its 
effective activation will be counted through the balancing mechanism or NEBEF mechanism. This 
market could act as an important enabler for demand-side development.  Demand Response 
operators are able to go through the certification process closer to real time than generators. 
Existing generators need to be certified 3 years ahead whilst Demand Response operators need to 
be certified only 1 year ahead of the delivery year. Such a solution is useful for Demand Response 
operators at it can give them bigger flexibility as far as planning their development is concerned. The 
Capacity market has some important enablers for Demand Response, such as the fact that the 
aggregator can bid in the market prior to contracting with the consumers.  This allows them to know 
their price and what a consumer will earn, prior to approaching them.   
However, the market will also allow EDF to be the only significant buyer and the main seller in the 
market, raising questions around open competition. (EDF will, by necessity, predominantly buy and 
sell to itself, and any aggregator looking to provide resources will have to complete with EDF’s own 
generation fleet.)  Therefore, although the market design is positive overall, with a significant 
improvement of the capacity market in Great Britain, there may be issues later on in the process.  
                                           
 
56
 The list of players participating in NEBEF Mechanism is available on the French TSO’ website : 
https://clients.rte-france.com/lang/fr/visiteurs/vie/nebef_operateurs.jsp 
57
 To participate, the Demand Response operator will have to prove its ability to activate Demand 
Response programmes matching the capacity it claims for in its portfolio. 
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Distribution Network 
ERDF runs 15 demonstration projects, aiming at testing programmes that could allow for better 
network management. The projects range from RES integration to evaluation of so-called active 
demand solutions58.  
Ancillary Services  
 FCR (Primary Control) and FRRa (Secondary Control). Minimum schedules for FCR & FRRa are 
1MW. FCR & FRRa are mandatory symmetrical products. From July 2014, Demand Response 
participation (certificated consumption sites, industrial & aggregated load as participants) is 
limited to the transmission grid and is based on bilateral contracts with generators59.  
RTE is considering allowing asymmetrical products, Demand Response participation from 
distribution grid and more aggregation-friendly conditions in the near future.  
The market design has caused issues for new entrants.  Prior to 2014, generators were 
required to provide frequency control for a fixed price. RTE did not wish to change this 
obligation when opening the market to Demand Response.  They therefore allowed the 
generators to purchase demand side resources from consumers, assuming the consumers 
would be engaged by the generators if they could provide services at a lower price.  
However, this has proved complicated.  The generators are centrally owned by EDF – 
meaning that there is only one buyer, and one main seller, giving EDF disproportionate 
market power.  There are therefore questions surrounding potential market distortion and 
RTE is reviewing the model although aggregators have successfully engaged to a certain 
extent.  
 FRRm (fast reserves) and RR. The minimum bid is set at 10 MW for FRRm and RR since April 
2014. Although this is not the 1-5 MW requirement achieved in most Demand Response 
friendly markets in Europe, it is a significant improvement over the earlier 50 MW 
requirement.  
Experimentation for 1-10 MW Replacement Reserve is expected in April 2015 for RR and for 
FRRm in October 2015. As for the availability within FRRm, the RTE tender allows much 
flexibility: Demand Response to participate for certain days only (and not 24/7). 
 
Rules surrounding aggregation 
Independent aggregation is enabled in France and standardised processes have been put in place 
between the BRP/retailer and aggregator.  Since 2014, there is no need for consumers or 
aggregators to contract with a BRP in order to provide its flexibility to the markets (Balancing, 
NEBEF, Capacity mechanisms). However, participation of Demand Response to FCR and FRRa is only 
possible through a secondary market. For this reason, consumers and aggregators have to sign 
bilateral contracts with producers (generators) to sell them their products.  
Sourcing Costs are costs incurred by the BRP/retailer when they purchase electricity in advance of 
actual consumption, in order to ensure they will have sufficient amounts to stay in balance. When 
                                           
 
58
 more information on ERDF’s website, at the following address: http://www.erdf.fr/smart-grids-ou-reseaux-intelligents 
(retrieved on 10 June 2015) 
59
 Thomas Veyrenc, “Market design for Demand Response: the French experience”, presentation of July 3, 2014, 
International Energy Agency, available at: 
https://www.iea.org/media/workshops/2014/esapworkshopii/Thomas_Veyrenc.pdf (retrieved on 10 June 2015). 
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consumers lower their consumption, the BRP loses the money they spent purchasing this electricity.  
This loss is incurred outside any competitive activity and they therefore state that the aggregator 
should pay them for these losses. French aggregators working with industrial/commercial 
consumers, agree that this is a fair solution - in principle.  They see the payment mechanism as a 
significant contributor to the smooth integration of aggregators and consumers in the market, and 
an important part of standardised process between aggregators and BRPs, (though they have 
concerns over how the costs are calculated).  Aggregators working with residential consumers, who 
provide small loads, maintain that these payments destroy their business model and will keep 
residential consumers from accessing the markets. The issue has been challenged in court and 
through the parliament multiple times, by both sides. 
 
The rules on the imbalance settlement and sourcing costs, is again under evaluation within on-going 
discussions on the new law on energy transition. In the balancing mechanism, ancillary services and 
wholesale markets, the BRP perimeter is corrected by the TSO after the load curtailment, so that the 
BRP does not face any imbalance due to Demand Response. 
Network Tariffs: Time Of Use Tariffs are available (day/night) but both EDF and others consider that 
critical peak pricing should also be introduced (perhaps in order to strengthen any pricing signal 
from EDF).  Network compensation mechanisms continue to encourage ERDF to invest in 
infrastructure rather than Demand Response or other efficiency mechanisms.   However, unlike in 
Germany, Network tariffs do not actively penalise consumers who participate in Demand Response.  
 
Conclusions: 
Main Market Enablers 
 Open Markets: The open wholesale, balancing and, eventually, the capacity market.  France is 
the first and only Member State to open its wholesale market to aggregated Demand Response.  
 Enabled aggregators: The standardised process between BRPs and aggregators is a significant 
enabler. This includes: 
o Volumes: Standardised processes for assessment of the traded energy between the BRP 
and the aggregator60.  
o Compensation: A price formula to calculate the price for the transferred energy. In the case 
of demand reduction, the aggregator pays the BRP; in the case of demand enhancement, 
the BRP pays the aggregator. This price formula should reflect as closely as possible the 
average sourcing costs of the energy transferred, however neither aggregators nor retailers 
seem satisfied with the formula currently used in France as it does not adequately reflect 
market prices. 
o Data Exchange: A clear definition of what data needs to be provided to the BRP through 
the TSO, to ensure both the aggregator and the BRP can fulfil their obligations whilst not 
having to share commercially sensitive information. 
o Governance structure: An appeals process and an appeals body, in case any issues need to 
be resolved. 
 Technical modality enabling aggregation: The pooled load has to fulfil requirements as an 
aggregate. This is a critical enabler of Demand Response as it allows the aggregator to act as 
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 i.e. the transfer of energy between the BRP’s and the aggregator’s balancing groups following a Demand Response 
dispatch. 
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mediator for consumers, protecting them from onerous technical pre-qualification measures 
and from costly duplication of procedures.  
Main Market Barriers 
 Sourcing cost payments: Within the wholesale markets these costs negate the profits of the 
aggregator and payment for the consumer  
 Market structure creating one buyer and seller: Within the FRR and FCRa, aggregators must 
make agreements with EDF who buys and sells most of the resource in the market. This is a 
significant issue – not only are aggregators and generators competitors but EDF owns the 
generation fleet giving them a large amount of market power.  This can be difficult for new 
entrants, though several have engaged successfully.  
 Technical modality:  
o The standardised formula for sourcing costs does not properly reflect changes in market 
prices – and consumers and aggregators can be over-charged or retailers may not be 
properly compensated.  They also pose an issue for residential consumers who tend to save 
more energy than industrial consumers and who have smaller profit margins per site than 
and industrial consumer. The service providers for residential consumers point to the fact 
that the total revenues from wholesale markets (NEBEF) left to DR operators in 2014 was 
limited to €14,032 (total for the full year for fifteen operators registered in 2014, operating 
more than 1,000 MW of DR in France), of which roughly 90% were handed back to retailers, 
leaving only 1,783 € to all DR operators for the full year. 
o A French DR representative states that ‘ttechnical constraints have been imposed on DR. In 
particular they name the required periods of availability, and control requirements. For 
instance, residential DR operating through automated electrical heating has a large potential 
in France, and could help face capacity issues related to peak periods; However these 
capacities face a significant barrier due to the requirement for availability during the full year 
- rather than only during peak 
o After Demand Response providers has reduced demand for a given period, e.g. 2 or 3 hours, 
they are not allowed to reduce it for the next period for the same duration; hence the value 
of DR is lowered by more than 50% as they can only participate in every other call; no such 
constraint is applicable to generation. 
o The requirements for entry in the Ancillary services markets are still relatively difficult.  
Minimum bid sizes are larger than average (10 MW aggregated load rather the standard 5 or 
3 MW. Bidding is annual, and does not allow for a more granular decision making process. In 
addition, aggregation possibilities are limited (not all sites can be aggregated with other 
sites). 
Other: Premium Explicit Demand Response in the residential sector (so called “l’effacement 
résidentiel diffus”) can receive a premium for the consumption reductions that they provide. In 
2015, the premium is set at the level of 16 €/MWh during daytime (7-23) and 2 €/MWh during night. 
There is a cap of 250 GWh per Demand Response operator, indicating the maximum amount of 
provided electricity reductions. This premium is financed through the tax included in the electricity 
tariffs. However, this premium is under question as a possible subsidy and its future is unclear at this 
stage.  
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Germany 
Context 
Currently, German market regulation creates significant barriers to most forms of Demand Response 
programme types, including both those provided by retailers and independent aggregators.  
However, the government is aware of these barriers and is undergoing a regulatory review to 
facilitate change. Conclusions of this review are summarised in ‘An electricity market for the energy 
transition’. Should the suggested changes be fully implemented, the situation in Germany will 
improve. However as of today – Germany is unique in Europe for having opened almost all markets 
to Demand Response while at the same time making actual participation almost impossible.  
With an announced plan to achieve 35% of renewable electricity supply by 2020 and the phasing out 
of nuclear power by 2022, the German energy system will integrate more and more de-centralised 
variable energy generation (wind, solar) as well as de-centralised energy generation by biomass and 
biogas, and will increase its needs in de-centralised flexibility. Situations where variable generation 
from wind and solar plants surpasses the general demand in the grid are expected to happen more 
frequently in the future. 
There is a growing gap between the continuously low wholesale market prices and the much higher 
balancing market prices in Germany. The gap regularly exceeds a factor of 100, due to the fact that 
large amounts of renewable energy generation are available within intra-day markets. This has 
damaged the business case for flexible generation – mainly gas fired power plants – as they are 
moved out of merit order within the intra-day markets and replaced with wind and solar. On the 
other hand, growth in intermittent renewables, such as wind and solar generation, drives increasing 
demand for balancing services.  
Today, a significant portion of demand-side flexibility in Germany remains untapped and will remain 
so, until important barriers are removed.  Though Demand Response is legal, aggregation is only 
enabled for the retailer and these also face significant entry barriers.  The wholesale market and re-
dispatch (incl. winter grid reserve) are closed for Demand Response. Intra-day markets are open for 
consumers working through their retailer (assuming the retailer offers this service). There is no 
capacity market in Germany, but debate to introduce a capacity reserve, which, according to the 
design proposals in the German White Paper, will also be closed for Demand Response.61 
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 German Ministry of Economy and Energy (BMWI) (July 2015): “Ein Strommarkt für die Energiewende”, available at: 
http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Mediathek/publikationen,did=718200.html 
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Status of technical modalities and market opening 
 
Table 9. Ancillary Services Markets open to aggregated demand
62
 
ENTSO-E’s 
terminology 
German TSOs’ 
terminology 
Tot. Capacity 
Contracted 
Load Access & 
Participation 
Aggregated 
Load Accepted 
FCR 
Primary control 
reserve (PCR) 
+ / – ≤ 670 MW *(n/a) * 
FRR 
Secondary control 
reserve (SCR) 
SCR + ≤ 2500 MW *(n/a) * 
SCR – ≤ 2500 MW *(n/a) * 
mFRR 
Minute reserve 
(MR) 
MR + 1513 MW *(n/a) * 
MR – 1782 MW *(n/a) * 
Interruptible 
loads 
Immediately interruptible loads 
(SOL) – AbLaV63 
     465 MW *(246 MW) * 
Interruptible 
loads 
Quickly interruptible loads (SNL) 
– AbLaV 
929 MW *(648 MW) * 
 
In principle, Demand Response and aggregation are legally allowed in all German balancing market 
programmes. The actual share of flexible demand-side loads in the overall participation is however 
very hard to estimate and is likely to be low, due to entry barriers.64 
Capacity Market 
This capacity reserve is open for generation only, with no access for the demand side, and initially 
will encompass 2.7 GW of lignite coal power plants. 
Wholesale Market 
German electricity is being traded at the European Energy Exchange EEX in Leipzig (forward market) 
and the EPEX SPOT in Paris (day ahead and intraday market). However, for the time being, only very 
large consumers participate in the spot market, and as intraday trade for Demand Response is still 
closed, the participation of demand-side aggregators is practically non-existent. In contrast, 3rd party 
aggregation of distributed generation assets, e.g. wind, biomass and biogas is a viable business 
opportunity, as the distributed renewable energy unit chooses a BRP to market its generation. VPP 
(Virtual Power Plant) providers have started to participate, but with very small amounts of Demand 
Response in their portfolio.  
Balancing Market and Ancillary Services 
Programme requirements act as a barrier for the development of Demand Response in Germany. 
The programmes in the balancing market are open to Demand Response resources.  Re-dispatch is 
closed for Demand Response: both the continuously contracted re-dispatch resources as well as the 
“winter grid reserve” are generation-only, non-marketed programmes. The TSOs contract power 
plants bilaterally without going through any public auction or tendering process. Interruptible 
Loads. Interruptible loads are defined as large consumption units which are connected to the high 
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 Source : SEDC DR Map 2015 
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 Verordnung für abschaltbare Lasten 
64
 50Hertz/Amprion/TransnetBW/TenneT (2015): Data for control reserve, available at: https://www.regelleistung.net 
(retrieved on 4
th
 April 2015) 
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and extra high voltage grid. Minimum bid-size is 50MW per consumer.  Primary Control Reserve: 
Very little consumer participation takes place as the technical modalities are still designed around 
generation. Secondary Control Reserve: Consumers participating in SCR, risk potential increases in 
grid tariffs for deviations from their normal (flat) energy consumption profile, which constitutes a 
significant financial disincentive for offering their flexibility in this market. On top of this, resources 
must be able to be dispatched for up to 12 hours. This is despite the fact that tertiary reserves 
should able to take over from secondary reserves within a few hours. Both the call durations and the 
grid tariff structures represent serious barriers. Minute Reserve: Consumers participating in Minute 
Reserve again risk potential increases in grid tariffs for deviations from their normal (flat) energy 
consumption profile, which constitutes a significant market entry barrier.  
DSO and Network Tariffs: As described above, most Distribution System Operators (DSOs) offer a 
so-called “Peak-Tariff (PT)” (Hochtarif, HT) which is used during the day and a so-called “Off-Peak 
Tariff (OPT)” (Niedertarif, NT) which is used during the night hours. The network fee reductions are 
applied to the “Off-Peak Tariff (OPT)”. However, with increasing shares of renewable energy and 
distributed generation on the system, this simple distinction between day and night is out-dated and 
no longer covers on - and off-peak times. Going forward, it will be crucial to re-design the traditional 
scheme in a modern and flexible way. 
Currently, customers using less than 100.000 kWh are paying volumetric rates. Since there are high 
charges, levies and network fees included in the price for each kWh, demand reduction and energy-
efficient behaviour is already stimulated substantially. There are no obstacles for energy service 
companies to engage in the market. However, in light of the current discussion with increasing 
renewable energy self-consumption and the need to invest in distribution grids in order to cope with 
high shares of distributed generation, it will be necessary to restructure the network tariffs. 
Appropriate approaches may include more capacity based network tariffs. 
DSO and Demand Response: In Germany, many large energy consumers (10 GWh per annum or 
more) have “individual network charges” which include discounts for maintaining a flat load profile. 
This is judged by multiplying the customer’s peak demand by 7,000 “full load hours”: to obtain the 
discount, the customer’s annual consumption must remain above this level. This is problematic in 
two ways. First, the provision of ancillary services — especially negative reserves — by the customer 
may cause their peak demand to increase. Second, the regular provision of Demand Response (or 
the taking of energy efficiency measures) may cause the customer’s annual consumption to fall. 
For many customers in Germany, the risk of increased costs outweighs the potential rewards for 
ancillary services provision. In Austria, for example, this issue has been ameliorated by separating 
out balancing energy from normal consumption when calculating network charges, and charging for 
the balancing energy at a much lower rate. This is a straightforward solution that could be adopted 
in other Member States. Better still would be to transition to tariff designs, which are more cost-
reflective. A customer’s individual peak demand is rarely a strong driver of network costs, as it only 
affects the sizing of dedicated connection assets. Tariffs based on the customer’s contribution to 
peak demand on the network are more cost-reflective and less likely to discourage the provision of 
flexibility. 
 
Regulation concerning aggregation 
Third-party aggregation is currently very difficult in Germany, due to regulatory barriers that require 
independent service providers (e.g. aggregators) to ask the bilateral permission of multiple parties – 
including the consumer’s BRP, a potential competitor – prior to offering a consumer’s flexibility into 
the market. In total, an aggregator operating in Germany has to negotiate and sign five different 
contracts: 
 Consumer (agreement on participation) 
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 TSO (prequalification (PQ), supply of reserve energy) 
 DSO (agreement, report of non-availability, confirmation for PQ) 
 Consumer’s BRP (agreement on schedule exchange, BRP-approval for PQ) 
 Consumer’s retailer (agreement on payments) 
A particular difficulty is the requirement to reach a bilateral agreement on schedule exchange and 
compensation payments with the consumer’s BRP and retailer. There are no standards for this, and 
the BRP and retailer often have no interest in working with the aggregator to reach such an 
agreement. The reason for this is that BRPs/retailers usually see the aggregator as a competitor.   
An aggregator may work as a service provider to a retailer. In this case the aggregator is pooling 
loads in one retailer's balancing group. Though it is positive to see Demand Response services 
offered by retailers, this limitation hinders market growth by lowering competition and limiting the 
range of customers who can participate within the portfolio of a particular retailer.  It also does not 
take into account retailer’s business model challenges with Demand Response (See Introduction). 
In the beginning of November 2015, the German government made legislative proposals for a new 
Electricity Market Act (Strommarktgesetz). Those proposals include changes to section 26 paragraph 
3 in the Ordinance on Electricity Network Access (Stromnetzzugangsverordnung - StromNZV) which 
aim at opening balancing groups by the balancing responsible parties for independent aggregators 
offering DR services in frequency restoration reserves (FRR) and minute reserves (mFRR). However, 
the bill still has to pass the parliamentary process and most importantly, the initiation of a 
subsequent formal regulatory proceeding defining the technical details and market processes lead 
by the German Regulatory Authority is lacking. 
 
Conclusions  
Ancillary service markets are open to aggregated demand in theory, however program descriptions 
remain generation centric and act as a barrier to participation.  For example E.ON and RWE, as well 
as aggregators and large consumers, have voiced frustration over these designs, but with relatively 
moderate results. Independent aggregation is not possible due to the requirement that the 
aggregator gains the permission of the BRP/retailer prior to contracting with a consumer. There is no 
standardised process in place to enable the role of independent aggregator in Germany. 
Main Market Enablers  
 In theory, market is open: Ancillary services are open, it is legal to bid in aggregated load.  
 Technical modality: Minimum bids for all balancing programmes have been downsized in 
2011 and 2012, making them more accessible for Demand Response.65 Minimum bids do not 
exceed 5 MW, except for the Interruptible Load programme where the threshold is still set 
at a prohibitive 50 MW.66  
Main Market Barriers 
Germany has many remaining barriers to Demand Response:  
 Roles and Responsibilities do not enable independent aggregation:  
                                           
 
65
50Hertz/Amprion/TransnetBW/TenneT (2015): Minute reserve, available at: 
https://www.regelleistung.net/ip/action/static/ausschreibungMrl (retrieved on 18
th
 April 2015) 
66
 50Hertz/Amprion/TransnetBW/TenneT (2015): ibidem 
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o No standardised process has been put in place to enable independent aggregation. 
An aggregator must have a bilateral agreement from its potential competitor, the 
BRP prior to engaging with a consumer. 
 Network Fees penalise many large consumers for changing their load profile either up or 
down. These penalties remove the benefits of Demand Response for the consumer and 
block participation.  Austria had similar structures in place but succeeded in removing them 
in 2014.  
 Technical modalities are inappropriate and remain generation centric.  These includes: 
o Reserve power requires the ability to be activated for a duration of 4 hours for 
Minute Reserves and 12 hours for Secondary Reserves (up to 60 hours over the 
weekend), whereas the service is normally only required for much shorter periods 
and the reserve power concept foresees secondary reserve to be replaced by 
minute reserve within much shorter timeframes. Markets such as Austria, Belgium, 
the Nordics, and the UK have lowered the required activation period in order to 
allow demand-side resources to compete.  
o Interruptible Loads (AbLaV) The minimum bid size of 50 MW, a prohibitive 
limitation. Very rigorous requirements on the consumption profile allow only a few 
seconds of deviation per month, creating significant entry barriers for consumer 
participation.  
 Technical Modality - Pre-qualification  
o Tests are required at an individual asset level, a significant barrier to consumer 
participation as each small consumer site is treated as if they were a 500 MW 
generation unit. This significantly limits participation, as many loads/assets that 
would provide valuable contributions to a pool through their specific capabilities 
cannot pass the pre-qualification stage on their own. Given that it is the pool 
delivering the services to the TSO, it should be the pool that is pre-qualified, not the 
individual assets/loads within the pool. Many neighbouring countries have moved to 
pool-level pre-qualification, such as France, Switzerland, Austria, Finland, Denmark 
and Sweden. 
o The pre-qualification process may take many months, or in extreme cases up to a 
year at times when TSOs have limited resources to deal with (sometimes large 
amounts of) pre-qualification requests. This unpredictability makes it challenging for 
consumers and their service providers to develop a reliable business case.  
 
United Kingdom 
Great Britain (GB) was the first country to open several of its markets to consumer participation in 
Europe. Today, all balancing service markets are open to Demand Response and aggregated load is 
accepted. However, unfortunately in recent years it seems that the stakeholder process between 
providers, DECC and Ofgem has not been as effective as would be hoped in a mature market. As a 
result, measurement, baseline, bidding and many other procedural and operational requirements 
are still inappropriate for demand-side resources, noticeably reducing the number of demand-side 
MWs in the system (even as national capacity continues to decline). Therefore, though the markets 
remain open in name, the actual results are worse in 2015 than 2013-14. If the trend continues the 
UK will no longer be a viable market for Demand Response providers.  
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The BRP and Aggregator issue is not yet resolved in GB. However, as the aggregator is not required 
to contract the retailer/BRP directly, this lack of clarity has not yet had an adverse impact on the 
market. In future, it will be important to clarify this relationship for the fairness of all involved – 
including the retailer/BRP and also in order to open the wholesale and balancing markets.  
The Capacity Market, introduced at the end of 2014, does not place demand-side resources on an 
equal footing with generation. In fact, only one demand-side aggregator, of the approximately 15 in 
the market, secured a contract within this new market in the first Capacity Market auction.  
As National Grid is under growing ‘distress’ because of the growth of embedded generation, 
interconnection and large transmission-connected renewables, and also DNOs encouraging more 
innovative products, the opportunity for Demand Response is in principle higher than ever. 
However, due to poor policy development and design choices, that opportunity cannot be realised. 
That said, due to the highly competitive retail market and the multiple small aggregators, at least 2 
of the aggregators have recently taken out supply licences. One new retailer, Tempus Energy, is 
building their internal balancing processes using Demand Response (they therefore balance their 
portfolio with flexible load rather than flexible generation). Tempus are the first of their kind, a new 
and very interesting development.  If these small new ventures are successful – it could be an 
important development.  Not all consumers are appropriate for Tempus’ portfolio because not all 
available loads are flexible.  Nevertheless, it demonstrates the results of lowering entry barriers and 
encouraging market momentum.  
 
Status of technical modalities and market opening  
All ancillary services markets are open to Demand Response, however as substantial market entry 
barriers appear in almost every market, consumer participation has fallen over the last 2 years. 
Aggregation is possible in all the programmes. The only dedicated programme for Demand Response 
is the Demand-Side Balancing Reserve (DSBR), which was introduced last winter. 
Table 10. Ancillary Services Markets open to aggregated demand
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ENTSO-E’s 
terminology 
National Grid’s 
terminology 
Tot. 
Capacity 
Contracted  
Aggregated 
Load Accepted 
FCR 
Firm Frequency 
Response (FFR)68 
Dynamic 180 MW * 
Non-Dynamic 0 MW * 
FRR 
Fast Reserve Firm 
Service (FRFS)*69 
Dynamic 2313 MW * 
Non-Dynamic 54 MW * 
RR 
Short-Term 
Operating Reserve 
(STOR)70 
Committed 2420.6 MW * 
Flexible 757.7 MW * 
RR Demand-Side Balancing Reserve (DSBR) 318.7 MW * 
FCR 
Frequency Control by Demand Management 
(FCDM) 
Not public * 
 
 
                                           
 
67
 Source : SEDC DR Map 2015 
68
 All accepted tenders active in January 2015 
69
 All accepted tenders active in January 2015 
70
 Data for STOR year 8 – weighted average capacity over all 6 seasons 
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Wholesale Market 
Demand Response currently only directly participates in the British Day-ahead and Intraday markets 
in the form of flexibility of retailers and large industrial customers that are already trading members. 
Capacity Market 
Aggregated Demand Response has access to the Capacity Market in theory, although in practice 
participation rules are strongly biased in favour of generation.  
Demand Response providers and small independent retailers interviewed also voiced frustration at a 
lack of full representation during key meetings.  For example within the capacity market design 
committee organised by DECC, meetings took place behind closed doors for over one year. Of the 15 
participants there was 1 representative for consumers and 1 for aggregators. The 13 other 
participants represented generators.  
The design of the market, reflected the balance of the group, and consumer participation within the 
capacity market has proven impossible. For example, new generators are eligible for 15-year 
capacity agreements, whereas Demand Response providers are eligible for one-year capacity 
agreements. While generators can bid in resources that they will build in future, Demand Response 
providers can only bid-in resources that they have already built – meaning that they had to contract 
with consumers in 2015 for a program that would begin to pay them in 2018.  Unsurprisingly, in the 
T-4 auction, a mere 0.4% of total capacity has been awarded to Demand Response.71Another barrier 
is the mandatory provision of a credit cover for new (i.e., unproven) Demand Response poses a 
significant barrier to potential participants. A change to regulations, providing longer deadlines for 
credit cover submissions, is part of the current consultation process. 
Short Term Operating Reserve (STOR): The new regulations within the STOR programme strongly 
devalued the market for consumers and approximately 9-10 aggregators have left.  The 
requirements are challenging for consumers, as they require daily weekday participation, with a 
window of 11-13 hours per day, in order to be paid at a competitive level. It is possible to choose 
one time window (morning/evening), but it involves an important devaluation of the resource, 
lowering revenues. Another significant barrier is the long period of time between contracting a site 
and obtaining first payments. Demand Response now represents a limited part of this reserve.  
A positive enabler: prequalification takes place at the pooled assets level. However signing a STOR 
framework agreement can take between 2 weeks and several months.  
STOR Runway, a new option, will shorten this period, as National Grid will accept tenders for 
volumes that have not yet been fully “created” and qualified. This allows aggregators to “grow” their 
pool with financial guarantees, a positive step forward. 
Ancillary services Markets 
Firm Frequency Response. FFR is open to Demand Response providers.  However the minimum 
capacity of 10MW, in both dynamic and non-dynamic profiles. Dynamic is where generation or 
consumption output will rise and fall automatically in line with the system frequency. Static is where 
an agreed amount of energy is delivered if the system frequency hits a certain trigger point e.g. 
49.8Hz.  Fast Reserve Firm Service. The FRFS programme requirements are very stringent, making it 
difficult for consumers to participate. It requires a 50 MW minimum bid size. Incremental additions 
are a minimum of 10 MW for each bidding unit. Coupled with a frequency of 10-15 activations per 
day, FRFS is not an attractive product for Demand Response.  Frequency Control by Demand 
Management. The FCDM programme is used to managing large deviations in frequency, such as 
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 Auction results available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/capacity-market-location-of-provisional-results  
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those caused by the sudden loss of a large generating unit. There were nine events in 2013 and nine 
in 2014, always with a maximum duration of 30 minutes. The service is a route to market for 
demand-side providers, and is entirely managed through bilateral contracts between potential 
providers and National Grid. 
Another issue: Baseline methodologies vary by market and product. No one methodology works for 
all types of Demand Response, and under current rules, some methodologies favour customer 
generation over load curtailment. 
Triad Charges. Triads, (Transmission Network Use of System) charges – are three half-hour periods 
on three different days separated by at least 10 days (the triad periods), that electricity demand is at 
its highest across GB. They were established to recover the cost of installing and maintaining the 
transmission system in England, Wales, Scotland and offshore. The triad days occur between 
November and end of February. Customers’ average consumption in each network zone over the 3 
triad periods is calculated, and then it is multiplied by the triad charge. This gives the total amount 
that retailers need to pay to National Grid. Customers receiving pass-through charges pay their 
share based on average consumption during the three highest peak triad periods. Service providers 
may send triad warnings to their customers about 20-30 times annually, up to one day in advance, 
by e-mail, text message or other devices in order to warn them of a possible peak triad period. 
Lowering the triad charges brings good value for load flexibility.  
Two new balancing service pilots have been developed to support National Grid in balancing the 
system and address tightening capacity margins until 2016. The new services are Demand Side 
Balancing Reserve (DSBR) and Supplemental Balancing Reserve (SBR).  
 DSBR is a Demand Response opportunity, targeted at large energy users who volunteer to 
reduce their demand during winter weekday evenings between 4 and 8 pm in return for a 
payment However, a very short application period of only 5 weeks in the first tender round 
for the 2014/2015 delivery period made it very difficult to gather sufficient market 
intelligence and customer support for this programme, again resulting in a failure to 
encourage demand side participation 
 SBR is targeted at power stations that would otherwise be closed and is close to Demand 
Response. Capacity margins are expected to tighten after 2016, and National Grid has 
recently consulted on whether to extend DSBR for two further years.  Even if it is extended, 
it will still be a short term, dead-end opportunity, which does not represent a good bridge to 
the capacity market. 
DSO Programs: Ofgem’s approach to incentivising network innovation supports demand-side 
measures when these are cost-efficient: Under the ‘Totex’ approach to regulation in distribution 
price control 5 (2010-15), innovation measures are treated on a par with capital investment; Great 
Britain is the only Member State in Europe with this mechanism in place.  
Network Innovation Competitions, especially the Low Carbon Network Fund (about £500m over five 
years)72; The current Distribution Price Control (2015-23), under the new regulatory framework 
RIIO-ED1, is based on innovation & specific outputs, obliging all DNOs to initiate or adopt Active 
Network Management. Recently implemented and continuously revised regulation mechanisms 
create the necessary incentives for network companies to introduce smart grid solutions, a dynamic 
that helped Great Britain attain thought leadership and become a frontrunner in levels of 
                                           
 
72
 Though the Low Carbon Network Fund has had some difficulty in attracting a satisfactory amount of commercially viable 
projects, partially due to the lack of payments to consumers for providing demand side flexibility.  
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investments in this sector. As a result, five out of the six DNOs are currently running Demand 
Response trials. 
 
Regulation surrounding aggregation 
Independent aggregation is enabled in GB. The aggregator is not required to ask for permission or to 
inform the retailer prior to load curtailment and has direct access to consumers. They may aggregate 
load from all over the country. The consumer, however, is contractually obliged to inform the 
retailer about intended participation. In the future, these rules will need to be formalised and 
legislation introduced which allows third-party aggregation while protecting the retailer/BRP from 
sourcing losses and imbalance payments caused through a Demand Response activation by a third-
party aggregator. 
Concerning BRP’s imbalances caused by load curtailment, the customer has no obligation to 
maintain a consumption profile and British legislation does not address this issue. Due to the 
number of incumbent retailers and the relatively low participation of Demand Response in general, 
Ofgem has so far not seen any urgent need to elaborate such an adjustment mechanism. However, 
Ofgem has indicated its intention to investigate the BRP and aggregator roles and responsibilities at 
a later date. 
 
Conclusions  
Great Britain offers a range of opportunity for Demand Response and encourages market 
competition between providers.   
Market Enablers  
 Open Markets: Most ancillary services markets are open to Demand Response  
 Aggregation enabled: Aggregation and independent aggregators are legal and enabled 
o The retail market is competitive, which encourages competition between providers, 
including incumbents, independent retailers and aggregators  
 Access to finance:  
o The EIS financing scheme (The Enterprise Investment Scheme is a uniquely British 
tax relief mechanism) allows many small companies to gain access to start-up 
finance – including energy service companies.  This alone has had a measurable 
impact on the dynamism of the UK market.  It indicates the important connection 
between access to finance for small companies and competitive energy markets.  
 DSO related regulation:  
o The regulation surrounding DNOs encourages innovation and energy efficiency.  
Again this is unique and is a regulatory structure which could be copied elsewhere 
o The Triade Charges allow consumers to earn off of flexibility. Customers receiving 
pass-through charges pay their share based on average consumption during the 
three highest peak triad periods. Service providers may send triad warnings to their 
customers about 20-30 times annually, up to one day in advance, by e-mail, text 
message or other devices in order to warn them of a possible peak triad period. 
Lowering the triad charges brings good value for load flexibility 
 Technical Modalities:  
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o The FRR and FRSR both allow demand to participate.  National Grid has also been 
willing to work with aggregation service providers who do not fulfil the 10MW 
minimum participation size – on a piloting basis.  This has enabled and encouraged 
innovative program development.  For example more than one provider has begun 
to automate the central heating units sometimes available in lower income housing.  
This is one of the first and only instances of lower income residential housing 
benefiting from frequency payments.  The results have been positive and the 
participation level is likely to increase.  
Market Barriers 
 Biased Market Design:  
o An open Capacity Market can provide critical investment security to Demand 
Response resources.  However the GB Capacity Market design is biased toward fossil 
fuel generation.  Entry barriers are found at every level from the market design and 
bidding process to the technical modalities.  For demand side providers this has 
meant that their competition, generators, benefit from approximately a 1 billion 
pound subsidy, to which they do have access. This skews ever market in GB, as 
Demand Response must always now compete against subsidised resources.  
 Technical Modalities:  
o Though all markets are open – unlike for example Austria and Belgium, GB 
regulators and the TSO have not succeeded in maintaining any fully viable entry 
points for demand side assets and many aggregators and consumers have left the 
market.  
o Changes within the STOR bidding process and availability requirements significantly 
lowered the value of the market for demand side providers and encouraged the 
entry of older generation assets.   
o Baseline and measurement criteria are better suited for back-up generators than 
demand reductions which lower the environmental benefits of Demand Response 
and shrinks the pool of available consumers.  
o The ‘replacements’ for STOR as a means of building demand side capacity, have 
been non-functional and/or short term.  For example the DSBR pilot which as meant 
to allow demand side resources to improve system security by lowering peak 
consumption on winter evenings, is only for 2 years.  This does not provide sufficient 
investment stability to create a robust volume of resources. On top of this National 
Grid allowed only 5 weeks to engage consumers, an impossible and unrealistic goal.   
Unfortunately the market barriers have therefore partially undermined the market enablers and 
British consumers do not fully benefit from the range of programs which in theory should be 
available to them.  
 
Greece 
Greece is still working to liberalise its retail energy prices and complete the deregulation of its 
market in accordance with the Third Energy Package.   
In recent years, electricity prices have risen steeply, in response to the removal of price caps and 
market liberalisation. This has further stressed an already difficult monetary situation. Due to the 
severe recession the Greek electricity sector was hit in 2012 by a liquidity crisis. This was created by 
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several factors, such as unpaid electricity bills, unsustainable support schemes for renewables, 
liquidity tensions in the Greek banking system and structural deficiencies of the Greek energy 
market.  Both the main incumbent retailer PPC and the market operatory LAGIE SA had accumulated 
unsustainable debts.  These have had to be restructured and prices have risen sharply both for 
residential consumers and industry73 between 2012-13 when it seems caps may have been re-
introduced for some consumers (the application of rules has been uneven across the country).  
According the European Commission’s report, European Energy Markets 2014, retailers were found 
to have the second lowest approval rating of any institution in the country.   It will be important that 
consumers are offered services and the ability to better control their costs as soon as possible.  
However, for the moment the lack of Smart Meters makes this difficult.  Efforts have therefore been 
concentrated on the larger Commercial Industrial customers.  
PPC announced plans in February 2014 to cut energy rates for energy-intensive industries including. 
A discount of 10% on PPC rates benefited companies with high electricity consumption during 2014–
15. Companies with annual consumption of over 1,000 GWh received an additional 10% discount. 
PPC offered a further discount of 25% on its night and weekend rates for industries with annual 
consumption below 1,000 GWh. The Greek government hopes that the expected loss of some €75 
million owing to the discount will be balanced by increased consumption by industrial users 
At the same time, they are establishing two Demand Side interruptible programs, to complement 
their existing Ancillary Services market.  These do not as yet allow for aggregation but unlike the 
programs in Italy and Spain, they will be dynamic, auctioned on a monthly basis and intended for 
frequent use.  Greece is also carrying out a full regulatory review in preparation for a CRM Capacity 
Remuneration Mechanism, and plans to define aggregation within this framework.  
 
Status of Technical Modalities and Market Opening 74  
The following table shows the electricity market product or sub-products and underlines where 
Demand Response and aggregation could participate, including related market sizes. 
Table 11. Ancillary Services Markets open to aggregated demand
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ENTSO-E’s 
terminology 
TSO’s terminology 
Market 
size 
Load Access 
& 
Participation 
Aggregated 
Load 
Accepted 
FCR Primary control and reserve 70 MW X X 
FRR 
Secondary control 
and range 
Secondary 
upwards 
reserve 
400 
MW 
X X 
Secondary 
downwards 
reserve 
100 
MW 
X X 
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 All information on the Greek Interruptability programmes is sourced from: SA.38711 (2014/N) Greece - Interruptibility 
service for the electric system in Greece dated 5 April 2014. 
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 Source : SEDC DR Map 2015 
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Fast 
Secondary 
upwards 
reserve 
30 MW X X 
Fast 
Secondary 
downwards 
reserve 
10 MW X X 
FRR-M 
Tertiary control and Spinning 
reserve 
800 
MW 
X X 
RR 
Deviation Management   X X 
Standing reserve   
150 
MW 
X X 
Voltage control 
2600 
MW 
X X 
Black start N/A X X 
Interruptible loads 
Type 1 
1000 
MW 
          * X 
Type 2 
1000 
MW 
* X 
 
 Balancing Markets: Between the day‐ahead settlement and real‐time delivery, the Greek TSO 
instructs units to dispatch in real‐time to ensure overall system reliability.  This market is not yet 
open to Demand Response or aggregation.  
 Interruptibility Programs: There are two interruptibility programs, which have been established 
and will be launched in 2016. Consumers with 5 MW of flexible load may participate. Low Voltage 
customers might eventually be included in the interruptibility scheme, assuming a positive review by 
the TSO. However, they will first need to be equipped with smart meters.  Participating consumers 
must register in the Interruptible Load Register in order to be able to participate in the monthly 
auctions.  
 Baseline Calculations and Payment are Calculated According to:  
 The maximum hourly measured electricity consumption and in each consumption location 
during the previous five calendar years.  
 The active power level for which the Consumer vows in the Interruptible Load Agreement 
that he can safely reduce the active power in the consumption location following the TSO’s 
Power Reduction Order.  
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Table12.  Different types of Interruptibility services, offered by the TSO, depending on the notice time, duration of each 
load shedding and maximum duration of the load shedding per year
76
 
Interruptible 
Programme 
Notice 
time 
Duration of 
each power 
reduction 
order (PRO) 
Maximum 
duration of load 
shedding per 
year 
Minimum 
period 
between 2 
consecutive 
PRO 
Maximum 
period between 
2 consecutive 
PRO 
Type 1 2 hours 48 hours 144 hours 1 day 3 
Type 2 
5 
minutes 
1 hour 24 hours 5 days 4 
 
The Ministerial Decision sets out two types of services to be procured by the TSO, summarized 
above.  Within the notice period specified for each service, the customer must reduce its electricity 
consumption to a level lower than or equal to that specified in the Power Reduction Order. The 
duration of individual load shedding events (and the cumulative duration of all load shedding events 
per year) cannot exceed predetermined periods for each customer, according to the type of service 
being provided.  Registered consumers comprise the annual list of pre-selected tenderers, allowed 
to participate in monthly auctions launched by the TSO. 
 In any case, the total financial compensation for any one month cannot exceed a limit of €15 per 
MWh of electricity consumed by the consumer during the month. Applying the cap on the 
monthly consumption of a consumer is intended to ensure that only consumers that were really 
consuming energy during a month and thus could actually provide the interruptibility service will 
be reimbursed.  
 Beneficiaries are selected on the basis of uniform price auctions, in which the lowest price bids 
will be selected, given the volume of each service requested. The price of the bid selected either 
in full or partially up to the limit of the offered capacity constitutes the marginal price and the 
uniform auction price. 
 Over the duration of the scheme, the amount of interruptible capacity for which the TSO will 
tender will be capped at 1000MW for each service.   
Wholesale 
Load is not accepted as a resource in the Greek wholesale market, even by retailers.  This will be 
reviewed during the development of the CRM (Capacity Remuneration Mechanism). 
Capacity Market  
The government is carrying out a review in preparation for a CRM. The regulator states that Demand 
Response participation is one of the key elements in the scheme.  Special care will be taken in the 
design phase, in order to ensure open access of all interested parties to the new scheme, as well as 
the involvement of aggregators.  
 
Legal framework for aggregators 
As of today there is no legal framework for aggregation in Greece.  This is still under development.  
 
Conclusions  
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The Greek market is still under development and shifting from a regulated to de-regulated system.  
Issues remain concerning cross subsidies between sectors.  The sharp increase in electricity costs 
during this period has caused further financial pain to the population and business.  
For the time being, the TSO has made good progress in creating a market based interruptable 
program designed to complement their existing reserve markets.  When this is expanded further 
within the CRM this legislation is completed.  
 
Main Market Enablers 
 Technical Modalities:  
o The baseline methodology is appropriate and realistic – based on consumer 
capabilities and metering data. 
o The payment criteria are clear.  
 Market Design:  
o The legislation is fully defined, clear and encourages competition through monthly 
auctions.  Bi-lateral agreements have been avoided.  
o The monthly bidding process allows for consumers to participate during the times of 
year best suited to their usage patterns.  
Main Market Barriers 
 Technical Modality: The 5 MW limitation is high for a single user. 
 Enable Aggregators. Aggregation of units is not yet allowed.  
 Closed Markets: The wholesale and remaining ancillary services market remain closed  
 
Ireland 
While balancing market programmes still remain closed to Demand Response, Ireland has seen 
increasing Demand Response activities in recent years. Having phased out its main Demand 
Response scheme in early 2013, Ireland’s TSO, Eirgrid, is providing incentives to Demand Response 
providers to enrol as Demand Side Units (DSU). Enrolment makes them eligible for capacity 
payments in the Single Electricity Market (SEM). The first DSU became operational in July 2012; the 
second in December 2012.   
With a rapid expansion of wind energy and a target of 40% renewable energy in electricity 
generation by 2020, the system’s need for flexibility is set to increase in the following years. Further 
business opportunities will be created with the opening of the balancing markets for DSUs. 
In fact, the lack of consumer access to ancillary services markets today is surprising. Ireland has quite 
severe issues with frequency due to a lack of interconnection with other markets and high levels of 
inflexible generation assets (such as wind).  For example it was representatives of the Irish TSO in 
ENTSO-E, who proposed all consumer appliances should be frequency sensitive (without consumer 
choice or information) and worked to drive this legislation through within the European Network 
Codes.  To justify this extreme measure they pointed to the difficulty of maintaining frequency in 
Ireland and the eventual issues elsewhere in Europe.  Yet the frequency markets, remain shut to 
paid consumer engagement for the moment, though this should change within 2016-17.  
The Commission for Energy Regulation and the Utility Regulator of Northern Ireland are currently 
developing an Integrated Single Electricity Market (I-SEM), intended to be implemented by late 
2017. The detailed design is still under consideration, but they have settled on a volume-based 
capacity market, using reliability options. The I-SEM will replace many of the structures described 
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here. The result could be better or much worse for Demand Response than the status quo, 
depending on some of the elements of the detailed design, which have not yet been decided.  
 
Status of technical modalities and market opening  
A DSU consists of one or more individual Demand Response sites that can be dispatched by the 
Transmission System Operator (TSO) as if it was a generator. Individual Demand Response sites may 
be aggregated to be operated as a single DSU. Eirgrid issues dispatch instructions at an aggregate 
level and the DSU aggregator then coordinates the reduction from the individual Demand Response 
sites. By being available for dispatch, the DSU will be eligible for capacity payments in the Single 
Electricity Market (SEM) while other ancillary services markets remain closed.  
Table 13. Ancillary Services Markets open to aggregated demand
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ENTSO-E’s 
terminology 
Eirgrid’s 
terminology 
Tot. Capacity 
Contracted 
Load Access & 
Participation 
Aggregated 
Load Accepted 
FCR Primary Operating Reserve Not available   
FRR 
Secondary Operating 
Reserve 
Not available   
RR Tertiary Operating Reserve Not available   
RR 
Replace- 
ment 
Reserve 
Synchronised Not available   
De-Synchronised Not available   
Interruptible loads STAR Not available * * 
Price-based 
capacity provision 
DSU 7,046 MW78  * * 
 
Balancing Market 
Ancillary services are still closed to Demand Response. A multi-stage consultation process through a 
review of System Services has been completed by the TSOs and the regulators are analysing 
recommendations. In its recommendations to the regulator, Eirgrid proposes that the services 
should be technology-neutral. New products are expected as well: ramping margins would be 
maintained to counter wind volatility by procuring Ramping Capacity.79 At the moment, the results 
of this consultation process are expected to enable Demand Response in the Balancing Market by 
2017. 
Wholesale Market 
Demand Response participates in the wholesale electricity market from the point of view of bidding 
and dispatch, however Demand Response providers do not earn an energy payment for this. 
Participation in the wholesale market is required to earn capacity payments in the capacity market.  
This is in clear contradiction to generation, which earns energy payments from providing supply side 
resources in the wholesale market and is not expected to participate for free.  
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 SEDC 2015, Demand Response Map 
78
 CER (2014a): Total Capacity requirement for 2015, available at: 
http://www.allislandproject.org/GetAttachment.aspx?id=229e36bd-411a-4a88-8140-f0a43068ad70 (retrieved on 20
th
 
February 2015) 
79
 For a description of these products, see: Eirgrid/SONI (2012): “DS3: System Services Consultation – 
New Products and Contractual Arrangements”, available at: 
http://www.eirgrid.com/media/System_Services_Consultation_Products.pdf, p. 25-27. (retrieved on 24
th
 March 2015) 
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Interruptible Contracts. Eirgrid’s STAR scheme provides short-term reserves to the transmission 
grid, using under-frequency relays at industrial sites. Providers of this service can expect 10 to 20 
unplanned and instantaneous interruptions per annum typically of the order of 5 minutes duration. 
Capacity Market 
A volume-based capacity market does not yet exist in Ireland. Ireland has established a price-based 
capacity provision in the wholesale market, with a fixed cap of total payments being split across the 
year into each half-hour window. Prices per half-hour vary throughout the year, and eventual 
payments are then split between all capacity providers that subscribed their capacity for this 
particular half-hour. There is 80% accuracy in upfront capacity calculations, with wind forecasting 
having the strongest influence on uncertainty. 
The individual units of each pool of loads have to fulfil all technical and prequalification 
requirements. Therefore, aggregators are not able to shield consumers from these technical and 
difficult prequalification procedures: each consumer is treated as if they were a large generation 
unit. This is a critical barrier to consumer participation as it forces providers to go through onerous 
technical pre-qualification measures, which they may not have the ability or knowledge to fulfil. This 
prequalification is also very costly and might even get worse in the years to come, with the opening 
of the balancing market programmes to Demand Response. Prequalification should be carried out at 
the pooled level to avoid this issue. 
An Irish Aggregator states: ‘Ireland exhibits a common problem with its product design for 
participation in the capacity mechanism: technical requirements, which are more onerous than 
strictly necessary. When only a small number of large power stations were participating, the costs 
were not material, so this didn’t really matter. Now that those same requirements are being applied 
to large numbers of much smaller customer sites, they have become highly significant. One such 
requirement in Ireland is the need for continuous telemetry from every site, with a maximum latency 
of 15 seconds.’ 
Once they have filled the Demand Side Unit (DSU) requirements, consumers or aggregators are 
treated like generators in the market. DSUs that are available for demand reduction are eligible for a 
capacity payment in the Single Electricity Market (SEM). They bid in prices and quantities for 
demand reduction and receive availability payments80. However, DSUs do not receive an utilisation 
payment. About €530 million was available in total in the capacity market in 2013 for availability 
payments. The Energy market is valued at €2.1 billion. 81 Aggregators must provide a minimum of 4 
MW bids, but there is no minimum size for individual units in the pool. 
As of today, a meter-before/meter-after system is used and no common baseline methodology has 
been agreed upon. This is inadequate. Nevertheless, a group has been created to discuss the issue in 
cooperation with the TSO.  
DSO: An aggregator must obtain the permission of a customer’s DSO before that customer can 
provide ancillary services to the TSO. In principle, this seems a reasonable requirement. In practice, 
however, it can cause problems, because the DSO has no incentive to take a balanced attitude to the 
benefits and risks of customer participation. This has been a particular issue in Northern Ireland, 
where the DSO has introduced an exhaustive approval process and indicated that they will refuse 
many such requests, or restrict participation to particular times of day or particular seasons, based 
                                           
 
80
 The payments are based on ‘value’ of capacity (month, trading day and trading period). Payments are given for each ½ 
hour of every day (assuming availability) and vary significantly for a given trading period - from zero to €181. 
81
 SEM-O (2013): SEM Market Overview, July 2013, available at: http://www.sem-
o.com/Publications/General/SEMO%20Market%20Overview.pdf (retrieved on 20
th
 March 2015) 
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on what appear to be unjustifiable fears of vanishingly improbable circumstances. In addition, they 
have indicated that the approval process would have to be repeated if the customer transferred 
from one aggregator to another, even though this would make no difference to the physical events. 
Distribution network 
Currently there is not much activity on the distribution network level. However, this is likely to 
change in the near future with strong involvement expected from DSOs. 
 
Rules concerning aggregators 
The SEM is currently an ex-post settled market or centrally dispatched. Retailers do not take a 
position in advance and are not a BRP. All energy is settled ex-post. Therefore, the sourcing issue for 
retailers does not exist.  The aggregator works as a service provider for demand sites gathered to 
fulfil the DSU requirements. He does not have to ask for permission or to inform the retailer or BRP 
prior to load curtailment. The aggregator can aggregate load from anywhere in the country. They are 
treated as a part of the consumer’s unpredictable behaviour.  
Neither the BRP nor the aggregator is charged for the imbalances caused by the load curtailment. 
The Irish electricity market is centrally dispatched, which means that the imbalances are covered by 
the TSO. When Demand Side Units are dispatched by the TSO, the demand site retailer has avoided 
costs (imperfections, capacity charges, Mechanism Operated Contacts) for the demand reduction 
quantity. 
 
Conclusions 
Main Market Enablers 
 Investment Security:  
o The capacity payments within the capacity market support investment security and 
consumer engagement.  
 Aggregators enabled:  
o The fact that Ireland is centrally dispatched removes the need for the retailer and 
aggregator to interact directly, or for a standardised process or BRP-Aggregator 
payment mechanisms to be put in place. This significantly lowers entry barriers for 
aggregators.  
 Technical Modalities:  
o The minimum bid size of 4 MW and the permission of aggregation for DSUs is high 
for such a small market but allows Demand Response participation (a minimum of 1 
MW would be a significant improvement over the current 4 MW requirement). 
o The STAR scheme has no minimum bid size, making it very accessible for 
consumption units.  
Main Market Barriers  
 Closed Markets:  
o The ancillary services markets, the balancing market, and the wholesale market, are 
still closed to Demand Response and to aggregation.  
 Technical Modalities:  
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o The prequalification process for DSUs has to be fulfilled on an individual asset level 
at a significant added cost.  Prequalification should take place at the pooled level 
and the role of the aggregator should be respected as in GB, France, Denmark, 
Sweden, Finland.. 
o The mechanism involved in the quantification of value within the capacity market is 
complicated and could be made more transparent.  
o The requirement for continuous telemetry from every site, with a maximum latency 
of 15 seconds. 
 DSO Issues:  
o In Ireland (Germany and Belgium), an aggregator must obtain the permission of a 
customer’s DSO before that customer can provide ancillary services to the TSO. In 
principle, this seems a reasonable requirement. In practice, however, it can cause 
problems, because the DSO has no incentive to take a balanced attitude to the 
benefits and risks of customer participation.  
o In Northern Ireland, where the DSO has introduced an exhaustive approval process 
and indicated that they will refuse many such requests, or restrict participation to 
particular times of day or particular seasons, based on what appear to be 
unjustifiable fears of vanishingly improbable circumstances.  
o In addition, they have indicated that the approval process would have to be 
repeated if the customer transferred from one aggregator to another, even though 
this would make no difference to the physical events. 
 
Italy  
Context 
In recent years, the electricity market has been characterized by rapid growth of renewable 
generation and by a decrease of electricity consumption. Italy relies mostly on hydro and gas for its 
flexibility needs, while the frameworks for Demand Response participation in the ancillary service 
market, the balancing or the wholesale market, are not yet in place. The only exception is the 
interruptible contracts programme, which is a dedicated Demand Response programme separate 
from the balancing market.  
The enrolment of interruptible loads is currently about 4 GW, with a minimum size of 1 MW to 
participate. Aggregation is not allowed. The payments are attractive and related mostly to 
availability payments rather than real utilisation. The programme has been called very few times 
during the last decade.  In fact it is unclear if it has ever been activated. 
Flexibility can access the day-ahead market, but only as demand bids with indication of price, 
through the retailer/BRP.  
The possible opening of balancing products to demand-side resources could lead to an increase of 
load participation. The potential progress is reflected in the strategic guidelines for the period of 
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2015-2018, in which the Italian NRA (AEEG) included the evaluation of demand-side mechanisms, for 
further market development82.  
 
Markets open to Demand Response 
The following table shows the electricity market product or sub-products and underlines where 
Demand Response and aggregation could participate, including related market sizes. 
 
Table 14. Ancillary Services Markets open to aggregated demand
83
 
ENTSO-E’s 
terminology 
TERNA’s terminology Market Size 
Load Access & 
Participation 
Aggregated 
Load 
Accepted 
FCR Primary Frequency Control 
1,5% of the 
total installed 
power 
  
FRR 
Secondary Frequency 
Control 
4,77 TWh84   
RR Tertiary Reserve 8,99 TWh   
 
Interruptible 
(Mainland) 
Fast 3.300 MW * 3.300 MW  
Emergency 0 MW * 0 MW  
Interruptible 
(Islands) 
Fast 
389 MW Sicily 
372 MW 
Sardinia85 
*389 MW Sicily 
372 MW Sardinia 
 
 Capacity Market 
Not yet 
defined 
? 
Not yet 
defined 
 
Balancing Market 
Market participation is not yet allowed for aggregators or Demand Response. 
Primary Frequency Control is an uncompensated service, mandatory for non-intermittent 
generators bigger than 10MW86. Secondary Frequency Control and Tertiary Reserve are paid 
services, but not open to load curtailment. The NRA considered starting by the end of 2015 
identifying market entry barriers and possible changes in the programmes in order to enlarge 
participation. In this context, load participation could be evaluated, though this remains unclear. The 
possible participation of demand-side resources would require a control centre operating 24/7, 
which is a market entry barrier. The rules regarding verification and definition of baseline are not 
explicit yet. 
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 AEEG (2014a): “DCO 528/2014/A, consultation document”, published on 30 October 2014, available at: 
http://www.autorita.energia.it/allegati/docs/14/528-14.pdf  
83
 SEDC 2015, Demand Response Map 
84
 AEEG (2014b): “Report 428/2014/I/eel, annex A”, of 7 August 2014, art. 9.1, 2013 values, available at: 
http://www.autorita.energia.it/allegati/docs/14/428-14.pdf  
85
 Terna (2013): Action results for the period 2013-2015 
86
 Terna: “Allegato A15 Codice di Rete, Partecipazione alla regolazione di Frequenza e frequenza-potenza (Grid Code, 
Annex 15, Participation to frequency and to frequency-voltage control)”, art.4, available at: 
http://www.terna.it/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=TwRReqwHbvk=  
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Interruptible Contracts. The participation is allowed for consumers with a minimum available 
curtailment potential of 1 MW for each site87.  
Interruptible Loads, managed by the Italian TSO (Terna), are trigged after a TSO’s order and have to 
react almost instantly (200 ms). Some conditions vary between mainland Italy and insular Italy (Sicily 
and Sardinia). Specifically, in mainland Italy, all the capacity has been already contracted for 3 years, 
starting from 2015. New entrants are only provided access in case of some participants’ withdrawal. 
Aggregation is not allowed.   
Participation is allowed for Consortium or community owned utility, which is a legal association of 
private companies or public bodies (i.e. agricultural associations, associations of public bodies, 
etc.)88. In that case, the Consortium manages all the energy needs for the group. Only two 
Consortiums were awarded for the 2015-2017 tender 89.  
This program is rarely called and could be seen as a form of state subsidy for large industry.  In fact, 
when the regulator has looked to open the market and allow in real bidding and aggregation, there 
has been some resistance on the part of these large consumers, as they are concerned they could 
lose this revenue stream in a competitive and open market.  
Wholesale Market 
Large industrial consumers can access the spot market in a single or aggregated form (as dispatching 
user), with demand bids with indication of price as part of their supply contract90. The participation 
is low as entry is difficult and very little activity takes place. The context of raising economic 
constraints could explain a small increase in the last few years. Participants entered offer for 46,5 
TWh in 2013 of which only 5,9 TWh were accepted.  
In the Spot Market, consumers should belong to the same market zone91, and bid a minimum of 1 
MWh. The participation fee is € 7.500, for the registration to the platform, and €10.000 as yearly 
fee, plus some variable costs over the electricity traded92.  Therefore, the cost of entry is high for a 
single consumer and aggregation is not allowed.  
Capacity Market 
In 2014, the NRA approved a new regulation for the capacity market in order to replace the previous 
temporary framework93. The tender-based market will be administered by the TSO. In this 
regulation, the NRA underlined that the demand-side resources should be able to access this market 
from the first auctions. The final rules would have to be closely monitored to prevent any form of 
prejudice to demand-side resources.  
 
                                           
 
87
 Terna (2015a): “Regolamento per l’approvvigionamento a termine delle risorse interrompibili istantaneamente e di 
emergenza nel triennio 2015-2017 (Regulatory framework for the period 2015-2017)”, art.2, available at: 
http://www.terna.it/linkclick.aspx?fileticket=6Df1L3TCJsA%3D&tabid=663  
88
 Terna (2015), ibid. 
89
 Consorzio Lattiere Virgilio Soc. agr. (agricultural) with 2MW, and Consorzio Toscana Energia Spa. (public bodies of 
Tuscany Region) with 211MW, Terna: “Auction results Fast Interruptible Contracts, period 2015/2017”, Ibid. 
90
 Italian electricity market is divided into 6 market zones: North, Central North, Central South, South, Sicilia and Sardinia. 
91
 Italian electricity market is divided into 6 market zones: North, Central North, Central South, South, Sicilia and Sardegna 
92
 GME (2015): “Corrispettivi (Fees)”, available at: 
www.mercatoelettrico.org/en/Mercati/MercatoElettrico/corrispettivi.aspx (retrieved on 15
th
 April 2015) 
93
 Ministry of Economic Development (2014): GU 158/2014, 10 July 2014 (Italian Official Gazette), Decree 30 June 2014 
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DSO Programs  
As in most European countries, programmes run by the DSOs are still limited or in a pilot phase. 
Some pilot projects seek to evaluate the potential of Demand Response at DSO level.  
 
Rules Concerning Aggregators 
Demand Response does not have access to the markets and aggregation is not enabled.  In the 
specific case of Interruptible Load Programme, to participate, a consumer is required to be a BRP or 
have an agreement with a BRP (dispatching user in that case)94. 
 
Conclusions 
Italy is in the process of performing a regulatory review. The TSO is concerned by increasing issues 
with frequency and system security and is searching for demand side solutions.  The regulator is also 
aware that the current rules are not compliant with current EU regulation. They also want to see 
their market brought in line with the developments in other European Member States.  Assuming 
this review is productive we can expect to see changes within the next 2-3 years in Italy.  
That said, they may continue to face resistance from existing large consumers who are adapted to 
receiving the availability payment through their interruptible contracts, without significant 
participation in the market. 
Main Market Enablers  
 The largest consumers are able to act directly and they receive a payment for contracting 
directly with the TSO and signing an interruptible contract.  
 Very large consumers can also participate directly in the Spot Market if they wish to pay the 
€17,000 upfront fee and €10,000 annually thereafter.  
 The best aspect of the market today is that the TSO, DSO and the regulator are aware of the 
issues and a thorough review is underway.  
Main Market Barriers 
 Demand Response and aggregation is not enabled within the Italian ancillary services, 
balancing market or wholesale market.  
 The interruptible contracts for large consumers are not a full Demand Response program, 
they are rarely activated. 
Luxembourg 
Context 
Luxembourg is almost 100% energy dependent, there are very few generators, and therefore 
Luxembourg has very strong interconnections with the neighbouring countries. These facts have a 
major blueprint on local generation, electricity grid and consequently on the possibilities for 
Demand Response. 
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 Terna (2015c): “Contratto tipo per la regolazione del servizio di interrompibilità istantanea (Framework Interruptible 
Loads)”, premise (j), available at: http://www.terna.it/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=79I33oECozE%3D&tabid=106&mid=468 
(retrieved on 15
th
 April 2015) 
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Market participants 
The Institut Luxembourgeois de Régulation (ILR) is the National Regulatory Authority. Besides 
electricity, ILR is also responsible for regulating other sectors such as the telecoms and postal 
sectors. As an electricity and gas NRA, ILR is also responsible for network access and pricing, cross-
border cooperation, monitoring investment plans and monitoring the function and transparency of 
the energy markets ((DG ENER) 2014). It also the mission of the NRA to support Demand Response 
and to put it on equal footing with generation (JRC 2015). 
 
The electricity market is not fully unbundled, because Luxembourg has asked for an exception based 
on Article 44(2) of the Electricity Directive. Therefore, Creos Luxembourg S.A (the transmission and 
distribution system operator), five distribution system operators (DSOs)  and one industrial system 
operator (ISO) manage the grid jointly ((DG ENER) 2014). 
 
Markets open to consumer participation 
Legally, Demand Response, as well as aggregators are eligible to participate in any of the electricity 
markets, and theoretically the NRA does not distinguish between the eligibility of generation and 
demand management. However, in effect, no DR takes part in the market and a change in this is not 
foreseen (JRC 2015). 
Balancing Market 
The situation in Luxembourg is particular due to its small size and lack of generators. The balancing 
market is fully integrated with Germany, whereas Germany performs all balancing activities, based 
on a bilateral contract between the German and the Luxembourgish TSOs. The same prices and rules 
apply to the local BRPs as to the German counterparts. The integration is in line with the European 
aspirations for internationally interconnected grids. 
There are BRPs in Luxembourg, however BSP does not exist. For demand to participate in the 
market, the Luxembourgish BSP would have to apply to the German TSO, however this procedure is 
not established. There is no platform and the IT solutions have not been set up. The TSO has studied 
the costs and benefits and found that the costs to create such a platform are too high compared to 
the DR potential. It is currently under discussion whether there should be an explicit incentive both 
to generators and demand flexibility providers to encourage participation in the balancing market. 
Wholesale Market 
There is currently no national power exchange or spot market for electricity, but the absence of 
congestion on interconnectors means wholesale operators can participate on other power 
exchanges, such as the European Power Exchange SE (EPEX SPOT SE), both in the day-ahead and the 
intra-day markets. Therefore, the same rules, practices and barriers apply as in Germany (see the 
chapter on Germany). 
 
Status of regulation concerning demand response 
The Energy Efficiency Directive Art. 15 was transposed on 19 June 2015 through the Act of 1 August 
2007 concerning the organisation of the electricity market and the Act of 1 August 2007 concerning 
the organisation of the gas market (JRC 2015), following a long legislative procedure (Ministry of 
Economy 2014). According to the law, DR is allowed on all markets, including balancing, wholesale 
and ancillary markets. 
Article 20, new paragraph 5 of the amended Act concerning the organisation of the electricity 
market requires that calculation methods for network tariffs contain incentives for network 
operators so that they can provide services to network users permitting them to implement energy 
efficiency measures in respect to the development of smart grids. In this respect, the network 
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operators must take into account the cost-benefit ratio of the individual measures (Ministry of 
Economy 2014). Furthermore, Art. 20, new paragraph 1 requires that demand response and other 
energy efficiency improvements are enabled by network tariffs. Network tariffs must also reflect 
cost savings in networks achieved from demand-side and demand-response measures and 
distributed generation (including savings from lowering the cost of delivery or network investment 
and a more optimal operation of the network). 
Network operators must treat suppliers of demand response services in a non-discriminatory 
manner, on the basis of their technical capabilities and subject to the technical constraints inherent 
in the operation of their networks (Art. 27, new paragraph 7).  
The regulatory authority must encourage the participation of demand-side resources, such as 
demand response, in the wholesale and retail markets to the same extent as supply-side resources 
(Art. 54(2), new subsections u) and v)). The regulatory authority must also support  access and 
participation of demand response in balancing,  reserve  and  other  system  services  markets. To do 
this, the regulatory authority must define the technical modalities for participation in these markets. 
 
Smart meters and smart grids 
A mandatory smart meter roll-out by 2016 was decided in 2012, which was postponed lately to 
2020. The costs are integrated into the network tariffs. This will allow the application of time-of-use 
tariffs. In this future model, small consumers will contract retailers 
 
Conclusions 
Demand Response is not used in Luxembourg. The legal basis has been established, including the 
eligibility of aggregators, however, as a result of the particularity of the Luxembourgish electricity 
system, a practical implementation has not followed. 
Main markets enablers 
The future integration of Demand Response is prepared via the established legal basis and a possible 
consideration of increasing the balancing power locally through the use of local load management. 
At the moment this inspiration is not adopted. 
Main market barriers  
The market is mainly limited because of the lack of the technical and procedural solution to join into 
the German market. The contract between the German and Luxembourgish TSO fully serves the 
needs for balancing the national electricity market. 
 
The Netherlands  
Context 
The Netherlands presents an interesting model, as the TSO has succeeded in enabling a significant 
amount of demand-side flexibility with relatively simple market structures, namely clear and timely 
price signals – particularly to green-house owners. This is positive and offers an opportunity to 
enable further market development through encouraging market competition between service 
providers.  
Tennet, the Dutch TSO, estimates that currently up to 1 GW of flexibility (including generation 
assets) may be present in the Dutch market. The total volume of balancing energy activated by the 
TSO per year presently stands at 500 GWh. 
The balancing market plays a central role in the Dutch electricity system. The main drivers for 
demand-side participation is imbalance management of BRPs for their own portfolios and so-called 
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“passive balancing”, which presents the advantage of simplicity, but prevents third-party aggregator 
to access consumers directly.  
 
 Status of technical modalities and market opening 
The table below gives an overview of the programmes used by Tennet in order to balance the Dutch 
network: 
15. Table Ancillary Services Markets open to aggregated demand
95
 
ENTSO-E’s 
terminology96 
TSO’s 
terminology 
Tot. Capacity Contracted Load Access & 
Participation 
Aggregated 
Load Accepted 
FCR Primary Control  
(Primäre Regeling) 
Weekly procurement   
aFRR Regulating Capacity  
(Regelvermogen) 
300 MW, yearly 
procurement; 
Additional voluntary bids 
per ISP (15 mins) 
* 
 (portfolio 
product, 
presumably no 
load involved) 
mFRR Reserve Capacity 
(Reservevermogen) 
Voluntary bids only, per 
ISP (15 mins) 
* * 
mFRR Emergency Power  
(Noodvermogen + 
Omgekeerd 
Noodvermogen) 
350 MW 97 + 150 MW, 
yearly procurement 
* 
 (>230 MW 
industrial load 
and aggregated 
resources) 
RR Replacement 
Reserves 
Traded on the intraday market 
 
The largest share of demand-side flexibility is used in “passive balancing/passive contribution”. It is 
based on voluntary contributions from BRPs to balance the grid, without being actively selected via a 
bidding ladder. This structure is unique to the Netherlands and therefore not easily repeatable in 
other Member States.  
In case of a short or long market, the BRPs can be rewarded for their imbalance – instead of being 
penalised, as it may happen in other countries, if their position contributes to the balancing of the 
whole network. Such a solution is possible due to publicly available near real-time imbalance 
positions and prices 98 . The BRP’s aggregators typically pool demand-side resources from 
greenhouses, hospitals, small industries with CHP and load shedding capabilities, which react to 
these prices often through automated controls.  
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 SEDC 2015, Demand Response Map 
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 Elia (2014): “Potential cross-border balancing cooperation between the Belgian, Dutch and German electricity 
Transmission System Operators”, p. 4, available at: http://www.elia.be/~/media/files/Elia/users-
group/141008_Final_report.pdf (retrieved on 14 March 2015) 
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 Energie Keuze (2014): “Tennet zoekt nieuwe leverancier noodvermogen na wegvallen 100 MW”, available at: 
http://www.energiekeuze.nl/nieuws.aspx?id=1926. (retrieved on 14 March 2015) 
98
 “In the Dutch imbalance management system control area imbalance positions and imbalance price are made public in 
near real-time. Therefore all market participants have the opportunity to voluntarily contribute to the TSO’s efforts in 
maintaining the system balance. This so called ‘passive contribution’ is believed to result in a substantial reduction in the 
required control energy.” TenneT (2011): “Imbalance Management TenneT Analysis report”, p. 14, available at: 
http://www.tennettso.de/site/binaries/content/assets/transparency/publications/tender-of-balancing-power/imbalance-
management-tennet---analysis-report.pdf (retrieved on 15 March 2015) 
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Balancing Market and Ancillary Services 
Demand Response and aggregation are allowed in Frequency Restoration Reserves (FRR) – 
automatic and manual (it includes Regulating, Reserve and Emergency Power), and in Replacement 
Reserves. Primary Control does not allow load access and aggregation.  FCR. Primary Reaction is 
tendered on a weekly basis. The participants should have a framework agreement signed. It is a 
symmetrical product and therefore blocks most demand-side units from participating. aFRR. 
Regulating Capacity is contracted through yearly procurement, and spontaneous bids are also 
possible. The minimum size of a bid is 4 MW. Submitted bids are selected in a common merit order.  
mFRR. Reserve Capacity is procured through voluntary bids. It is divided into Reserve Capacity for 
balancing purposes and for other purposes; the latter serves for re-dispatch and is not a part of 
balancing market. In the Regulating/Reserve Power scheme, large electricity consumers (> 60 MW) 
are required to make their flexibility resources available to the TSO99. All other parties can do so on 
a voluntary basis. Bidders are free to state the conditions for activation. These include automatic 
activation or scheduled products, activation time and bid price. The TSO then accepts the bids 
according to its needs. Replacement Reserves are traded on the intraday market; they are not 
activated by the TSO. In 2013, 48% of the total Dutch load was traded via Power NL Day-Ahead 
Market100. 
Network Congestion Management 
The programme, introduced by Tennet in 2008, aimed to distribute limited amounts of transmission 
capacity. In case of expected congestion, a participant (generator) could offer to refrain from 
injecting electricity into the grid in exchange for payments. However, the programme is not currently 
active and does not include the possibility for consumers to reduce consumption for the same 
payment. 
Emergency Capacity 
Noodvermogen is contracted annually via tenders in May/June. Since 2014, it is procured separately 
for downward and upward regulation, allowing consumer loads to participate. The contracted 
volume has to be provided within 15 min., and shall be available nearly 24/7 (required availability 
amounts to 97 – 100%). The minimum contracted volume is 20 MW101, and it can also come in an 
aggregated form102. The Emergency Capacity is therefore difficult to enter for new entrants as the 
20 MW minimal load required acts as a significant barrier to participation.  
Wholesale market 
The wholesale market is a portfolio market for buying and selling energy. Demand Response offers 
can be bided into the wholesale market through the retailers’ supply contract.  
                                           
 
99
 Tennet (2012): “Implementation Guide”, available at: 
http://www.tennet.org/english/images/120214%20SO%20SOC%2012-
xxx%20Uitvoeringsregels%204%202%20%20UKclean_tcm43-19026.pdf (retrieved on 14 March 2015) 
100
APX Holding BV (2014): “Annual Report 2013”, p 11, available at: http://www.apxgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/APX-
Group-Annual-Report-20131.pdf (retrieved on 15 March 2015) 
101
 Tennet (2013): “Memorandum to Retailers Emergency power”, available at: 
http://www.tennet.eu/nl/fileadmin/downloads/About_Tennet/ENGELS-SO-SOC_13-
056_Productinformatie_noodvermogen.pdf (retrieved on 13 March 2015) 
102
Tennet, “Noodvermogen”, available at: 
http://www.tennet.eu/nl/fileadmin/downloads/About_Tennet/Publications/Other_Publications/plugin-
120521_Brochure_noodvermogen_tcm43-20672.PDF (retrieved on 14 March 2015) 
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DSO Programs: There are few experimental projects run by DSOs, focused on electricity storage or 
use of smart technologies.  
 
Rules governing aggregation 
In the Netherlands, competition over demand-side services is not enabled. The offering is always 
bundled with the sale of electricity and by a BRP (the non-competitive portion of a Retailer). 
Consumers must either reject the entire service or accept the aggregator’s/BRP combined offer, or 
try to re-negotiate their entire retail contract with another retailer in order to access the Demand 
Response services they required. 
Aggregators in the Dutch Market offer portfolio optimisation services to BRPs only, through trading 
on the day-ahead, intraday and balancing markets. BRPs optimise imbalances through real-time 
dispatch and may act as balancing service providers. BRPs can act as aggregators or they can hire a 
third-party aggregator for this service.  
In this context, a third-party aggregator is obliged to have an agreement with the consumer’s BRP 
and with its retailer. The aggregator can only work as the BRP’s service provider. As in other Member 
States, this creates a market entry barrier for new entrants.  
The pooled load has to fulfil requirements as an aggregate. This is a critical enabler of Demand 
Response as it allows the BRP-aggregator to act as mediator for the consumer, protecting them from 
onerous technical pre-qualification measures, which they may not have the ability or knowledge to 
fulfil.  
Baseline settlement depends on the contractual relationship between the end consumer, its BRP 
and its retailer. The absence of standardised requirements can act as a barrier as each contract must 
be negotiated individually. For TSO contracted FRR (manual) the BSP is required to supply 
measurements directly to the TSO103. The data regarding actual baselines is only required for a FRR 
(continuously, 4 seconds-based) and Emergency Power (checked ex post, taking into account the 
values 1 hour prior to activation to 1 hour after deactivation, with 5 min metering resolution). 
 
Conclusions  
In reviewing the Dutch market, one unique structure, is the engagement of significant commercial 
capacity in the balancing market.  This is made possible by immediate communication of dynamic 
prices from the balancing market, and the fact that BRPs are rewarded for being ‘out of balance’ 
when this helps the position of the overall market.  Neither of these elements are present together 
in other Member States and may be difficult to replicate as they involve regulation government 
balance responsibility. However, for the green-house industry, this seems to have been a good 
model.  
Main Market Enablers  
 Market Structure:  
o The real-time prices in the balancing market within the passive balancing/passive 
contribution option. 
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 Metering is a liberalised market in the Netherlands; the meter data is managed by the meter data manager. The 
required metering equipment for important connections (superior to 3 * 80 A) is a telemetric meter, with (at least) 15 
minutes resolution. For smaller connections there is no such obligation; allocation of realized volumes will then be based 
on profiling. 
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o The rewards to the BRP for being out of balance in a direction that supports the 
market. (This allows BRPs to work more closely with consumers without concern 
that they will over-respond to a high prices for example, and push them out of 
balance again). 
o The dynamic nature of the market and the willingness of the TSOs to enable demand 
side participation. 
 
 Technical Modality:  
o The pooled load is measured and pre-qualified at the aggregated level lowering 
entry barriers and administrative burdens for individual consumers. 
Main Market Barriers  
 Rules governing aggregation:  
o Independent aggregation is not enabled, which means that competition around 
demand side programs are not possible as the Demand Response program is 
attached to the electricity price.  
 For example, it would be easy to visualise a larger range of consumers, than 
green houses, engaging in the wide range of programs available if 
competitive offers were made.    
 Technical Modality:  
o The baseline methodology is created through a bi-lateral agreement rather than an 
open and standardised process.   
 
Poland 
Context 
Between 2014 and 2015, Poland saw an increase in contracted volume of Demand Response, from 
approximately 50 to 147 MW. However, Demand Response can only participate in the Emergency 
Demand Response Programme (EDRP). The balancing market was opened for Demand Response on 
July 1st, 2014, but due to strict requirements and low payments, there were no consumption bids. 
In Poland, coal is the predominant source of energy. Aging coal-fired power plants increase costs of 
generation, while the demand for electricity is expected to grow continually. As power plants are 
located mostly in the south of the country, the transmission network faces congestion issues to the 
North. Thus, DR could add important flexibility resources in areas of the country suffering from 
transmission and/or generation capacity constraints.  
The development of Demand Response in Poland will require legislative changes, as today there is 
no legal role for the independent aggregator. Another important issue is the question of payments 
for DR providers. Current regulations provide only for utilisation payments, as there are few calls per 
year and the payments are low – this constitutes a barrier to the development of Demand Response 
in Poland. 
 
Status of technical modalities and market opening  
The table below gives an overview of the programmes used by the Polish TSO to balance the grid. It 
can be easily noted that possibilities for Demand Response to participate are limited. 
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Table16. Ancillary Services Markets open to aggregated demand
104
 
 
Emergency Demand Response Programme (EDRP). Today, EDSR is the only programme where 
Demand Response actually participates. The first contract was signed in March 2013 – 30 MW of 
capacity for summer and 25 MW for winter.  
The specifications of the latest tender provide for 24 month contracts (winter or summer seasons). 
The maximum number of activations during this period is 15, and there can be a maximum of 1 per 
day and 3 per week. One “testing” activation is guaranteed otherwise activations are not 
guaranteed. Each reduction can be 2, 3 or 4 hours long. The minimum bid size is 10 MW, which is 
high, and aggregation of individual units is allowed by the BRP. The consumption units have to be 
equipped with at least hourly meters.  By March 2015, there were 5 tenders, with the latest tender 
round foreseeing a total volume of 200 MW to be contracted (until the expiration of the first 
volumes contracted). Ancillary Services. Due to the regulatory environment and the lack of 
transparency, it is not feasible for consumption units to participate in the TSO’s system services 
schemes.  
Balancing Market 
DR participation was allowed as of July 1st, 2014, but due to the measurement and verification 
requirements – which closely resemble those required by large generation facilities and are not 
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 SEDC 2015, Demand Response Map 
105
 from 1 June 2015 
106
 CEPI (June 2015):“Demand Side Management Poland”, available at: 
http://www.cepi.org/system/files/public/documents/events/other/8.%20DSM_Poland_CEPI%20Webinar_AM.pdf 
(retrieved on 10 June 2015). 
ENTSO-E’s 
terminology 
PSE’s 
terminology 
Tot. Capacity 
Contracted 
Load Access & 
Participation 
Aggregated 
Load Accepted 
FCR 
Primary Reserve (Regulacja 
Pierwotna) 
n/a   
FRR 
Secondary Reserve 
(Regulacja Wtórna) 
n/a   
RR 
Automatic Voltage Control 
Reserve  
(Automatyczna Regulacja 
Napięcia i Mocy Biernej)  
n/a   
- 
Emergency Demand 
Response Programme 
(Redukcja 
Zapotrzebowania na 
polecenie OSP) 
176 MW105   
- 
Operational Capacity 
Reserve 
4 150 MW106   
- Cold Intervention Reserves 
830 MW 
(for 2016-17) 
152 
  
- Balancing Market n/a   
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suited as yet to demand-side resources, no DR provider is participating.  The requirements need to 
be adjusted in order to actual provide access. The balancing market also includes “Operational 
capacity reserve”. This scheme provides availability payments as an incentive for the generators to 
be available at peak hours. It is not open to consumers. “Cold intervention reserve” is another 
generation-only scheme, providing capacity (and utilisation) payments to maintain the availability of 
old power plants, marked for decommissioning.107 
Wholesale Market 
Demand Response cannot be traded even by BRPs on the Polish day ahead and intraday markets. 
However, the above generation-only capacity schemes, and the coal subsidies have limited price 
volatility and attractiveness for Demand Response.   
 
Rules governing aggregation 
An aggregator must work through the consumers BRP there is no independent aggregation. As the 
market currently stands, it is unlikely that a retailer will contract with a consumer outside of its own 
balancing area. In EDRP, aggregation service providers/BRP has a bilateral contract with the TSO. 
They do not require a contract with the consumer’s BRP.  
In order to ease the implementation of such agreements and acquire measurement data from DSOs, 
TSO updated transmission agreements between TSO and appropriate DSO and BRPs. 
Measurement and verification take place at an aggregated level.  
Within the balancing market, the pool of loads has to prequalify as an aggregate. There is no 
minimum size for an individual unit within the pool, but there are high requirements in terms of 
measurement and planning accuracy, as Demand Response providers shall use the same baseline 
calculation methodology as generators, which is impossible to fulfil and therefore shuts the market 
to consumers.   
 
Conclusions 
Coal is an important part of the Polish economy and the electricity market is designed to support its 
interests.  The electricity price is therefore set according to the price of coal-fired generation, for 
example prices may not go below the clearing price of coal.  
The TSO is motivated by concerns of future capacity issues and has therefore begun to develop 
consumer-oriented programs.  This is done, however, in a context where the true market value of a 
resource is not transparent and prices are controlled.  
There are also strong entry barriers, such as baseline measurements, which are not adjusted to 
adequately measure consumption reductions.  This is an indication of an early stage of market 
development. If and when the TSO/regulator becomes serious about consumer engagement, they 
will review these issues.  
Main enablers 
 There are positive signs from the regulators, e.g. there has been a development of EDRP; 
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 PWC and ING Bank (2014): “5 Myths of the Polish Power Industry 2014“, p.22, available at: 
http://www.pwc.pl/en_PL/pl/publikacje/assets/pwc_ing_5_myths_of_the_polish_power_industry_2014_report.pdf 
(retrieved on 10 June 2015). 
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 Two open programs: Balancing market is open to Demand Response in theory. 
Main barriers 
 Aggregation: Independent aggregation is illegal.   
 Market structures:  
o Ancillary services are not accessible to Demand Response and not transparently 
contracted; 
o There are no availability payments for the participation in EDRP; 
 Technical Modalities:  
o Complex verification and measurement requirements in the balancing market are 
considered as prohibitive; 
o Lack of legislation concerning demand-side participation hinders development of the 
market. 
 
Portugal 
Context 
Demand Response is not defined in Portugal, though it is not illegal. However, measurement, 
baseline or payment structures are not in place as yet.  Aggregation of consumer load has not yet 
been defined, though the aggregation of distributed generation is enabled.  
The regulator is aware that the structures have yet to be put in place, which would enable Demand 
Response, (such as how to measure, define and pay for consumption reductions for example) but 
indicates that as to date no requests for this have come from the market.  They intend to handle 
these issues once they have a push from market participants.  In the meantime, they are 
incorporating storage from pumped hydro plants in the balancing market and point out that this has 
much the same impact as a demand reduction and is therefore good preparation.  
Consumers have had access to a dynamic price of 3-4 price bands per day since 1997, though most 
consumers have decided to remain on the flat controlled tariff scheme.  
Portugal is interconnected to Spain and shares the same wholesale market, the MIBEL, and 
balancing market structure.  
 
Status of technical modalities and market opening  
The following table presents the electricity market product or sub-products and underlines where 
Demand Response and aggregation could participate, including related market sizes. 
Table 17. Ancillary Services Markets open to aggregated demand
108
 
ENTSO-E’s TSO’s 
Load Access & 
Participation 
Aggregated Load 
Accepted 
terminology terminology 
FCR Primary regulation X X 
FRR Secondary regulation X X 
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 SEDC 2015, Demand Response Map 
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RR Tertiary regulation reserve X X 
RR 
Deviation Management X X 
Guarantee of Supply 
Constraints 
X X 
Resolution of technical 
Constraints (PDBF) 
X X 
Real-Time Constraints X X 
RR 
Power Reserve X X 
Secondary Regulation Band X X 
 
While the largest consumers have a requirement to shed load during a system security event, 
Demand Response is not active in Portugal.  
A BRP/retailer may include consumers within their portfolio; however, there seems to be little 
interest from the retailers present in the market.  This may partially be due to a large amount of 
capacity and the capped electricity prices, which slow market development.  
Distributed generation can be aggregated and sold but there is no specific enabling regulation for 
the aggregation of demand.  And though it is not expressly forbidden, no infrastructure is in place for 
such baseline criteria, measurement requirements, prequalification or payment methods.  It is 
therefore not enabled.  
There are a few large consumers (such as steel mills), which act as their own retailer/BRP, and 
participate in the wholesale market.   
 
Rules governing aggregation 
Aggregation of load is not forbidden but there is no specific legislation allowing it.  There are also 
none of the surrounding rules for defining roles and responsibilities.  
 
Conclusions 
Portugal, while open to the idea of Demand Response in principle, is a closed market, largely due to 
a lack of regulatory structures defining roles and responsibilities, access rights, measurement, 
prequalification and all other technical modalities required for creating a clear path for consumer 
participation. 
Main Market Enablers 
There are no specific rules against Demand Response or aggregators and the attitude of the 
regulator is positive toward development.  
Main Market Barriers 
Portugal is shut to Demand Response and Aggregation due to a lack of regulatory definition and 
structure.   
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Spain 
Context 
Today, Spain relies mostly on hydro and gas for its flexibility needs. As Spain is evolving towards 
more distributed energy generation, the need for flexibility is expected to increase in the coming 
years. Despite the fact that there are certain smart grid pilot projects under development in Spain, 
the development of Explicit Demand Response is yet to start. 
Aggregation is not legal in the Spanish electricity system and there is only one scheme allowing 
Explicit Demand Response: the Interruptible Load programme for large industrial customers. The 
scheme, which is reserved only for large consumers, is managed by the TSO, Red Eléctrica de España. 
The programme acts as an emergency action, in case the system is lacking generation and the 
balance resources are not enough. Though annual tests are conducted, this programme has not 
been called for many years, raising questions whether it is a genuine interruptible load programme 
or a form of subsidy to the national industry. There are proposals to open balancing services to 
Demand Response that could lead to changes in 2016-2018, especially given that a full smart meter 
roll-out is expected by 2018. 
 
Status of technical modalities and market opening 
The following table presents the electricity market product or sub-products and underlines where 
Demand Response and aggregation could participate, including related market sizes. 
Table 18. Balancing market products, including volume and load accessibility in Spain 
109
 
ENTSO-E’s 
terminology 
TSO’s 
terminology 
Tot. Capacity 
Contracted110 
Load Access & 
Participation 
Aggregated 
Load Accepted 
FCR Primary Control n/a   
FRR Secondary Control 2.876 GWh   
RR Tertiary Control 5.142 GWh   
RR Deviation Management 3.252 GWh   
 
Guarantee of Supply 
Constraints 
4.085 GWh   
 Technical Constraints (PDBF) 7.433 GWh   
 Real-Time Constraints 2.258 GWh   
RR PowerReserve 3.010 GWh   
 Secondary Regulation Band  1.203 GWh   
 
Interruptible 
Mainland111  
5MW blocks 1.190 MW 1.190 MW  
90MW 
blocks 
810 MW 810 MW  
Interruptible Islands ≈50 MW ≈50 MW  
 Capacity Market ≈2.500 MW   
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 Red Electrica (2013): “The Spanish Electricity System”, available at: http://www.ree.es/en/publications/spanish-
electrical-system/spanish-electricity-system-2013 and Red Electrica (2013): “Servicios de ajuste de la operacion del 
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 BOE-A-2014-10399, Spanish Official Gazette (2014): “Resolución de 10 de octubre de 2014”, published on 14 october 
2014, art.5, (mainland Spain), and Red Electrica (2013), ‘The Spanish Electricity System’, Ibid. (insular Spain). 
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Balancing Market and Ancillary Services. Currently, Demand Response has access neither to 
balancing markets nor to the ancillary services.  
Interruptible Contracts. The programme does not allow aggregation and is limited to large industrial 
consumers, connected to the high voltage grid. It represents an available capacity of 2.000 MW of 
demand reduction in peak hours. Industrial energy consumers involved in this scheme are 
construction industries (steel, concrete, glass, etc.), or other material factories (paper, chemistry, 
etc.) and desalinisation plants (in the Canary Islands). From 2015, a new framework applies for the 
programme in mainland Spain, while the previous rules still apply in insular Spain112. In mainland 
Spain, 113 consumers were awarded in the tender round for 2015, with 139 connection points113, 
while, in insular Spain, 15 consumers were awarded in the tender round for 2014. 
The programme is the only ‘Demand Response’ programme available and it does not allow 
aggregated demand-side resources to participate. The participants must have in an ICT system, 
which links them directly to the TSO, and not to the DSO where they may be connected. If they are 
connected to the DSO’s network, the DSO does not participate in it, and it is not even able to 
forecast it in advance. The retailer’s imbalance is directly corrected by the TSO, which takes into 
account its reduction order. The baseline is set individually; the available capacity is tested around 
twice a year. The participants have to send the forecast to the TSO monthly for the following two 
months. In the absence of aggregated Demand Response, there is no regulation concerning single 
unit requirement or baseline definitions for aggregated loads. 
Wholesale market 
Only generators with a production unit of at least 50 MW can participate as seller in the wholesale 
market. Flexibility resources can participate in the spot market, though demand bids with indication 
of price.  
Capacity Market The capacity mechanism allows for the participation of generation units only, 
providing both availability and utilisation payments114.  
 
Rules governing aggregation 
There is no possibility for aggregated demand-side resources to take part in the Spanish electricity 
market. There are no standards at the moment defining their relationship with the BRP and the TSO. 
 
Conclusions 
While smart meters and dynamic pricing is now starting to be available for residential consumers, 
the Spanish market has been slow to enable consumer participation in any form of program.  
Demand Response and aggregation are not enabled.  And little serious effort to change this seems to 
be underway.  
Main Market Enablers  
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march 2014 
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There is abundant opportunity – in the form of grid constraints and renewable generation. But there 
are no enablers.  The market is shut. 
Main Market Barriers  
Demand Response is not enabled in any market, accept for one interruptible program for large 
consumers which has not been called for many years.  
Aggregation is not enabled or allowed in any market.  
 
Bulgaria 
Context 
The electricity market in Bulgaria is legally liberalised since 2007, however the actual level of 
unbundling, free market and trading has been limited so far (Ministry of Energy 2015).  
The Bulgarian Government has been working to review the liberalisation process and complete a full 
reform of the energy sector. The Government claims to achieve full liberalisation by the end of 2016 
(Sofia News Agency 2016b). The legal framework for Demand Response is not fully admissive (JRC 
2015), and Demand Response does not take place. Bulgaria is working on harmonising the energy 
policy with EU Directives, and is especially lagging behind with the implementation of the Energy 
Efficiency Directive ((EC) 2015). 
Market participants 
- Ministry of Energy is the main institution responsible for  the development of policies related to 
the energy sector. In 2005, a separate Directorate was designated to deal with energy efficiency 
and environmental protection. 
- Transformed from the State Energy Regulatory Commission (established in 1999), the Energy 
and Water Regulatory Commission (EWRC; DKER) has its legal basis in the Energy Act115. In its 
current setting, the EWRC regulates the natural gas, electricity, district heating and water 
supply and sewage markets. EWRC is responsible for tariff setting and quality of services of 
enterprises. EWRC is also responsible for licensing of enterprises and issues permits for 
construction of transit gas or oil pipelines ((ERRA) 2016). 
- The Bulgarian Energy Holding EAD (BEH EAD) was established in 2008 to act in activity 
acquisition, management, evaluation and sale of shares in companies, carrying out business 
activities in the areas of production, extraction, transmission, transiting, storage, management,  
distribution, sale and/or purchase of natural gas, coal, electricity, heat and other forms of 
energy and raw materials. BEH EAD is a shareholding company with 100% state participation. 
Other key players in the electricity sector as of 2015 include ((ERRA) 2016; Grozdanov and Dinova 
Rusev and Partners 2014): 
 Generation licensees; 
 1 TSO with wholesale functions; 
 4 regional distribution/supply licensees companies; 
 112 licensed traders of electricity, of which 52 are active. 
 The grid is owned and operated by ESO but remains government property and part of BEH 
EAD company's vertically integrated holding structure. 
 
                                           
 
115
 State Gazette, SG No. 107/9.12.2003, last amendment on 06.03.2015. 
  
84 
 
Markets open to consumer participation 
The Bulgarian electricity markets do not include Demand Response yet, but a progress towards real 
liberalisation foresees DR development in the near future (JRC 2015). 
Transactions in electricity may be concluded at prices regulated by EWRC, or at prices freely 
negotiated between the parties, or on the stock market, as well as on balancing market (Bulgarian 
Government 2015).  
The electricity market looks as follows (based on ((DG ENER) 2014; Grozdanov and Dinova Rusev and 
Partners 2014; Sofia News Agency 2016a): 
Wholesale market 
According to the Energy Act, transactions in electricity at freely negotiated prices may be concluded 
between electricity producers, electricity traders, the providers of last resort, the operator of the 
stock market of electricity and the end customers.  
Although – similarly to the  industrial sector – the consumers connected to the middle-tension grid 
(mainly small and medium size companies) were officially not eligible for regulated prices any more 
from July 2012 (Mihaleva, n.d.), but according to estimates, still about 75-90% of the consumers 
were under regulated prices in 2015 ((EC) 2013). 
The Bulgarian market is still small, and in December 2015, the European Commission raised concerns 
about restrictions on the wholesale market. In particular, the Commission investigated clauses in 
electricity supply contracts concluded between BEH's production subsidiaries and third parties, such 
as traders, that impose restrictions on where these third parties could resell the electricity bought 
from BEH. Furthermore, the suppliers of last instance had to purchase electricity only from the 
public supplier at regulated price in order to mitigate the inexperience of the new entrants 
(Mihaleva, n.d.).  
Bulgaria has committed to resolve the problem by offering certain volumes of electricity on an 
independently-operated day-ahead market on a newly-created power exchange in Bulgaria. 
The regulated and free markets are divided according to the below: 
 Regulated market: includes trading of the base load needed for securing the uninterrupted 
supplies to the general public. EWRC determines the base load, which is traded under long-term 
agreements between generators and NEC; furthermore EWRC determines what part of the 
capacity must be reserved for supply of the base load to NEC. 
 Free market: allows that generators conclude bilateral agreements with traders or consumers 
at freely negotiated prices. Typically, the NPP and other major state-owned generators organise 
tenders for electricity sold in the free market. All transfers and payments are cleared by the 
ESO. Some generators also sell at freely negotiated prices under long-term agreements. 
 The Bulgarian Independent Energy  Exchange (IBEX) started its operations in January 2016, after 
a month of trial. The market price will be set by the demand and supply on a spot-basis 
principle. As many as 17 companies participated in the first real session, which is considered as 
adequate considering the size of the electricity market. Experts report a price that is “too low” 
in order to be compatible with what is currently being paid under existing bilateral contracts 
(Sofia News Agency 2016b). 
Balancing market 
The market for balancing energy is based on annual agreements between ESO and the respective 
generator to provide balancing energy. The prices are determined for each MWh under complex 
formulae set by the Electricity Trading Rules, which are adopted by SEWRC. ESO arranges settlement 
of fees due for balancing energy. 
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The grid operator has the right to order curtailment of production in cases of overloading and is not 
liable for compensation for lost profits. Renewable energy production must be granted priority of 
dispatch (Grozdanov and Dinova Rusev and Partners 2014). 
Regulatory status regarding Demand Response and tariffs 
The main statutory act of the electricity market is the Energy Act116, which was revised drastically in 
2013 and 2015. The regulatory changes were driven mainly by political pressure to (adapted from 
Grozdanov and Dinova Rusev and Partners 2014): 
 Reduce electricity prices paid by consumers, provoked by the unprecedented social unrest at 
the beginning of 2013. 
 Address the grave financial situation of the National Electricity Company (NEC). 
 Complete the liberalisation of the electricity market. 
 Transpose the Energy Efficiency Directive. 
Under these changes, powers were moved from the Ministry to EWRC, new electricity trading 
mechanisms were introduced and the basis for the power exchange market were established 
(Grozdanov and Dinova Rusev and Partners 2014). 
However, Demand Response is not dealt with in this policy, although some requirements in Article 
14 and Article 15 of the EED are transposed with the Energy Act. 
The Energy Act is complemented by the: 
 Energy from Renewable Sources Act, which regulates production of electricity from 
renewable sources. 
 The Energy Efficiency Act117 was adopted in 2008 and last amended in 2013. The law fully 
transposes Directive 2006/32/EC and Directive 2010/31/EC. 
Voluntary agreements exist that can serve as a basis for Demand Response actions. Voluntary 
agreements may be concluded between the Sustainable Energy Development Agency (SEDA) and 
the energy sales companies or the owners of industrial systems. There are 4 signed voluntary 
agreements with the biggest electrical supplying companies on the country’s territory and with the 
only Nuclear Power plant in Bulgaria. They all are obliged persons under the Bulgarian obligation 
scheme. 
According to the NEEAP, the legislation substantiates the introduction of dynamic tariffs as a 
measure for the final clients to optimise their electricity use by means of: 
1. tariffs that take into account the period in which energy is used; 
2. tariffs for the critical peak-load periods; 
3. pricing in real time; 
4. discounts for reducing the use of energy during peak-load periods. 
 
Renewables with impact on DR 
The feed-in-tariff (FIT) system and long-term PPAs have been the main incentives for investment in 
renewable sources, following the start of the transposition of the Third Energy Package. The FIT is 
fixed for the term of the PPA (12 years for wind and 20 years for PV). However, following hectic and 
unforeseen policy changes, including the significant reduction in the FIT for wind and solar 
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production, retroactive measures, such as introduction of access fees, a new 20% fee on production 
as well as imposition of financial responsibility for imbalances have deteriorated investor interest in 
new projects and led to the cancellation of a number of RES projects. In addition, in 2015, 
retroactive fee of 5% was imposed on all electricity producers. Currently, the challenge is to regain 
investors’ confidence. The incentives for small hydro and biomass installations are still intact under 
the recent changes but investor interest remains low. 
 
Conclusions 
Bulgaria has not adopted the proper legislation to support Demand Response yet. There are bilateral 
contracts between producers and consumers that were traditionally set up before the EU 
requirements already, however, these involve major producers and consumers and do not elaborate 
as real Demand Response. 
The country is focused on filling in the gap between the EU requirements for liberalisation and its 
current status, and a lot has been achieved during these last years. It is expected that full 
liberalisation could be concluded by the end of 2016, which can open up the market also for 
Demand Response. 
Bulgaria faces severe problems due to overcapacity. This is caused partially due to the economic 
downturn that led to a decrease of both domestic consumption and exports. It is foreseen that 
demand will not grow significantly in the future. Due to the regulatory strictness and long-term 
contracts, it seems to be difficult to drive out the least effective power generation facilities, and 
results in a lock-in problem. 
Main markets enablers  
According to the NEEAP of Bulgaria the new amendments of the Energy Act will introduce an 
obligation for the assessment of the energy efficiency potential of gas and electricity infrastructure 
and for the formulation of concrete measures, investments and implementation schedules to 
improve their energy efficiency. Such studies could form the basis for the admission of Demand 
Response and the technical background. 
Bulgaria’s transmission lines run on great distances, causing large energy losses. In order to 
accommodate new entrants, i.e. new generation facilities to the grid, Bulgaria has to increase the 
transmission system capacity. Demand response integration may be a way forward. 
Bulgaria has started with a few projects to enable a smart grid. In 2009 CEZ installed more than 
18,000 smart meters, which are now purely used for remote metering, but will be available for more 
efficient use of energy by adapting consumers’ supplies to changing daily demand patterns and 
enabling consumers to feed unused electricity back into the grid. A prerequisite for this is the full 
liberalisation. 
Main market barriers  
The legal basis for Demand Response does not exist at the moment. There are changes that open 
the market for an easier access even by consumers, however, the traditionally regulated market 
seems to be slow in taking up even new producers. Bulgaria is lagging behind with implementing the 
Third Energy Package. 
Policy uncertainty and retroactive changes in the Renewables market, extrapolate to a general 
investment feeling. Furthermore, the reduced development in renewables, and the limited grid 
capacity have been considered as a major obstacle for the inclusion of Demand Response. 
Technically, the grid and the consumers (smart meters) are underdeveloped. Although there have 
been a few independent (mostly supplier financed) smart meter installations, the possibility to 
extensive Demand Response is limited technically. 
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Finally, prices are mostly regulated, and only a small portion of the market is based on free market. 
The recently initiated power exchange will be a crucial step forward. 
 
Croatia 
Electricity from Crodux can be bought by all segments and categories of electricity consumers in the 
Croatian market, and the partnership with Alpiq will be gradually expanded in the region as well. 
Context 
The Croatian electricity market is characterised by low liquidity, even though the Third Energy 
Package has been legally transposed in 2012 through the Energy Law118. Competition is very low and 
it is necessary to increase efforts to improve the situation for new market entrants (DG ENER 2014). 
The Croatian energy sector has been concentrated with one single state owned energy holding 
company, HEP. The operations of production, transmission, distribution have been unbundled, 
however supply and trade remain to be separated (Peltoniemi 2015). 
Croatia is an energy importer, with the majority of imports from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Also, import-
relations exist with Hungary, Slovenia and Serbia and Kosovo network area. However, Croatia also 
exports considerable large amounts of power to Slovenia. 
 
Market participants 
The key market actors include the following companies (((ERRA) 2016; Peltoniemi 2015): 
 Croatian Energy Regulatory Agency (HERA) was established in 2004 as an independent body. 
Funds for financing the work of HERA are secured from income from its own activities 
(collection of one-off fees and compensations) 
 The Croatian Transmission System Operator (HOPS) was established in 2013. 
 Electricity distribution and supply activities are carried out by Croatian distribution system 
operator HEP-ODS.  
 HEP-ODS also provides electricity supply as public service, resulting in a lack of full 
unbundling. 
 The Croatian energy market operator HROTE was established in 2005 by HEP-Group, with 
key responsibilities including organization of electricity and gas markets as public service. It 
operates under the supervision of HERA. 
 
Markets open to consumer participation 
The level of legal market opening is 100% since August 2008, according to which all customers are 
eligible to participate ((ERRA) 2016). Households can stay under regulated tariffs, and they mostly 
do. In effect the real market opening is around 50%. 
Demand response does not take place and it is not mentioned by the law. The key reason is the lack 
of competition, which makes Demand Response non-economic. 
Balancing Market 
Apparently, a study in 2012 (Energy Community Regulatory Board 2012) found that “balancing” is 
understood differently in countries of South-East Europe. In Croatian Law, “balancing” is used to 
mean “energy purchased or sold by the TSO to balance the whole system” and also to refer to 
“imbalances of individual market participants”.  
The reserve capacity is fully based on incumbent generator (Energy Community Regulatory Board 
2012), and Demand Response does not participate. The provision of balancing energy for primary, 
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secondary and tertiary reserves is mandatory, with a time-horizon of one year. The payment for 
activation of reserve energy is based on regulated prices in Croatia, which is included in the 
transmission tariff. It is the responsibility of the Regulatory Authority to prescribe methodology for 
provision of balancing services. The TSO is also obliged to act as Balance Responsible Party for 
renewable energy. 
Wholesale Market 
The wholesale market functions on a bilateral basis and the prices are freely negotiable. However, 
the competition in the market is very limited (SeeNews 2015). The generation sector is dominated 
(95% ownership) by HEP - Group and TE Plomin d.o.o which is co-owned by RWE and HEP. The Cross-
border transmission and allocation of interconnection capacity is progressing. 
The power exchange market, CROPEX, was founded in 2014, in order to ensure an open electricity 
market and Day-ahead electricity auctions. It will be launched on 10 February 2016 (SeeNews 2016). 
CROPEX plans to introduce an intraday local market later in 2016 in a bid to join the European Cross 
Border Intraday (XBID) project, and intends to be fully integrated with the XBID in 2017. 
Demand response has not taken place. 
Retail market 
According to the law, all customers are eligible and free to choose their supplier. The prices have 
been going up constantly for households, nevertheless remain low compared to other EU MS and 
regulated. However, the market has seen a few new entrants in the last years. 
 
Status of regulation concerning aggregators 
The Energy Act is the key regulatory framework and has transposed the Third Energy Package in 
2012119. 
Further relevant regulation include: 
 Act on the Regulation of Energy Activities (“Official Gazette”, No. 120/12) 
 Act on the Electricity Market (“Official Gazette”, No. 22/13) 
 Act on the Gas Market (“Official Gazette”, No. 28/13,14/14) 
 Act on the Oil and Oil Derivatives Market (“Official Gazette”, No. 19/14) 
 Act on Production, Distribution and Supply of Thermal Energy (“Official Gazette”, No. 
80/13,14/14,102/14) 
 Act on Energy Efficiency (“Official Gazette”, No. 127/14 
 
Conclusions   
Demand response is not properly regulated in Croatia, and does not take place. The electricity 
market is concentrated, and the liberalisation process is lagging behind, although recent years have 
seen a few steps towards a market available also for DR. 
Main markets enablers  
The market is moving ahead slowly towards full liberalisation. Consumers are open for switching 
suppliers in spite of the regulated prices (Energy Community Regulatory Board 2012). 
Furthermore, the power exchange market is about to be launched, and alternative prices will be 
available. A move away from bilateral contracts is foreseen. 
Main market barriers  
Demand response in not yet legally supported, and even the livberalisation process has been slow. 
Attention is now given to an increased unbundling and removal of regulated prices.  
The electricity system is fully based on the supply. 
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Czech Republic 
Context 
The Demand Response system running in the Czech Republic currently was installed decades ago, 
and it is based on ripple control (Ministry of Industry and Trade 2014). The ripple control system is 
similar to radio teleswitch, in that it can be controlled centrally, only that it uses the power line 
communication (McKenna 2013). Ripple control is linked to the electric heating appliances, providing 
the technicalities for a time-of-use pricing. Though the technology and the price system are rather 
outdated only small changes have been implemented towards modern Demand Response 
integration, and Demand Response cannot move towards a broader application, unless a major step 
is taken (JRC 2015). 
All customers are given a right to choose their electricity supplier and product; however, they cannot 
choose their regional DSO. The access to both transmission and distribution grid is regulated. The 
prices are regulated by ERU and set using revenue cap regulation (Stepan Krska 2014). 
Market participants 
The Energy Department of the Ministry of Industry and Trade is in charge of the country's energy 
policy. Following the closure of the Czech Energy Agency, the promotion of energy efficiency and 
renewable energy was also transferred to the Ministry. 
The Energy Regulatory Office (ERO) was set up on 1 January 2001 under Act No. 458/2000 (the 
Energy Act), as an administrative authority responsible for regulation in the energy sector. ERO is 
responsible for price controls, providing support for the use of renewable and secondary energy 
sources and combined heat and power generation, protection of customers´ and consumers' 
interests, protection of licence holders' vested interests, inquiries into conditions for competition, 
support the competition in the energy industries, and supervision over markets in the energy 
industries. 
OTE, a.s. is the Czech electricity and gas market operator. OTE was established in 2001. OTE 
organizes trading in the day-ahead, the intra-day and block electricity markets. OTE offers 
continuous data processing and exchange required for the accounting and settlement of imbalance 
between the contractual and actual volumes of electricity and gas supplied and received are among 
services offered by the OTE to players in the Czech electricity and gas markets, as well as 
administrative procedures associated with a switch of supplier.  
CEPS, a.s. is the TSO, which balances the supply of electricity with demand on a minute-by-minute 
basis; operates, maintains and further develops the Czech transmission system; ensures electricity 
transmission between generators and distributors; is involved in the allocation of available 
transmission capacity on interconnectors by auction and cooperates with other transmission system 
operators throughout Europe and contributes to the development of the wider electricity market. 
Power Exchange Central Europe (PXE) was established in July 2007, and as of 2016, it offers trading 
in Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, Polish and Romanian electricity. PXE also offers end consumers the 
opportunity to find the best electricity supplier by means of electronic auctions since November 
2014. 
There are three licensed regional DSOs, and the energy distribution market is a typical example of 
natural monopoly (Stepan Krska 2014). The customers cannot change the regional distributor. Power 
plants with lower wattage may be connected directly into the distribution network. The fees for 
electricity distribution also comprise the contribution for RES. 
There are more than 300 licensed retailers. 
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Markets open to consumer participation 
Legally, the wholesale and balancing markets are available for Demand Response, but in practice this 
is limited to the ripple control mechanism (see below) and aggregation is not happening. Traders 
have no platform available to carry out aggregation (JRC 2015). Generation is traditionally 
considered as the means to control the electricity balance, and consumers have not entered the 
market (JRC 2015). The Third Energy Package has been transposed fully, and all consumers are 
eligible to choose their suppliers (JRC 2015). 
Wholesale Market 
The wholesale market is populated primarily by large producers and consumers (JRC 2015). The 
concentration is particularly high, with ca. 80% of the generation market share in the hands of one 
company (DG ENER 2014) 
Electricity trading can take place in the form of bilateral negotiated agreements (OTC) or on the spot 
market (day-ahead and intra-day market) operated by OTE as the market operator or on the Power 
Exchange Central Europe, and on the Czech-Moravian Commodity Exchange, Kladno (Nedelka, 
Lindinger, and Hocková 2012). It is estimated that most of the trading takes place on the power 
exchange (JRC 2015). 
The Czech day-ahead market was integrated with the Slovak day-ahead market since 2009. Czech 
electricity traders can place bids for purchase and/or sale of electricity for the whole territory of 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic. OTE also operates the intra-day market. Trading on the intra-day 
market is conducted via a notice published on the internet that sets out all offers for the purchase 
and sale of electricity. 
Balancing Market 
When the intra-day market closes, the market operator moves the bids onto the balancing market, 
where electricity can be traded to/from the TSO, i.e. ČEPS, a.s. (Nedelka, Lindinger, and Hocková 
2012). 
Ripple control is still the main mechanism for managing the distribution grid constrains, however it 
was widely used to cover the balancing market until ca. 2005 (JRC 2015). After 2005 the ownership 
and control of the system passed to the distribution network companies (JRC 2015).  
The costs of ripple control are incorporated into the price for the distribution of electricity. The main 
reason for using ripple control is to spread out consumption evenly, i.e. to optimise the operation of 
the distribution system. Ripple control is also used to handle emergencies in the grid. In the face of 
emergencies and other high-alert situations, ripple control is used to prevent and eliminate such 
situations and to clear up any consequences thereof. (Ministry of Industry and Trade 2014) 
 
Status of regulation concerning Demand Response 
The central legislation of the electricity market is the Energy Act (Energetický zákon), which sets out 
the conditions for business activities, regulation and public administration in the energy sector. 
More detailed provisions on trading are comprised in the Electricity Market Rules Decree. 
The distribution system is incentivized to reduce overall losses in distribution networks, and 
distribution companies receive a financial compensation if they can increase the efficiency of 
electricity distribution. If a DSO achieves a reduction in the share of losses in distribution, the 
difference between the permitted costs of losses and the actual costs of losses will be realised as 
additional profit (Ministry of Industry and Trade 2014). 
Tariffs 
Time-of-use tariffs and real time pricing are used in the Czech Republic (JRC 2015) 
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Ripple control is associated with two tariffs: the first is an 8-hour off-peak time-of-use pricing tariff, 
while the second is a 20-hour off-peak time-of-use pricing tariff (McKenna 2013; Ministry of Industry 
and Trade 2014). The share and timing of these slots have been changing drastically, making them 
more and more user-friendly (JRC 2015) (adapted from Ministry of Industry and Trade (2014)):  
 Eight-hour accumulation –designed for electrical appliances with storage (e.g. a boiler) used to 
heat water or a building. With this rate, the installed electrical equipment and its load must 
have a value corresponding to at least 55% of the value of the main circuit breaker before the 
electricity meter. These appliances heat up water during the low tariff period. The low tariff is 
controlled during the day based on developments in electricity consumption in the Czech 
Republic. The low tariff switchover time is determined by the distributor. The low tariff may be 
broken down into several intervals throughout the day. The aggregate of these times must 
always be at least eight guaranteed hours. The minimum uninterrupted interval for the low 
tariff is one hour. Modes: low tariff lasting at least eight hours a day, high tariff lasting a 
maximum of 16 hours a day. 
• Sixteen-hour accumulation –designed for hybrid electrical appliances (a combination of storage 
and direct appliances) used to heat water or a building. The sum of the output of all devices 
must correspond to at least 50% of the value of the main circuit breaker before the electricity 
meter. Modes: low tariff lasting at least 16 hours a day, high tariff lasting a maximum of 8 hours 
a day. 
• Direct heating – designed for electric direct appliances used for spatial heating. The sum of the 
consumption of all devices must correspond to at least 40% of the value of the main circuit 
breaker before the electricity meter. Modes: low tariff lasting at least 20 hours a day, high tariff 
lasting a maximum of 4 hours a day. 
• Heat pumps – designed for spatial heating by means of a heat pump. Modes: low tariff lasting at 
least 22 hours a day, high tariff lasting a maximum of 2 hours a day. 
• Weekend – designed for weekend stays, where the cheap electricity tariff (the lower tariff) is 
set year-round from midday on Friday until 10 p.m. on Sunday. 
• Since 2013, it has been accompanied by a special tariff designed for the recharging of electric 
vehicles, which is contingent on the ownership or right of use of an electric vehicle. The low 
tariff mode lasts for eight hours a day during the night. 
 
Distribution and other network tariffs are cost reflective of cost-savings and they do not prevent the 
network operators or energy retailers making available system services for Demand Response (JRC 
2015). 
 
Renewables 
The Renewables Support Act was introduced in 2005, and was a very significant support for the 
industry, inspired by the German energy transition. The subsidies kicked off rapid growth of wind, 
biomass and even solar energy, especially around 2010, when the investment prices declined. This 
caused legislative turbulence due to the socially debated high rates of support, which was overcome 
by retroactive changes, such as the solar tax, which destabilized the business environment. After 
2010, new photovoltaic panels could only be installed on buildings, and in 2014, support was cut off 
without substitution for these installations altogether. Positive changes started again in 2005, 
including an amendment to the Energy Act, based on which small-scale plants with an installed 
capacity of up to 10 kW will not be required to acquire a license. 
The Green Bonus scheme defines a premium for electricity produced from RES to be paid by the 
Czech electricity and gas market operator (OTE) and an obligation to purchase by the DSO. In 
support in the form of green bonuses , the producer has to find the customer electricity itself as it 
can negotiate the price  
 
Smart grid and smart meters 
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According to the third NEEAP (Ministry of Industry and Trade 2014), a Smart Grid Action Plan has 
been prepared in order to explore opportunities to facilitate a smart grid and Demand Response.  
Beforehand, two pilot projects were carried out by the two key electricity companies around 2007-
2009 (JRC 2015). The primarily purpose of the pilots was to assess the feasibility and reliability of 
various AMI/AMM technologies. Both projects met a number of miscellaneous technical problems 
and bottlenecks. A larger scale test was done in 2010 with the inclusion of about 40 thousand 
measuring points (ca. 1 % of all the metering points serviced by the given company), which was seen 
to lead into a  mass-scale roll-out of smart metering technology in one region by 2015, however 
according to the cost-benefit analysis carried out as a requirement of the Third Energy Package, the 
Czech Republic is one of the few countries, where a full roll-out would not be beneficial (Zdanik 
2015). The reason for the result may lie with the ripple control system, which is incompatible with 
the modern smart metering devices, and therefore the costs would be higher and benefits lower 
than in other countries. In 2016, a new study is expected, taking into consideration new 
developments and new legal and political circumstances. 
Therefore, at the moment there is no official plan for mass-scale implementation of smart metering 
in the Czech Republic yet.  
 
Conclusions   
The Czech electricity market is liberalised, and there are a large number of players. Nevertheless, the 
generation is still very concentrated. While, some kind of Demand Response is running and 
successful in the Czech Republic, it cannot supply or the requirements established by modern 
systems. 
 
Main markets enablers  
The ripple control system has acted as a Demand Response mechanism since the 1960s. It is based 
on the dual tariff offers, and is able to compensate distribution constraints. 
At the moment, the prices motivate energy savings. The fix fees are low, compared to the 
consumption-related costs. However, the Government is considering to increased the fee for 
distribution access in 2016, which could actually demotivate energy savings and Demand Response 
interest (JRC 2015) 
 
Main market barriers  
While ripple control worked well for balancing until about 2005, and is still operational and 
supported, it is outdated. However, it is very difficult to step away from this mechanism, which is 
built in and used by about 40% of the customers. While this is a suboptimal solution which is not 
compatible with smart meters and smart grids, the cost-benefit ratio to implement a modern smart 
system is too negative.  
 
Probably in 2016, a new CBA will be carried out, which may value the advantages of developing a 
smart grid system, and thus provide a wider-scale opportunity for Demand Response. 
 
Hungary 
Context 
The energy system of Hungary is traditionally based on ensuring an overcapacity in supply, and 
therefore Demand Response is an alien solution both at the policy-making level and at the 
customers’ perception. There have been no capacity issues for decades, neither are they foreseen 
even on a long term, and as a result, there is no local driver for the roll-out of DR and/or smart 
solutions and/or renewable source technologies. These “alternative” solutions are largely driven by 
European obligations and market forces, and their regulation is rather low scale or non-existent. 
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Therefore, energy policy has been directed more by social than environmental targets (and resulted 
in utility cost reduction programmes), import agreements and the extension of traditional power 
production. 
Liberalisation is not fully successful, switching is rare (Alfoldi et al. 2014).  
Market players  
Based on Alfoldi et al. (2014): 
- 12 companies that operate power plants with a capacity of 50 MW or above; 
- 233 companies that operate power plants with a capacity of 0.5-50 MW, of which 169 really 
active in 2014; 
- The Hungarian Energy and Public Utility Regulatory Authority (“Magyar Energetikai és 
Közmű-szabályozási Hivatal”) – HEA, called until 2013 the Hungarian Energy Office, HEO – is 
an independent body of the administration. 
- MAVIR is owned by the state-owned company Magyar Villamos Művek Zrt. (Hungarian 
Electricity Ltd., MVM), a major player both in generation and on the wholesale markets. 
Mavir was certified by the Regulator in March 2012 as an independent transmission system 
operator (ITO); 
- Operators of private lines: 4 companies; 
- 8 Virtual Power Plants; 
- One large industrial plant, which participates in DR. 
Hungary has a robust infrastructure both in electricity and natural gas sectors, which have not been 
developed through recent years. As a consequence of residential utility rate cuts in 2013 and 
extraordinary taxation on energy infrastructure, companies are dissuaded from making further 
investments, except for a few EU funded projects.(DG ENER 2014)  
Directive 2009/28/EC requires from Hungary a 13% renewables share within the total gross energy 
consumption by 2020, and this target was further raised in Hungary’s National Reform Programme 
and the NREAP to 14.65% (DG ENER 2014). In general, the country is on track to reach its target, but 
RES share in electricity was dropping between 2011-2014 (going below 2009 levels), and the market 
changes dissuade further development, while licencing is almost not possible. 
 
Markets open to consumer participation 
Legally, all markets are open for large and aggregated consumers (JRC 2016), but its scale is limited 
and is not linked to the ideal from the EED. Participation is based on consumption balancing rather 
than capacity balancing (JRC 2015). 
Wholesale market 
The wholesale market is based on long-term (1-2 years) bilateral contracts between the retailers and 
the large consumers, and a profile is submitted to MAVIR, which is confirmed 1 month and 2 days 
beforehand. Direct contract with the operators is possible, but very rare. Penalty is extracted in case 
of non-compliance. Therefore, there is no market opportunity to react to prices. There is an over-
the-counter (OTC) market and participation at the HUPX is also possible. The Hungarian energy 
exchange (HUPX) works well, and about 30% of the supply is sold here. Intra-day tariffs were 
introduced from 2016. Large consumers, retailers and aggregated consumers are allowed to 
participate in this system (JRC 2015), however entrance is difficult and very expensive and there are 
liquidity problems. The combination of bilateral contracts and participation at the exchange is 
common. 
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Balancing market 
MAVIR, the TSO is responsible for the security of supply and balancing the electricity system. 
Balancing is based almost fully on the overcapacity of power plants, and is hampered by the low 
number of participants. Offerings are auctioned, and the price is going down. 
While DR is legally allowed, administrative hurdles are so strong, and MAVIR is so reluctant to issue a 
licence that so far only one company can offer DR services, namely BorsodChem. This is a chemical 
factory that can react very rapidly to changing demand, and has a local CHP power production in 
addition that can be used by the factory to make up for the lower electricity supply. 
Smaller consumers (residential and public) are also allowed to participate in DR, but in the lack of 
motivation and market rules, they are not represented on the market. On the other hand, residential 
and tertiary consumers have been offered time-of-use-tariff system for decades, using the ripple 
control technology. Similarly large consumers have also a choice to select the two-tariff price system 
(also called switching tariff) for the last 30 years, and in this system the network operator is allowed 
to switch on and off the consumers electricity use (JRC 2015). 
Dynamic pricing does not exist in Hungary, due to the lack of technology, which is not yet installed, 
and smart meter projects are at the piloting level at best. Smart grids are used by aggregators, but 
not for pricing. The pilots do not imply a roll-out in the near future. 
While Demand Response is not recognised as a normative practice and/or as a source of negawatts, 
consumption restriction is allowed as a crisis solution through a ministerial decree to be issued 
jointly with the other ministers concerned in the regulation (IEA 2014). 
Since 1979, Hungary has had rules and legislation giving the minister responsible for energy wide-
raging authority to impose demand restraint measures. If necessary, a parliamentary decision can 
also be prepared. Hungary distinguishes three levels of demand restraint: light-handed, medium-
handed and heavy-handed measures (adapted from: IEA 2014). 
The light-handed measures can be executed within a few days and would result in a 2% to 4% 
reduction in consumption. They include: 
 publicity to encourage fuel savings 
 avoiding the use of cars for short distances 
 reducing the temperature of public buildings 
 encouraging a reduction of the temperature in dwellings. 
The medium-handed measures would take one to two weeks to implement and would result in a 4% 
to 8% reduction in consumption (including the aforementioned light-handed measures). They 
include: „ 
 introducing driving and speed restrictions 
 prohibiting driving for one day a week or at weekends 
 restricting the use of passenger cars based on registration numbers 
 reducing the quantity of fuel that can be purchased at filling stations 
 restricting the deliveries of oil products. 
Heavy-handed measures include:  
 the introduction of quotas on fuel oils for large customers (amounts to be determined by a 
crisis committee) 
 retail quotas and restriction of fuel oil deliveries for small customers 
 a restriction on the use of motor fuels by the chemical industry 
 the introduction of rationing tickets for motor fuels in the private sector; the introduction of 
quotas on motor fuels in the public sector 
 the allocation of quotas on motor fuels for the trading and services sector.  
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The impact of the heavy-handed measures has not been quantified and could take two to three 
months to have an effect.  
 
Status of aggregators 
Aggregation of demand is not known. There are 8 Virtual Power Plants (VPP) operating in Hungary, 
with the first started in 2011. They are mostly concerned with the aggregation of small (1-3 MW) 
CHP plants into larger pools, mounting up to 1000 MW capacity. The number of participating 
gasmotors is around 600. The VPPs set up and operate  
                      
Figure 1. The business model of VPP, the first aggregator in the Hungarian Demand Response market. 
Conclusions 
Main markets enablers 
The main driver of Demand Response in Hungary is the natural development of markets. Demand 
response is based on the surplus production of electricity by CHP plants. The small producers are 
collected by aggregators and large consumers may act on their own. 
The HUPX is also a successful element of the DR market. 
Large energy suppliers have ancillary services and even public awareness raising programmes, but 
the government is lagging behind with education, awareness raising and supporting energy savings 
in general and especially in Demand Response. 
Main barriers 
There are a number of reasons why Demand Response has not increased from the minimum level 
that has been present for decades. These barriers can be categorised as macroeconomic or 
structural and regulatory or strategic. The key result is the demolition of motivation on the side of 
consumers and the lack of opportunities on the side of suppliers. 
The key structural reason for a lack of interest in DR is the low cost of import energy prices (JRC 
2015). As long as these are available based on long-term agreements with importers (almost 
exclusively Russia), the relative cost of preparing the network and introducing smart technologies 
(smart meters and smart grids) remains too high. 
Furthermore, wholesale prices have decreased across Europe, and this was also reflected in 
Hungary, while overall consumption (final and primary energy)  actually decreased steadily from 
2008 mainly due to weak economic development (Ministry of National Development 2015).  
Furthermore, the Hungarian government introduced obligatory price reduction on utility prices for 
small consumers in 2013 and 2014, which translated into a ca. 25% price decrease of retail prices of 
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gas and electricity compared to 2012 (DG ENER 2014). With such a drop of costs, energy efficiency 
and Demand Response have lowered values.  
On the public authorities’ side, there is a problem with split incentives and with fixed fees. These 
consumers have energy price (and consumption level) agreements for at least a year, and peak 
consumption is not defined in these agreements, therefore the consumers spread their consumption 
on their convenience. 
The macroeconomic barriers are linked to the regulatory barriers. Currently, there enough power 
plants that can supply the domestic demand and also produce for exports. The governmental 
approach is to expand the supply side (in particular the Paks power plant), which has a message 
against energy and capacity savings. Furthermore, it is not beneficial to reduce demand, when 
supply is being increased.  
 
Figure 2. Gross reserves at daily peak (2013) 
The connection of renewable is technically and administratively difficult. The feed-in tariff does not 
encourage netmetering, even though the legislation provides priority to local producers. Biomass 
has a special support system, and has been growing more rapidly. Wind power and solar power are 
mainly supported from grants, which have been closed for years. 
The energy sector is subject to an energy tax, a differentiated profit tax and a crisis tax. The crisis tax 
was set on (generation and supply) energy companies’ taxable revenue, and later the government 
imposed a new tax on infrastructure, set by the length of transmission and distribution lines and 
pipelines. 
Due to the special taxes and the price caps, several supply companies have left (part of) the 
market. The Hungarian public companies are taking over these markets and produces a 
centralisation process, which seems to be risky and costly. 
 
Romania 
Context 
After the full liberalisation in 2007, on legal terms, there is a decentralized electricity system in 
Romania in which the generation, transmission, distribution and supply activities are separated and 
provided to final consumer by suppliers. The market is continuously expanding since then.  
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Electricity trading on the Romanian market is carried out through two market segments: 
 Regulated market, 
 Competitive market. 
 
Price regulation for non-domestic sectors was phased out starting from January 2014. 
Demand response is legally allowed on the wholesale and the balancing markets, nevertheless the 
activity is very limited. 
Market participants 
The Romanian Energy Regulatory Authority (ANRE): From 2012, after the approval of the Electricity 
and Gas Law no.123/2012, ANRE is an autonomous administrative authority, under Parliamentary 
control, entirely self-financed and independent. Key responsibilities (Vasiliu and Ene 2015) of ANRE 
are regulating the electricity and gas sectors, setting up prices and tariffs for the captive consumers 
and for natural monopoly segments of the markets, monitoring the electricity and gas markets and 
compliance with the regulations, authorisations and licensing ((ERRA), n.d.). 
Ministry of Energy, SMEs (Small and Medium Size Enterprises) and Business Environment: The 
Ministry is responsible to apply the government programme and strategy in the energy sector, 
monitor the energy sector and the compliance with international treaties in the energy sector. 
(Vasiliu and Ene 2015) 
Transelectrica is the TSO: it was founded by the Government Ordinance No. 627/July, 31, 2000 
further to unbundling the former Romanian Electricity Authority (CONEL). The company is 
responsible for electricity transmission, and therefore it is completely separated from the 
generation, distribution and supply activities. From the technical viewpoint, the electric power 
system remained unitary, managed by a unique operator. 
Electricity Market Operator (Operatorul Pietei de Energie Electrica si Gaze Naturale “OPCOM” S.A., 
OPCOM120): OPCOM is the electricity market administrator. OPCOM provides the framework for the 
deployment of commercial trade on the wholesale electricity market and performs administration 
activities of the centralized markets in the natural gas sector. 
Furthermore there are 667 generators, license holders, 8 DOSs with more than 100,000 customers, 
and 195 suppliers, license holders ((ERRA), n.d.) 
 
Markets open to consumer participation 
The electricity market is divided into a wholesale market and a retail market (Vasiliu and Ene 2015). 
Demand response and aggregation are allowed on both the wholesale and the balancing markets. 
Balancing Market 
Demand response is allowed in the balancing market, and aggregation is legally frameworked, 
however, no incentives are provided. 
The balancing market is handled by the TSO, Transelectrica, which also acts as the metering 
operator. Interested parties (producers and consumers) have to either register as a Balancing 
Responsible Party (BRP) or join an existing BRP which undertakes the balancing obligation. The TSO 
registers participants to the balancing market, collects and validates offers and determines the 
                                           
 
120
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volumes needed for settling the transactions. Although this is not explicitly defined, joining a BRP is 
the basis for aggregation, even though pooling is not known yet (JRC 2015). 
Settlement itself is currently ensured by the market operator, OPCOM acting as settlement 
administrator. OPCOM provides settlement calculations for transactions concluded on the day-
ahead market and the balancing market. Settlement services are available for a regulated tariff. 
19. Table Overview of the Romanian balancing market. Source: (Energy Community Regulatory Board 2012) 
 
The ancillary services are obligatory and are based solely on producers, demand is not present 
(ANRE 2015). 
Wholesale Market 
The sale of electricity between generators and suppliers can be performed only on the centralised 
platforms operated by Opcom. Transactions can be concluded on several alternatives, such as the 
Centralised Market for Electricity Bilateral Contracts (CMBC), the Day Ahead Market (PZU), the Intra 
Day Market (ID), Over-the-counter (OTC) market, and the Electricity Market for large consumers 
(PMC) (Cojocaru and Velicu 2014). 
By the enactment of Law No. 122/2015, as an exception from the provisions of Electricity and 
Natural Gas Law, producers of E-RES operating power plants with a capacity not exceeding 1 MW or 
2 MW in case of high efficiency cogeneration have the opportunity to sell their electricity directly to 
suppliers of electricity to end-consumers by concluding direct negotiated PPAs. 
 
Regulatory status regarding Demand Response and tariffs 
Law no. 121/2014 on energy efficiency is the central legal piece for Demand Response. In effect, this 
law transposes all the critical provisions of the EED, but these are not yet translated to secondary 
legislation and/or practice. 
Key provisions are (JRC 2015): 
- Art.15, alin.(3): “Electricity transmission and distribution network regulation and network tariffs 
approved by ANRE fulfill the criteria in Annex VIII, taking into account guidelines and codes 
developed pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 714/2009”; 
- Annex VIII: “Network tariffs shall be cost-reflective of cost-savings in networks achieved from 
demand-side and demand- response measures and distributed generation, including savings from 
lowering the cost of delivery or of network investment and a more optimal operation of the 
network” 
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- Annex VIII: “Network regulation and tariffs shall not prevent network operators or energy retailers 
making available system services for Demand Response measures, demand management and 
distributed generation on organised electricity markets” Note: network tariffs are constant and do 
not incentivize the shift between peak and off-peak. 
- Network tariffs do not hinder “energy savings from Demand Response of distributed consumers by 
energy aggregators”. 
- Network tariffs do not hinder “demand reduction from energy efficiency measures undertaken by 
energy service providers, including energy service companies”. 
- Art.15, alin.(6): “ANRE verifies the transmission and distribution network tariffs and if necessary, 
ensures the removal of those incentives that are detrimental to the overall efficiency (including 
energy efficiency) of the generation, transmission, distribution and supply of electricity and natural 
gas or those that might hamper participation of Demand Response, in balancing markets and 
ancillary services procurement of the final customers themselves or by energy aggregators”. 
- Art.15, alin.(7): “ANRE includes in the transmission and distribution network tariffs incentivised 
rules for the transmission and distribution network operators for electricity and gas in order to 
improve efficiency in infrastructure design and operation and the network tariffs allow suppliers for 
electricity and natural gas to improve consumer participation in system efficiency, including Demand 
Response, accordingly to the Law 123/2012 for electricity and natural gas, with the following 
modifications and supplements”. 
- Art.15, alin.(17): in order to promote access of the final customers to the system services markets,  
transmission system operator and distribution system operators have the obligation to elaborate 
technical modalities for participation in these markets based on Demand Response, that are 
submitted for approval by ANRE. In order to set the mentioned technical rules the transmission 
system operator and distribution system operators cooperate with the final customers and the 
energy aggregators 
The energy efficiency law builds on the Electricity and Natural Gas Law No. 123/2012, which gives 
the principles of the electricity market, and it was subsequently amended and completed and 
detailed in secondary legislation. Electricity-related activities are strictly regulated under the 
Electricity and Gas Law and are usually subject to a specific authorisation or licensing by the 
Romanian Energy Regulatory Authority (ANRE). 
Renewables with impact on DR 
In promotion of electricity from RES, there is a regulatory framework in place including mandatory 
quotas and a green certificate market (AEA 2014), however these have been undergoing significant 
changes between 2011 and 2015, leading to reduced support for green certificates. 
This legislative instability and the lack of predictability proved to be the main obstacles in the 
medium and long term for RES. Furthermore, in new regulated obligations for producers there is an 
obstacle, such as, to pay a specific tariff for the reinforcement of the transmission or the distribution 
grid (a tariff that amounts around EUR 100,000/MW), or to provide for financial guarantees for the 
connection of the project (so that in case the project will not be built, for whatever reason, the 
guarantee will be lost). 
Smart grid and smart meters 
A number of pilot projects had been implemented to explore the validity of smart meters and smart 
meter systems in Romania. These include: 
 Installation of advanced metering management systems to approximately 1300 households 
and small economic operators (low voltage consumers); the meters communicated via 
electrical lines combined with fibre optics and GPRS; 
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 Starting a remote reading system for about 8000 households and small economic operators, 
using GPRS as communication infrastructure; 
 Installation of advanced metering management systems to nearly 13 000 households and 
small economic operators; communication was via PLC (from low voltage to medium 
voltage), and consumption was measured every 60 minutes; 
 An automatic reading system, installed to about 35 000 economic operators, using GPRS 
communication. 
 
According to the 3rd NEEAP of Romania (Romanian Government 2015), a study was carried out in 
2012 about ‘Intelligent Metering in Romania’, and it found that implementing intelligent metering in 
the electricity sector has the potential to be a profitable investment due to the benefits from 
reducing grid losses and operating costs for utilities. 
Therefore, ANRE Order No 91/2013 on the implementation of intelligent metering systems for 
electricity was adopted. At the moment, further pilots are running to test the optimal characteristics 
for each DSO, in regards to cost-effectiveness (Romanian Government 2015). The final timetable, 
with implementation details (e.g. funding) was to be prepared by the end of 2015, but to our 
knowledge, this is not yet available at the time of writing. 
 
Conclusions   
As of 2016, Demand Response is not taking place in the Romanian electricity market. The legal 
framework is well-established, the Government has transposed all the relevant provisions of the 
EED, and the 3rd NEEAP highlights the importance of Demand Response.  
 
However, due to a number of key barriers, DR has not taken off the ground, and for the moment 
there are no plans or actions that indicate a change. 
Main markets enablers  
The legal background is fully in place, both the Third Energy Package and the EED are transposed. 
Based on the legal documents, tariffs do not involve barriers to the cost effectiveness and in general 
for the participation of DR. Demand response is allowed in the wholesale and balancing markets, as 
well as aggregators, but has not taken up. 
Renewable facilities have been sprouting, due to a generous support system, including green 
certificates and later the introduction of FiT.  
Main market barriers  
Although the legal framework is established, in reality, Demand Response is not taking place. There 
are a number of technical, structural and historical barriers. 
First of all, the electricity system is traditionally supply driven, and additional power supply is being 
constructed to cover the full demand, instead of involving Demand Response as an alternative 
solution. Some of the construction is state-aided, and therefore the relative cost-effectiveness of 
Demand Response is reduced. 
Secondly, the legal framework is a word-by-word translation of the EU directive, and it is unclear 
how this will influence the practical side. It has been noted, that secondary legislation would be 
necessary as a next step. In fact, in regards the smart meters there have been pilots and a national 
roadmap is expected, which may have an influence on Demand Response, too. Also, it shows that 
slowly, other provisions related to Demand Response can be expected to be dealt with, however, at 
the moment this does not seem to be a priority for the Regulator. 
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Thirdly, the technical barrier of the lack of meters, sometimes even individual meters (mainly for 
heat) is apparent. There is some move towards resolving this, and it is promising that the studies 
have found that smart meter system have an overall benefit and should be rolled-out. 
 
Slovakia 
Context 
Electricity generation and wholesale activities are fully liberalized in Slovakia since January 2005, and 
therefore wholesale prices reflect market prices and are not regulated.  
The Slovak electricity market is part of the former regional market, CENTREL with Poland, Hungary 
and the Czech Republic, later with Romania. The interconnection capacity for electricity was 61% in 
2014 for Slovakia, which is well above the 2020 and 2030 objectives of 10 and 15% respectively121. 
Import and export prices are determined by bilateral contracts and since January 2005 there are no 
limits on the amounts of electricity that can be exchanged out of the domestic market. (Slovenské 
elektrárne 2014). The price convergence between Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Hungary increased 
from 11% (2012) to 82% (2014). Taking into account all energy products, Slovakia is a net importer 
(European Commission 2015). 
One electricity provider, Slovenské elektrárne, owns 82% of the country’s generation market, and is 
the main supplier of electricity for the three biggest regional distribution companies in Slovakia (ZSE, 
SSE and VSE) and also supplies electricity to large businesses. Slovenské elektrárne is also the main 
provider of ancillary services in Slovakia. While the company is not involved in the electricity 
transmission sector or in electricity distribution, SE Predaj, a 100% subsidiary of Slovenské 
elektrárne, operates in the SME distribution since 2009. In 2011, it started selling electricity also in 
the regulated household segment. (Slovenské elektrárne 2014) 
The three biggest distribution companies (DSOs) are ZSE (West), SSE (Central), and VSE (East of 
Slovakia), which are 51% owned by the State, and the remaining shares are in private hands. 
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Figure3.  Market share of the three largest suppliers (CR3) and the number of main suppliers and number of 
nationwide suppliers in retail markets for households. Source: (Pototschnig et al. 2015) 
 
Market participants 
The primary responsibility for the energy sector lies with the Ministry of Economy (ME).  
The Slovak Board for Regulation is responsible for regulation strategy and management in network 
industries, whereas regulatory implementation is the responsibility of the Regulatory Office for 
Networks Industries (URSO). The Board and URSO were established in 2001 by the Act no. 276/2001 
“On the Regulation of Network Industries”, amended various times over the years. 
Other key market participants include ((ERRA), n.d.): 
 Slovenské elektrárne, a.s. (66% owned by ENEL SpA) with 70.43% of the market share in 
domestic electricity supply; 
 1 national, 100% state-owned TSO is SEPS, a.s. (Slovak electricity transmission system, Plc.). 
Its tasks include ensuring transmission system reliably, provision for the dispatching control 
of the system, its maintenance, renewal and development so that the reliable and quality 
supply of electricity to all transmission system users is ensured, as well as its parallel 
operation with the neighbouring transmission systems; 
 3 main regional DSOs (see above); 
 ca. 160 small local distribution companies; 
 3 final suppliers of electricity for households and small businesses, as a part of vertically 
integrated utility performing simultaneously distribution system operator’s function; 
 Other market players: 134 license holders for generation (+2060 license holders for 
generation of up to 1 MW), 446 license holders for electricity supply (39 household 
suppliers). 
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4. Figure Basic market structure. For abbreviations, see in the text above. 
 
Markets open to consumer participation 
Legally all customers are eligible on the wholesale and the balancing markets since 1 July 2007 
((ERRA), n.d.), except for households. 
However, to date, the DR system is largely populated by large consumers, who are in direct 
contractual connection with the main suppliers or the TSO and DSO. DR operation is therefore based 
on a bilateral contract, tailored for each case. These are mostly incentive-based contracts, i.e. 
consumption is based on a previously set profile and penalties are paid in case of failing to follow the 
profile. (JRC 2015) 
Besides the predominant bilateral contracts, market participants, especially wholesale electricity 
traders, also use the short-term electricity market (day-ahead market, organized by OKTE), 
electronic exchange (organized by SPX) or auctions.  
Smaller consumers do not participate in Demand Response in spite of the legal possibility, probably 
for technological reasons (JRC 2015). 
Aggregators are not present on the Slovak electricity market, and they are not mentioned in legal 
documents. Therefore there are no possibilities for pooling of DR services. Balancing Service 
Providers participate on the market, and it is foreseen that they will develop into aggregators in the 
future (JRC 2015). 
Entry to the market for all functions is dependent on a license. The granting of the license depends 
on technical and legal requirements as well as the payment of a fee. Licence is generally not 
required for generation and distribution of electricity for own consumption and for supply of 
electricity (including also its distribution) to third person(s) at a purchase price without profit 
margin. In these cases (i.e. where the licensing regime does not apply) a simple notification is 
sufficient. 
Each market participant is responsible for its imbalances or may transfer this responsibility to a third 
party, e.g. to OKTE as the imbalance biller. Respective method depends on the position of the 
market participant. For example, wholesale electricity traders as electricity suppliers are generally 
obliged to transfer their responsibility to OKTE, while household customers' responsibility is usually 
transferred to the respective supplier and settled jointly as one balancing group. In case of 
renewable energy generating facilities with a total installed capacity of up to 1 MW (in case of solar 
energy up to 30 kW), the responsibility for imbalances is ex lege transferred to operators of regional 
distribution systems. (SeeNews 2014) 
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Regulatory status regarding Demand Response 
The key regulation related to Demand Response include (based on (Michek 2015; European 
Commission 2015)): 
 Energy Act No.251/2012 - It defines principal rights and duties of all participants in the 
electricity market; It is the basic transposition tool of the Third Energy Package and sets rules 
for electricity trading. 
 Regulation No. 423/2013 defines market rules, Regulation on regulatory  measures 
No.24/2013, Regulation on implementation IMS No.358/2013, Regulation on metering No. 
3/2013 
 Energy efficiency Act No.321/2014, Act on energy efficiency transposes the EED. This Act will 
impact on the structure of metering systems, metering data processing and provision of 
respective data. 
 Regulation No.358/2013, Principal categorisation and requirements for the implementation 
of Intelligent Metering Systems (IMS) in Slovakia. 
According to the Third NEEAP of Slovakia, URSO published the Methodology Guideline No 
01/12/2013, Article V(2), which regulates electricity market stakeholders to create and make 
available systemic services for the management of consumption, in particular:  
a) by shifting the load from peak to off-peak times by final customers, taking into account 
the availability of renewable energy, energy from cogeneration and distributed generation;  
b) by energy savings from demand management;  
c) by demand reduction from energy efficiency measures undertaken by energy service 
providers, including energy service companies;  
d) by the connection and dispatch of generation sources at lower voltage levels;  
e) by the connection of generation sources closer to the consumption site;  
f) by the storage of energy. 
Tariffs 
Price regulation is applied in the fields of RES and CHP generation, generation from domestic coal, 
connection to the system, access to the transmission system and electricity transmission, access to 
the distribution system and electricity distribution, supply of electricity to vulnerable customers, 
provision of ancillary service, provision of system services, performance of the organizer of short-
term electricity market activities, supply provided by a last resort supplier. 
Freely Negotiated Tariffs: 
Freely negotiated tariffs primarily apply to the supply of electricity to a company directly, except for 
small companies (companies with consumption up to 30 MWh electricity in preceding year). Also, 
electricity trading is based on freely negotiated tariffs. (SeeNews 2014) 
Regulated Tariffs: (SeeNews 2014) 
Certain electricity transactions are subject to regulated tariffs, such as supply of electricity to 
households, small companies and suppliers of last instance; production of electricity generated from 
renewable energy sources, electricity generated by cogeneration and electricity generated from 
domestic coal (in case of obligations in the general economic interest imposed by the Ministry of 
Economy); connection to a network; access to a transmission system and access to a distribution 
system; transmission and distribution; provision of system services and provision of support 
services; organisation of the short-term market. 
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Regulated tariffs are set in an administrative procedure by the Board of Regulation and the 
Regulatory Office for Network Industries. 
Renewables with impact on DR 
Electricity from renewable energy sources (RES) has been promoted through fixed feed-in tariff (FIT), 
which is set by URSO ((URSO) 2015; Mark Newbery and Silke Goldberg 2015). The set prices of 
electricity produced from RES and high-efficiency combined production have a major impact on the 
value of the applied tariff for system operation. Originally, the FIT were set quite high and resulted in 
a rapid proliferation of RES projects in 2010 and 2011, especially in the solar sector (Mark Newbery 
and Silke Goldberg 2015). To avoid an unstable electricity grid and high costs for consumers, the 
support for solar and wind projects was significantly decreased. Later biomass and biofuels became 
preferred and according to the Energy Law, the RES target for Slovakia for 2020 (14% share) should 
be achieved mainly by heat production and not by generation of electricity, support of which should 
gradually be lowered or removed. 
New wind energy facilities are legally allowed, however, these must be first approved by the Slovak 
electricity TSO (Slovenská elektrizačná a prenosová sústava, a.s.), and the approval is very difficult 
(Mark Newbery and Silke Goldberg 2015). Furthermore, as of January 2014, the so-called "G-tariff" 
or "G-component" was introduced to be paid by all generators (including small/RES facilities) to the 
system operator for reserved capacity of its energy facilities within the transmission or distribution 
system. This significantly increases the transaction costs, and creates difficult entry for RES facilities. 
 
Conclusions   
Main markets enablers  
The legal framework that transposes the Third Energy Package and the EED are in place, and 
provisions are set for Demand Response. Barriers still limit the actual functioning of DR. 
Main market barriers  
The key market barrier to DR is reported to be the lag in technological requirement, in particular the 
limited spread of smart meters (JRC 2015). A rollout of smart metering in Slovakia is still in the phase 
of discussions only (European Commission 2015), Although DSOs install smart meters on a voluntary 
basis, usually for energy-intensive customers. 
The entry requirements hinder the proliferation of DR services. It is rather costly and cumbersome. 
Network tariffs include elements that increase the costs. 
Liberalisation, although done at the legal stage, is not fully evolved. The power generation market is 
highly concentrated, and trading is mostly based on bilateral contracts and focused on large 
consumers. 
 
Slovenia  
Context 
The regulatory framework of Demand Response (and consequently tariffs) is based on the "Act on 
the methodology determining the regulatory framework and the methodology for charging the 
network charge for the electricity system operators"122. The following measures are introduced:  
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- Demand Response measures;  
- Quality of Service regulation;  
- Incentives for smart grid projects,  
- Supporting of pilot projects from a field of Demand Response and demand side 
management, renewable energy management and storage of energy.  
These measures ensure the cost-savings in networks according to criteria mentioned under 
paragraph 1 of the Annex XI. of EED. 
Shifting of the load from peak to off-peak by final costumers taking into account the availability of 
renewables is not prevented by the regulation (for retailers), and not explicitly supported either (for 
network operators). Time of use tariffs and critical peak pricing are applied in Slovenia, and they are 
established under Article 98 of the "Act on the methodology determining the regulatory framework 
and the methodology for charging the network charge for the electricity system operators". 
Market participants 
TSO - The public company Electricity Transmission System Operator (ELES Ltd.) has the exclusive 
right to perform the public service of the transmission network system operator in Slovenia. The 
founder and the sole owner of the company is the Republic of Slovenia. 
PMO - Borzen provides and facilitates coordinated operation of the Slovenian electricity system. It 
executes the activities of balance scheme management, recording of closed contracts, elaboration of 
indicative operating schedule, imbalance settlement and financial settlement of transactions, all 
connected with the aforementioned  activities. 
 
Markets open to consumer participation 
Balancing Market 
Participation of Demand Response (DR) in the balancing market is legal and possible in Slovenia in 
every reserve since 2014, however aggregation was limited to only the Tertiary Reserve until 2015 
(SEDC, 2015), and the Secondary Reserve was opened for aggregated load in 2016 (ELES, n.d.) 
(Error! Reference source not found.). The contracted volume in 2014 was 12 MW, and 20 
W in 2015. 
At the moment, the Primary (and until 2016 the Secondary) Reserve was based on bilateral contracts 
between ELES and large industrial consumers. 
Table 20. The status of balancing market products related to load acceptance and aggregated demand: 
Adapted from (SEDC 2015). 
Balancing market (using ELES’s 
terminology) 
Total capacity 
contracted  
Load access and 
participation 
Aggregated load 
accepted 
Primary Reserve n/a Y N 
Secondary Reserve n/a Y Y* 
Tertiary Reserve 348 MW Y Y (20 MW) 
* newly opened 
 
Furthermore, there is a cooperation agreement with Austria in place for secondary reserves, namely 
the Imbalance Netting Cooperation (INC). 
Wholesale Market 
Demand Response is not allowed in the wholesale market (SEDC 2015). 
Ancillary services 
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ELES publishes tenders and/or auctions for the ancillary services and purchase of electricity for 
covering losses on the transmission network annually (ELES, n.d.). Network regulation enables 
participation of aggregated distributed consumers in ancillary services, according to Article 31, 
paragraph 4 of the "Act on the methodology determining the regulatory framework and the 
methodology for charging the network charge for the electricity system operators" (JRC 2015). At 
the same time, Demand Response providers are required to ensure 24/7 availability which is a major 
obstacle, and excludes a large number of potential (small) participants, thus limits the size of the 
load (SEDC 2015). The response time is 15 minutes, and it must be possible to deliver the service for 
a maximum 2 hours. The time between two activations must be at least 10 hours, with a maximum 
number of 2 activations per day. The minimum aggregated bid size is 5 MW. Activation is manual. 
(SEDC 2015) 
Capacity Market 
There is no capacity market and no plans to introduce it in Slovenia. 
 
Status of regulation concerning aggregators 
Aggregation is legal in the Tertiary Reserve, and now open for the Secondary Reserve, however, its 
size is small. There is only one entity that operates as an aggregator: the Virtual Power Plant (VPP), 
that is managed by the supplier Elektro Energija and the DSO Elektro Ljubljana, with CyberGrid as the 
system provider. 
There are no clear rules related to contractual issues. If a party is interested in providing Demand 
Response services, it is required to obtain the consent of the BRP. However, demand-side flexibility 
is tolerated without written agreement in some cases. Apart from that, the aggregator is required to 
have a contract with the consumers (flexibility providers), and a market entity (where he will place 
this flexibility). There are no official compensation mechanisms in place to cover revenue losses of 
suppliers. 
The single available official baseline (Baseline 1) is based on Demand Response unit schedule, where 
actual reduction is determined as the deviation of ‘reduced’ consumption from the scheduled 
‘regular’ consumption. The companies can use their own baselines if they are accepted by the TSO, 
as done by VPP. In order to match schedules with the actual consumption, they are proportionally 
scaled to the last measured value before the activation. 
According to Article 318 of the Energy Act123, suppliers of electricity and heat and suppliers of solid, 
liquid or gaseous fuels to final customers shall be designated as obligated parties (hereinafter: 
obligated parties) to ensure the achievement of energy savings among final customers. These 
measures are not covered in the network regulation yet. (JRC 2015) 
 
Main markets enablers  
The most important driver of participation is that requirements for participation in the Balancing 
Market are acceptable and are sized to the capabilities of the Demand Response providers, except 
for the full-time availability criteria. 
ELES, the TSO provides both utilisation and availability payments for the participation in the Tertiary 
Reserve. Availability payments are 38 000 EUR/MW, and utilisation payments reach 240 EUR/MWh. 
At the same time penalties for non-availability are high, with 20% tolerance level. 
Currently, there are pilot projects supported by incentives to test Demand Response in relation to 
efficient use of networks and generation capabilities, based on Article 71. of the Act on the 
methodology determining the regulatory framework and the methodology for charging the network 
charge for the electricity system operators"124 
                                           
 
123
 http://www.uradni-list.si/1/content?id=116549 
124
 http://www.uradni-list.si/1/objava.jsp?urlid=201566&objava=2713 
  
108 
 
According to the Slovenian NEEAP (Ministry of Infrastructure 2015), the introduction of intelligent 
metering is outlined as a key factor for the participation of consumers in network efficiency. Grants 
will be provided from OP EKP 2014–2020 funds for the promotion of the development of intelligent 
distribution networks by upgrading the existing electricity infrastructure (smart metering, ICT 
support for smart services, etc.). Under this measure, the introduction of remote metering by actual 
consumption with two-way digital communication between supplier and consumer is expected as 
well as the introduction of dynamic innovative tariffs. These are expected to be important for the 
facilitation and encouragement of Demand Response services. 
Main market barriers  
The key barriers are related to the specificities of the country. The size of the electricity market is 
small with small volumes, and the number of accessible programmes is limited. In effect, there is not 
really a business case for Demand Response. For the moment, there are no programmes aimed at 
the network management. 
A significant chunk of the market has not been available, namely the wholesale market and the 
Balancing market is more fit for large consumers due to the limitation on aggregators. The 
requirement of 24/7 availability is too difficult for participants that are potentially interested in the 
Tertiary Reserve. 
 
Conclusions   
Demand Response is allowed in the Balancing Market in Slovenia, but not in the Wholesale market. 
The capacity market does not exist in Slovenia. To the contrary of most countries which opened their 
product requirements to DR, Slovenia did not allow aggregated load in a wide scale, and limited 
aggregation to the Tertiary reserve, which now seems to open up in the Secondary reserve, too. This 
has resulted in the limitation of participants because small consumers are excluded, while large 
industrial consumers are the sole participants that can access the markets. There is only one 
aggregator in the market. 
The business case is not evident in Slovenia for Demand Response, primarily because it is a small 
market. Both the TSO and the Demand Response providers need to improve their products in the 
future in order to compete with the conventional supply units. 
 
Malta 
Context 
The Third Energy Package has been transposed by Malta in 2011, however with plenty of 
derogations. 
Malta has no domestic resource of fossil fuels and no natural gas market however, the primary 
energy supply remains entirely based on fossil fuel. Ensuring the security of the supply side is 
therefore one of the main priorities for Malta. In order to secure the electricity supply and reduce 
the vulnerability of the sector, in April 2015 Malta was able to connect its power grid to the Italian 
transmission network which is part of the European grid. This interconnector allows Malta to 
exchange electricity with the Italian power market, importing and exporting electricity from and to 
Italy, ending its electricity isolation and, at the same time, achieving a diversified mix of energy 
sources.  
Since there are no transmission systems and no transmission system operators in Malta, all the 
electricity consumers are served by Enemalta Corporation, the only distribution system operator 
(DSO). Enemalta Corporation is therefore responsible for the operational network security of the 
distribution system in Malta.  
Capacity issues are not seen as a particular threat to Malta. Electricity is provided through three 
different sources and it is locally-generated at the Delimara Power Station and through other small-
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scale domestic and industrial renewable energy installations125.  Since April 2015 it is also imported 
through the Malta-Italy Interconnector126.  
The total combined installed capacity of Enemalta’s plants is currently 599MW which includes 
155MW from plants at the Marsa Power Station which was shut down in March 2015.   
The local electricity sector is undergoing great infrastructural and operational changes and the 
technical capabilities and opportunities for Demand Response participation in the retail market are 
not yet clear to warrant a definition of technical modalities for participation. 
Malta has a “Single Buyer Model” market and the production and distribution costs for the supply of 
electricity are covered by a single unbundled Tariff. The Tariff system is established by the Electricity 
Supply Regulations. The tariff system for the residential is based on a Progressive Tariff Model with a 
social component at the base, progressively increasing to emulate a Polluter Pays Principle. There is 
also an Eco-reduction bonus for consumers whose consumption is below average. In the residential 
sector there are no specific measures aimed at Demand Response. In particular for large non – 
residential consumers there are a Night Tariff and a Maximum Demand Charge, two measures which 
promote Demand Side Management helping to limit the infrastructural investments and operational 
cost on the network. 
  
Markets open to consumer participation 
The balancing between generation and demand is done by Enemalta Corporation as part of its daily 
generation dispatching operations to meet the demand. In the absence of large independent 
producers there is no market for balancing and ancillary services and as such, both of these services 
are provided by the facilities owned by Enemalta Corporation. There are no separate charges to 
customers for these services. 
In Malta there are no wholesale electricity markets. Enemalta Corporation has effectively 100% 
share of the electricity retail market. The electricity retail market is not open to competition and 
therefore customer switching is not possible in Malta. 
Dynamic pricing for Demand Response measures offered by networks or retail tariffs such as time-
of-use tariffs, critical peak pricing, real time pricing and peak time rebates are still absent in the 
Maltese electricity market however, the electricity tariffs system differentiates between primary 
residences, domestic premises and non-residential premises127. The electricity market in Malta is 
constituted by a relatively high proportion of low consumption customers and a small portion of 
high consumption customers. Thereby dynamic pricing as a means of Demand Response will have to 
be distributed over a wide base of consumers to produce any meaningful contribution that might 
benefit both supplier and customers. The roll-out of Smart Meters is in an advanced stage; however 
the operator (being the only one) cannot consider offering dynamic pricing unless the deployment of 
Smart Meters is complete and fully commissioned. Further, the operator and regulator still have to 
evaluate the implications of the evolution of the local power sector and the role Demand Response 
may have in the new set-up. 
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 During 2012, there was a further increase in the generation capacity from renewable energy sources (RES) connected to 
the grid such that the total RES capacity installed by the end of the year was at 18MW. The increase in RES capacity 
consisted mainly of solar photovoltaic installations and the largest uptake took place in the residential sector due to the 
grant scheme that was launched in July 2011. 
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 The Malta-Italy Interconnector, inaugurated in April 2015, is capable of transferring to Malta an additional 200MW of 
electricity. 
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 The tariff structure provides the possibility for households to benefit from a percentage eco reduction on their 
electricity consumption bill on one registered primary residence. 
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Capacity Market 
There is no capacity market and no plans to introduce it in Malta. 
Status of aggregators 
A market for Demand Response is not yet set up in Malta. Since the role of aggregators depend upon 
the participation of consumers in Demand Response programmes, Malta does not have aggregators. 
 
Conclusions  
Demand response in Malta is not yet developed mainly due to the lack of market pre-requisites 
conditions however, Malta should step up its efforts to diversify the energy mix and energy sources, 
notably by further developing renewable energy.  
Although the rolling out of Smart meters has achieved over 90% of Enemalta's electricity meters and 
could encourage consumers to consume electricity more efficiently, with the current regulation and 
market set-up, Demand Response and demand management are not motivated for most of the 
consumers and producers.  
Main markets enablers 
Although Demand Response in Malta is not yet developed, the rolling out of smart meters can be 
viewed as a key factor for the participation of consumers in network efficiency. 
Main barriers 
The main barriers are related to the peculiarities of the country which has a relatively small 
electricity market with small volumes and no accessible programmes for Demand Response. 
This is reflected by the monopoly of Enemalta, the only DSO in the market, the absence of 
transmission systems and transmission system operators in Malta and the fact that all the electricity 
consumers are served by Enemalta Corporation. Finally the Maltese electricity market is made by a 
high proportion of low consumption consumers and a small portion of high consumption customers 
therefore dynamic pricing as a means of Demand Response should be distributed over a wide base 
of consumers to produce any meaningful contribution that might benefit both supplier and 
customers.  
 
Cyprus 
Context 
Cyprus is an island with no indigenous hydrocarbon energy sources. This means that its power 
generation system operates in isolation and totally relies on imported fuels for electricity 
generation. The security of energy supply can be considered as one of the main issues in Cyprus. The 
electricity system in Cyprus operates without cross-border links, however, in 2013 Cyprus signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding ("MoU") with Israel and Greece on cooperation in the fields of 
energy, welcoming joint projects to enhance the security of energy supply, sustainable development 
and cooperation among the countries in the region. In this respect, the three countries welcome the 
EuroAsia Interconnector project (a private initiative), which aims to create an electricity 
interconnector between Israel, Cyprus and Greece. This project will allow the export of electricity 
generated in the Eastern Mediterranean to the EU energy market through trans-European electricity 
networks.  
The Third Energy Package has not yet been fully implemented by Cyprus. This is because in Cyprus 
only one company generates and supplies electricity therefore there is no wholesale market and 
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there are no cross-border links. For this reason Cyprus has been granted the status of a small 
isolated system under both the Second and Third Energy Packages. 
Market participants 
The Cyprus Energy Regulation Authority (CERA) is the independent national regulatory authority for 
the electricity and gas markets. CERA’s role is to ensure proper regulation of the electricity and gas 
markets, to promote competition and to protect all consumers. CERA's responsibilities include 
approving tariffs, resolving disputes and securing a reliable electricity system. 
The Cyprus Transmission Service Operator (TSO) was established in order to harmonise national law 
with the relevant European Directives for opening the electricity market. Its main duties are to 
operate, synchronise and manage Cyprus' transmission system accurately and to ensure the proper 
maintenance and development of the electricity network. The TSO also arranges the daily trading of 
electricity while at the same time supporting and promoting electricity generation from renewable 
energy sources. 
The Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC) is an independent semi-governmental company established 
by the Electricity Development Law. The EAC had a monopoly on the generation and supply of 
electricity across Cyprus until 2004.  EAC generates 90% of the electricity in Cyprus, although there 
are some producers that have entered the generation sector by producing electricity for their own 
use. 
Markets open to consumer participation 
Liberalisation of the Cyprus electricity market began under the provisions of the First Electricity 
Directive and the Second Electricity Directive concerning the common rules of the internal electricity 
market. As a result, 65% of the electricity market has been liberalised and opened to competition 
(with effect from January 2009) including all "non domestic" consumers being able to select their 
supplier according to what is in their best interest, thus ending the EAC's monopoly. Despite 
liberalisation of the electricity market, EAC remains the dominant producer of electricity and the 
owner of both the electricity transmission and distribution systems in Cyprus. The opening of 
electricity market to all customers has been delayed and it should be implemented by mid-2016128. 
As the EAC is the only company generating and supplying electricity, there is no wholesale market in 
Cyprus and there are no cross-border links. Due to the absence of competition, the wholesale and 
balancing market cannot yet function. 
 
Status of aggregators 
As Demand Response is not yet set up and the role of aggregators depend upon the participation of 
consumers in Demand Response programmes, Cyprus does not have aggregators. 
 
Conclusions  
Demand Response is not applicable in Cyprus due to the absence of market conditions. Furthermore, 
it could not be deployed until the electricity market will be fully liberalised129. On the other side, EAC 
has committed to support the integration of RES plants in the power generation system which could 
end Cyprus isolation and improve the security of energy supply. 
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 http://www.cyprusreporter.com/newsdetail/Opening-of-electricity-market-to-be-postponed-2602 
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 The electricity market in Cyprus should be fully liberalised by mid 2016. 
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Main barriers 
The main barriers are related to the structure and the size of the electricity market in Cyprus which 
is small with small volumes, the absence of competition amongst networks and therefore the 
absence of accessible programmes. There is not really a business case for Demand Response in 
Cyprus. 
 
The Baltic countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
Context 
The context of the three Baltic countries is presented together, as these nations have – historically 
and geographically – a lot of features of their electricity system and markets in common130. The 
Baltic power system is highly integrated with the Unified Energy System UES power system, i.e. with 
the Russian electricity market, both in terms of physical connections and in terms of system stability. 
As a consequence, the Baltic power markets are synchronous with the UES market. One of the key 
goals of the near-future developments of the Baltic States is to increase the security of supply 
through full integration into the European electricity markets and by strengthening the 
interconnection capacity to the EU neighbouring countries. An overview of the Baltic Energy Market 
Interconnection Plan (BEMIP) is shown in the next figure. 
 
Figure 5. Overview of the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP), with indications in relation to 
the Third Energy Package and electricity markets.
131
 
The Baltic electricity markets can be characterized by the following features: 
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 Mainly based on the study Sarah Carter, Rahul Desai, Jimmy Forsman, Michel Martin, Oliver Pearce, Bradley Steel, 
Magnar Vestli (2015). Demand-side response as a source for flexibility. Pöyry: Tallin and on IEA 2016. Re-pwering markets. 
Market design and regulation during the transition to low-carbon power systems. Paris: OECD/IEA. 
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 Members of the integrated Nord Pool market (along with Denmark, Sweden, Norway and 
Finland). 
 Highly integrated with one another. 
 Part of the UES Russian network i.e. ’synchronous’. 
 Markets are relatively small (in terms of demand). 
 Markets have historically been dependent on one power source in each market (oil shale in 
Estonia, hydro in Latvia and nuclear power in Lithuania) and one vertically integrated national 
utility. 
A Memorandum of Understanding on a refined BEMIP extension plan was signed in June 2015, in 
order to proceed with the removal of regulated tariffs, separation of TSO activities and roles, 
removal of cross-border restrictions, establishment of market based constraint management as well 
as common reserves and balancing power market, full opening of the retail market and 
establishment of common power exchange for physical trade in Nordic and Baltic area. The Baltic 
TSOs also plan to desynchronise from the UES power system. 
Estonia is broadly on schedule with its BEMIP process plan, while Lithuania and Latvia need to 
strengthen efforts. 
Estonia 
Context 
Currently, Demand Response is very limited in Estonia, due to legal barriers. However, the 
government - and the TSO in particularly -, are exploring the possibilities and the potential of 
empowering DR, and have been preparing the ground for this. 
The Estonian electricity market was de-regulated by January 2013, which openned new business 
opportunities for market participants, leading to competition in electricity generation and retail. 
However, functions related to the network infrastructure and transmission services have remained 
under monopoly. 
Estonia is one of the European countries that is least dependent on energy imports. Oil shale is the 
predominant primary energy resource (providing about 85% of generated electricity), with RES 
increasing its importance132. 
The Estonian power system is interconnected with the power system of IPS/UPS of Russia, which is 
planned to be desynchronized by 2025. In 2012, the total capacity of installed power plants was 
2647 MW, the peak demand is around 1600 MW and is expected to increase 1.8%/year during the 
next 10 years. 
Furthermore Estonia has cross borders electricity connections with Latvia and Finland (via a 350MW 
sea cable Estlink1). In 2014 a second sea cable between Estonia and Finland (Estlink2) was 
completed, increasing the transmission capacity between the Baltic and Nordic countries.133 Estonia 
has sufficient production capacity for covering domestic electricity demand and has the possibility to 
export electricity, mainly to Latvia and Lithuania.134 There are no capacity issues. As regards the 
security of supply in Estonia, this was also improved through the construction of two emergency 
reserve power plants by the TSO , Elering AS.  
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 IEA. 2016. Re-pwering markets. Market design and regulation during the transition to low-carbon power systems. Paris: 
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 In addition to these links, further interconnections, namely between Estonia and Latvia (2020) are in the planning phase 
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The Estonian government and the TSO, Elering, have been intensively exploring the options to 
extend the use and application area of Demand Response during the last 1-2 years, and a number of 
background studies have been commissioned.135 
 
Market participants 
Elering is the TSO which is responsible for the Estonian electricity system. As the backbone of the 
Estonian energy system, its role is also to ensure conditions for efficient energy market operations 
and economic development. In addition to Elering, electricity producers and network operators such 
as Elektrilevi and Imatra Elekter are expected to be interested in lowering the peak load curve. Their 
interest is to reduce the need for additional electricity generating capacity, because it is very 
expensive and additionally increases the capacity of electricity networks. Until now only the major 
Estonian generator (Eesti Energia) and neighbouring TSOs have provided balancing services. The 
network operators have legal obligation to contribute to the roll-out of smart meters. 
RES 
The biggest share of the renewable electricity production in Estonia comes from the biomass and 
municipal waste using CHP plants. A few DR programmes using renewable energy sources are 
present in Estonia. Some aggregators of RES do offer services related to switching of power sources 
in building where accumulators or renewable energy production equipment are installed.  Until now, 
the electricity system has been fit to absorb the growing amount of new installed capacity, and 
Demand Response has not been very interesting. 
 
Markets open to consumer participation 
Since consumers are able to buy their electricity from various sellers and ideally could choose from a 
variety of pricing options. Thanks to the shared Nordic Electricity Exchange Nord Pool Spot platform, 
electricity producers and consumers in Estonia have the opportunity to buy and sell electricity in a 
larger Nordic-Baltic market. This in turn enhances competition.  
Balancing Market 
The TSO, Elering has the obligation to ensure the security of supply and balance the Estonian power 
system. The amount of the production, consumption, export and import in the system depends on 
the portfolios of the balance providers and the balance plans they have submitted. There are 7 
balance providers that operate on the Estonian electricity market136. The balancing market is 
governed by the responsibility rules and mutual obligations for balance providers set in the standard 
conditions of the electrical balance agreement.  
The current rules that are relevant for RES and DR involvement in the balancing market are 
summarized in the next figure: 
                                           
 
 
136
 The main ones are: Eesti Energia AS, Baltic Energy services OÜ, Latvenergo Kaubandus OÜ, Nordi Power Management 
OÜ and the Estonian branchof EGL Nordic AS 
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Estonian and Nordic balancing market rules. Source: Sarah Carter, Rahul 
Desai, Jimmy Forsman, Michel Martin, Oliver Pearce, Bradley Steel, Magnar 
Vestli (2015). Demand-side response as a source for flexibility. Pöyry: Tallin. 
At the moment, there is no Demand Response programme in the balancing market in Estonia. "The 
main issue with the existing balancing service is that it is not based on a market mechanism and it 
lacks of transparency how the prices are formed.” Furthermore, it has been seen as a barrier that 
“currently most of the service providers are from outside of Estonia”137.  
However, it has been suggested that the role of Demand Response will become apparent in the 
Balancing Market when Estonia desynchronises the electricity system from IPS/UPS (Russia), in order 
to ensure its own reserve. The value associated with the use of DR for holding reserve is relatively 
high, especially compared to the (low) wholesale market use of DR.138 
Wholesale Market  
Estonia is covered by the Nordic electricity exchange area Nord Pool Spot. Although there is no 
explicit prohibition of DR, the lack of a clear legal framework, definitions, responsibilities and market 
functions act as a key barrier to its development. As a result, Demand Response has not taken place, 
although the studies commissioned by Elering indicate an interest from investors. Even for the 
future, studies do not indicate major interest in DR on the wholesale market. 
Retail Market 
According to the law, in the retail market in Estonia, all customers are eligible and free to choose 
their supplier and the price of electricity is set by competition among the sellers. Since the time of 
market liberalisation, most electricity customers in Estonia have switched electricity suppliers, while, 
electricity tariffs have also increased (between 30-55%). 
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Capacity Market 
There is no capacity market for DR in Estonia. 
 
Status of regulation concerning Demand Response and pricing 
There is no specific legal framework for DR, nevertheless it is not directly prohibited either. The 
vague circumstances present a major barrier to the development of DR. On the other hand, 
according to the 3rd NEEAP of Estonia, the legislative framework legislation of this sector is managed 
by the Energy Department of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications, and all 
detrimental incentives to the overall efficiency of the generation, transmission, distribution and 
supply of energy, or might hamper participation of demand response in balancing markets and 
ancillary services procurement have been removed. 
The Estonian Government adopted the new Energy Management Coordination Act on 16 June 
2016, which transposes all the legal framework for the EED. This opens the way forward secondary 
legislation, which should enable the dissemination of DR, as well as other EED-requirements in a few 
years. 
There have been other relevant amendments to the electricity market legislation in Estonia, 
including: 
 In January 2010 comprehensive amendments to the Electricity Market Act (the central 
regulatory framework) were adopted. These changes were largely related to the opening of 
the electricity market to all customers. 
 In June 2012 amendments were enforced in the Electricity Market Act, which also 
harmonised other requirements arising from Third Package into the Estonian legislation. 
As of January 2013 the Estonian electricity market was 100% opened and all types of consumers can 
choose the seller of electricity.  
The document issued by the Competition Authority 'Integral methodology for the calculation of 
network charges for electricity' sets network charges. The methodology also prescribes that, as 
concerns costs, the Competition Authority may determine (through the conditions of an operating 
licence) an undertaking's development obligation for a specific period of time, in order to increase 
technical efficiency139. 
• Time-of-day tariffs, i.e. electricity retailers offer consumers packages with two (or more) 
rates. This tariff is widely used, and there is a tendency to move towards more and more 
real time hourly prices to reflect the smart meter roll-out. 
• Therefore, dynamic pricing is gaining popularity. 
Smart meters 
Estonia has legal requirement to fully roll-out smart meters by the end of 2016. The roll-out will 
concern all types of consumers, and the expected scenario has increased the attention of investors 
and developers of smart meters technology, potential aggregators and DR providers. 
 
Conclusions 
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While the use of DR currently is very low and non-sophisticated, the studies commissioned by the 
TSO indicate that the deployment of DR would be highly beneficial with low costs. A summary of a 
possible DR future is shown in the next figure: 
 
Figure 6. DR future in Estonia 140 
Demand response in Estonia can be deployed and consumers seem willing to participate in providing 
Demand Response services for the transmission system operator, who should use this information 
as an input for developing the necessary market entity for balancing services. Large electricity 
consumers have started to monitor the situation on the electricity market and plan their production 
according to the market situation141.  
Main markets enablers 
 It is expected that when Estonia desynchronises from the IPS/UPS system, the value of 
holding reserves will increase greatly. To contribute to this, DR is expected to play a crucial 
role and deliver significant cost saving potential for the Estonian system. The value 
associated with the use of DR for holding reserve is relatively high, while the expected 
monetary value of DR in the wholesale market is rather low142. A stronger connection to the 
Nordic countries and the use of various types of production is likely to lead to price 
harmonization.  
 Since the opening of the market in 2013 consumers are allowed to switch and select their 
electricity supplier, even though interest so far has been limited. 
 The role of aggregators in the Estonian electricity market will be key to provide balancing 
services on the demand side e.g.: by monitoring the electricity balance. Aggregators support 
                                           
 
140
 Sarah Carter, Rahul Desai, Jimmy Forsman, Michel Martin, Oliver Pearce, Bradley Steel, Magnar Vestli (2015). Demand-
side response as a source for flexibility. Pöyry: Tallin. 
141
 Cited in: Using demand side management in energy-intensive industries for providing balancing power - The Estonian 
case study. Available from: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/261309948_Using_demand_side_management_in_energy-
intensive_industries_for_providing_balancing_power_-_The_Estonian_case_study [accessed Jan 27, 2016]. 
142
 Sarah Carter, Rahul Desai, Jimmy Forsman, Michel Martin, Oliver Pearce, Bradley Steel, Magnar Vestli (2015). Demand-
side response as a source for flexibility. Pöyry: Tallin. 
  
118 
 
individual consumers and companies to reduce energy costs as well as to earn income 
through participation in energy trade by Demand Response programmes.  
 The Nordic Electricity Exchange Nord Pool Spot (NPS) platform which covers the Baltic 
electricity market enhances competition among the electricity producers and consumers 
which, as a result, triggers competitive price for consumers. 
 It is further expected that DR for the within-day or balancing timeframe will increase due to 
increased wind penetration, but only to a limited extent, given the flexibility of the 
neighbouring Nordic system. This means that the overall market volume for Estonian 
domestic generators and DR is expected to remain unchanged. 
 The roll-out of smart meters will enable DR. 
 DR has been evaluated in Estonia to provide value to the Estonian distribution system 
through relieving network congestion and allowing network investments to be deferred. 
However, the value was calculated as relatively low compared to the value associated with 
national level benefits from DR. 143 
Main market barriers 
Since the liberalisation of the electricity market in Estonia, prices have increased steadily. The issue 
is that harmonized market rules have to be applied to everyone and consistently. The legislation that 
regulates the electricity market in Estonia must allow market participants to operate without 
obstacle. E.g.: lowering the participation cost in DR programmes.  
While there is no explicit prohibition of DR in Estonia, the lack of a clear, transparent legal 
framework, including market rules, network rules and definitions hinders the willingness of investors 
to engage in DR even on a market basis. This environment is seen as instable. 
The study by Elering collects the core barriers as seen by stakeholders. 
 
Figure 7. Stakeholder views on the barriers to DR in Estonia
144
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Latvia 
Context 
Latvia was granted derogation from the Third Energy Package as an emergent gas market and it 
liberalised the electricity market in April 2014. 
The Electricity Market Law, the Law on Regulators of Public Utilities as well as other legal acts which 
are in force in Latvia, allow the use of Demand Response and established the methodology 
determining the regulatory framework and the methodology for the calculation of transmission and 
distribution system service tariffs.  
The Latvian national regulator, the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) is the multi-sector regulator 
active in Latvia. The state-owned company JSC “Latvenergo” dominates the field of electricity supply 
controlling around 90% of installed capacity for the generation of electricity in Latvia. The company 
offers services related to the import and export, and delivery of electricity to customers. The 
functions of the electricity transmission system operator are carried out by JSC “Augstsprieguma 
tīkls”, the independent transmission system operator. The functions of the electricity distribution 
system operator are carried out by JSC “Sadales tīkls”, the independent distribution system operator 
owned by Latvenergo.145 
Network and retail tariffs 
In Latvia there are no such incentives in distribution or TSO tariffs that are detrimental to the overall 
efficiency. Also there are no incentives in TSO tariffs that might hamper participation of Demand 
Response, in balancing markets and ancillary services procurement. National regulator verifies 
technically and economically reasonable system operator’s costs that are necessary for effective 
provision of the system service. Regulator controls (ex-post) the quality of system services like 
losses. New customers are incentivized to choose corresponding capacity of new constructed 
connection – DSO is covering the cost of connection if the customer efficiently uses this capacity. 
National regulator approves DSO costs and tariffs, continuously checks operational efficiency 
(SAIFI/SAIDI rates, energy losses etc.) and sets new regulations and targets for efficiency.  
Liberalisation 
The electricity market was fully liberalised on the 01/01/2015 when the regulated end-users process 
were abolished however electricity tariffs remain high, when compared to EU levels. 
Market participants 
The state-owned company JSC “Latvenergo” dominates the field of electricity supply in Latvia, 
controlling more than 90% of installed capacity for the generation of electricity in Latvia. The 
company offers services related to the import and export, and delivery of electricity to customers146. 
The stock company “Latvijas elektriskie tīkli” is the owner of the transmission system which is a 
separate legal entity within the holding company JSC “Latvenergo”. 
TSO - Augstsprieguma tīkls AS is the leading Transmission System Operator which operates the 
electric power transmission network and ensures security of electric power supply in Latvia. 
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In addition to this, it provides power transmission services based on the tariffs published and free 
third-party access to the transmission network. Augstsprieguma tīkls AS holds operational control of 
the transmission system and ensures its stable operation.  
DSO - JSC “Sadales tīkls” is a separate legal entity within the holding company JSC “Latvenergo”, 
covering 99% of electricity distribution. 
 
Markets open to consumer participation 
The electricity market became 100% open on July 1, 2007 when all customers became eligible to 
choose an alternative supplier of electricity. In 2010, 2,3% of the electricity customers that were in 
the free electricity market switched their electricity supplier.147 
Network tariffs currently allow suppliers to improve consumer participation in system efficiency and 
customers are motivated to use limited capacity of network connection and, at the same time to 
consume more energy during off-peak time. TSO tariff is definitely not an obstacle for consumer 
participation in system efficiency, including Demand Response. 
In Latvia the average energy consumption is quite low comparing to the capacity of the distribution 
system. Distributed generation is not covered with consumption (DG is located in areas with less 
consumption). That’s why there are no cost-savings achieved in networks directly related to 
demand-side and demand- response measures and distributed generation in short and medium 
term. According to the distribution system service's tariff calculation methodology, tariffs are 
differentiated depending on time of day and day of the week in order to promote a more efficient 
distribution system. 
Balancing Market 
In Latvia balancing is ensured by TSO Augstsprieguma tikls AS (AST), the Latvian leading transmission 
system operator (TSO) responsible for power balance in the system as well as for providing of 
balancing services at the transmission network level. The TSO uses its existing capacity reserves in 
the electricity system and concluded agreements with Estonian (Elering) and Lithuanian (Litgrid) 
TSO, as well as with external balancing trader. All these procedures are set out in the Grid Code. 
According to the Latvian Electricity Market Law148 that sets the guidelines on the balancing 
arrangements among customers, producers and system operators, each electricity market 
participant shall be liable for the fact that the quantity of electricity sold by it in each trading interval 
complies with the quantity of electricity delivered to the system and the quantity of electricity 
purchased complies with the quantity of electricity received from the system. Thus, all Latvian 
electricity market participants, including those which intend to trade electricity in the Latvian 
bidding area of the Nord Pool Spot AS (NPS) Power Exchange, have to conclude the respective 
agreement on receipt of balancing services.149 
Wholesale Market 
The Latvian Wholesale Electricity market is heavily congested (more than 60% of time EE-> LV 
interconnection is congested). The electricity interconnections are represented by 2 Interconnection 
between EE-LV; 4 interconnections between LV-LT; 1 interconnection between LV-RU (see pic 1. 
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below). Electricity generation in Latvia is almost entirely related to “Latvenergo” producing 
approximately 60% of total electricity consumption. The independent electricity generators are too 
small to offer significant volumes of energy for potential customers.  
The network regulation and tariffs allow active usage of demand-side management and demand-
response activities. Intraday market exists and it allow market participants to trade in close to real 
time horizon and in such way, to correct their generation/consumption plans taking into account the 
availability of renewable energy, energy from cogeneration and distributed generation. Energy 
producers are allowed to change their generation plans. According to tariff methodology system 
operators can differentiate tariffs. Tariffs may be differentiated depending on time of day and day of 
the week in order to promote a more efficient distribution system. Current network regulation and 
tariffs is not preventing network operators or energy retailers making available system services for 
Demand Response measures, demand management and distributed generation. 
 
Figure 8. Source: http://www.ast.lv/eng/transmission_network 
 
Retail Market 
The electricity retail market in Latvia was officially opened on 01/01/2015 and is made up by 13 
active traders and 5 traders active in the household segment. DSO has also designed and 
successfully implemented the trade platform/data sharing system and allows easy switching via DSO 
platform. 
In 2015 the electricity retail market was reformed and it introduced a new centric model based on 
one bill to household customer - a universal service fixed price offer for one year – a protection 
service for vulnerable customers and in parallel a communication campaign at regional level was 
organized by ERRA (Energy Regulators, Regional Association).   
Ancillary services 
Network regulation and tariffs enables participation of aggregated distributed consumers in ancillary 
services. They do not prevent network operators or energy retailers making available system 
services for Demand Response measures, demand management and distributed generation. It is 
unclear whether in Latvia ancillary services are available to support DR programmes.  
Capacity Market 
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Capacity market provide an additional incentive for developers and owners of generating capacity 
(i.e. power plants or Demand Response providers) to make their capacity available to electric 
markets where price signals alone would not.  Capacity providers are paid on a kilowatt per year 
basis for the capacity that a power plant can generate or, in the case of Demand Response, the 
capacity of power that can be reduced. In Latvia is unclear whether DR can develop in the capacity 
market. 
 
Status of regulation concerning aggregators 
There are no clear rules related to contractual issues for aggregators. 
 
Conclusions   
Although the electricity market was liberalised, Latvenergo still remain the main electricity supplier 
for Latvian consumers. Dynamic innovative tariffs are expected to be important for the facilitation 
and encouragement of Demand Response services.  
Main markets enablers  
Current network regulation and tariffs can be considered one of the most important drivers in 
Latvia. They support dynamic pricing for Demand Response measures by final customers. In fact, 
time-of-use network tariffs are mandatory for large customers (above 800A) and also available for 
other customers. Real time (hourly) retail pricing is available for all customers. 
By combining dynamic pricing systems such as time of use or real time pricing with smart meters 
technology, (timely and appropriate information feedback that can facilitate energy efficiency 
improvements and increase demand side flexibility mitigating peak loads), Latvia can achieve peak 
load shaving.  
Main market barriers  
Improper functioning of the wholesale electricity market is the key issue for the power sector in the 
country, along with the necessary renewal of outdated infrastructure. Challenges remain as regards 
smooth functioning of the regional electricity market.  
Large part of the wholesale market has not been available to Demand Response and due to the 
limitation number of aggregators, the Balancing market is more suitable for large consumers.  
 
Lithuania 
Context 
Lithuania has fully transposed the provisions of the Third Energy Package. 
Its electricity market is vastly dependent on Russian power imports150, particularly from the Russian 
Federation. In 2009, Lithuania retired its last nuclear reactor, which accounted for 77% of domestic 
electricity production and abruptly switched from an exporter of electricity to an importer of 
electricity. In 2015 interconnectors with Sweden and Poland have been finalized in order to decrease 
the shortage in generation, and to foster security of supply and wholesale market functioning.  
The 700 megawatt (MW) transmission cable linking Lithuania and Sweden and the 500 MW cable 
linking Lithuania and Poland have drastically changed the future of energy politics in this Baltic state 
                                           
 
150
 Lithuania imports almost 70% of its power from Belarus and the average price of electricity is among the highest in EU.  
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since the new transmission lines provide Lithuania with enough power to meet internal demand for 
all but a few hours of the day when power demand peaks.  
Although Lithuania and the other Baltic states remain part of the Russian power grid for the time 
being, in the future they could be synchronized with the European Union’s emerging transmission 
grid. This synchronization with Europe would give more responsibility to Litgrid AB, the electricity 
transmission system operator, which would then have to monitor the reliability of the grid and 
frequency spikes by itself. 
Distributed electricity generation is still not very well developed in Lithuania except the launch of a 
campaign on PHV (Control of solar photovoltaic power) which took place between 2012-2014 and 
resulted in about 30 MW of total PHV capacity established by the government using the feed-in tariff 
obligation which was 3 times bigger compared to the retail electricity price. Hence becoming a cost-
ineffective measure. On the other hand, the distribution of heat production by solar collectors and 
heat pumps combined with district heating option in public and residential buildings, seems to be 
much more promising. Energy savings deriving from Demand Response of distributed consumers by 
energy aggregators are still absent in Lithuania. 
EPC and ESCOs are not yet developed in Lithuania however, a few steps have being made by a State 
Investment Development Agency targeting EPC actions in the public buildings. 
Concerning the storage of energy, network regulation and tariffs do not prevent network operators 
or energy retailers making system services for Demand Response measures, demand management 
and distributed generation on organised electricity market. Lithuanian electricity system includes 
Kruonis Hydropower storage, which was coupled to work with Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant 
(decommissioned in 2010).  
Dynamic pricing for Demand Response measures offered by networks or retail tariffs such as time-
of-use tariffs and real time pricing are present in Lithuania. Electricity prices for consumers are state 
regulated. The DSO offers about 6 to 8 plans for consumers, which take into account: real time of 
consumption, 1 or 2 time-zones and minimum amount consumed with corresponding discount. 
Critical peak pricing and peak time rebates are not yet available. 
Concerning the removal of those incentives in transmission and distribution tariff that are 
detrimental to the overall efficiency (including energy efficiency) of the generation, transmission, 
distribution and supply of electricity or those that might hamper participation of Demand Response, 
in balancing markets and ancillary services procurement as required by Art.15 (4) Lithuania is not yet 
ready to comply with these requirements. Further, switching suppliers does not often occur and it is 
practically non-existent for consumers. However, final users can select a purchase plan according to 
their consumption needs and efficiency considerations. 
 
Main markets enablers 
Lithuanian consumers can switch electricity supplier since the beginning of 2015 (companies had this 
option since 2013), however, in practice they do not use this option due to the suppliers' lack of 
interest in doing a risky business with small customers. All electricity consumers from DSO are 
regulated by a state owned-tariff.  
 
Main barriers 
Lack of information and motivation to recognise the benefits that could be achieved with Demand 
Response programmes. There is no information related to the procedures, requirement obligations 
and price levels at which short term regulating service could be provided by TSO.   
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Conclusions  
Lithuania should continue to promote competition through better integration of the Baltic energy 
markets. Since Lithuania is a fully functioning internal energy market, it should further support and 
encourage demand side resources such as Demand Response to participate alongside supply in 
wholesale and retail markets. This would mean to ensure that transmission system operators and 
distribution system operators should treat Demand Response providers, including aggregators, in a 
non-discriminatory manner, on the basis of their technical capabilities. MS should also promote the 
access to and the participation of Demand Response in balancing, reserve and other system services 
markets and should also define technical modalities for the participation of aggregators in these 
markets.  
With the current regulation and market set-up, Demand Response and demand management are 
not motivated for most of the consumers and producers.  
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Chapter 6. Conclusion and recommendations for improving 
DR in MSs 
 
In reviewing the continued progress of Member States toward opening markets for Demand 
Response, a uniquely European Model begins to emerge.  In these successful cases, TSOs and 
regulators have used the deregulated and competitive market structure to empower providers and 
encourage market entry for consumers.  These positive examples could be collected, highlighted and 
replicated across Europe.   
 
While a significant portion of EU Member States have yet to begin their regulatory review with any 
seriousness, those who have looked to enable Demand Response are succeeding, despite continued 
barriers and remaining issues.  This bodes well for the future of the market, particularly when we 
consider the overcapacity of generation now available in some Member States. The fact that 
consumer load is still able to compete successfully and reliably under these conditions is positive. 
 
However, further clarity is required. A main finding of this report is that many national regulators 
find the process complex and confusing.  For example, two repeated questions were:  
 Is it enough that Demand Response is not specifically forbidden?  
 Is it enough that retailers can aggregate consumer load?  
They may also be unsure as to what is needed in order to either fulfil the requirements of the EED or 
what a positive market structure would include.  As one regulator from an inactive Member State 
remarked ‘But Demand Response is not illegal here, and no one wants it anyway – why bother with 
all these little technical changes? They are a lot of work.’  
 
The status of Member States regulation can be divided into roughly three groups.   
 
First are those who have yet to seriously engage with Demand Response reforms. Obligatory 
provisions of the relevant EU Directives may have been transposed in name but not in fact. 
Therefore while Demand Response may be ‘legal’ the MS have not adjusted their regulatory 
structures to enable demand side resources to participate in the markets, nor begun the process of 
defining the role of the independent aggregator and DR service provider, nor adjusted critical 
technical modalities.  The result is therefore that though Demand Response is ‘legal’, there is no 
defined party to offer the service, no way to measure or pay for the service and no markets in which 
consumers or aggregators can sell demand side flexibility.  Therefore, despite significant progress in 
certain EU Member States consumers and DR providers therefore remain barred from the majority 
of electricity markets in Europe.   
These national regulators often state they find the development of the needed regulatory changes 
complex and confusing. It may also not always be understood how (or why) the regulatory 
environment would need to be changed at all. Regulators in Portugal, Spain, Italy, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Bulgaria and Cyprus and Malta have not as yet enabled DR or aggregation.  However, Italy 
is aware of the issue and is undergoing a regulatory review, the status may change within 2017-18. 
Greece has created one auction-based program for large consumers and intends to open the market 
further. Poland has created two programs, however these are not successful today due to the low 
and controlled prices offered by the TSO. 
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Traditional supply approach in most of the CEE countries makes Demand Response to be considered 
as a hassle or an alien solution. Mostly, regulation text allows the participation of Demand Response 
(all or almost all), and EU Directives are transposed (word by word in Bulgaria, for example), but this 
does not translate into real practice. In Hungary, the regulator always keeps an overcapacity from 
traditional power stations that equal the expected load profiles from RES each day. In these regimes, 
the Regulator legally allows Demand Response to join the network, however when the licensing 
procedure takes place, in the end licenses are not approved on minor or questionable basis. There is 
no market pressure, and out of the very few applicants only 1 or 2 succeed to finally participate. For 
example, in Hungary, the only participant is a very flexible chemical factory, which has an additional 
on-site power generator (CHP), which was the way the Regulator was convinced about the low risk 
of participation in DR. 
 
The wide-scale use of ripple control, an out-dated, but structurally built-in load-management system 
is seen as a key barrier to Demand Response in several CEE countries, such as Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Hungary. Ripple control involves superimposing a higher-frequency signal onto the 
standard main power signal, in order to regulate the load from outside through a receiver that is 
attached to non-essential (heating and water-heating) devices. Currently, the control is in the hands 
of DSOs, in e.g. the Czech Republic, and the function as Demand Response is partial. In effect, the 
problem is that in case of ripple control, all the decision is in the hands of the supplier/retailer/DSO, 
while DR would allow the consumers to make decisions themselves. Ripple control works with dual-
tariffs (or other time-of-use tariffs), which have developed in recent years, but responsiveness is far 
below from DR. In addition, this technology is not compatible with smart meters, increasing the cost-
benefit ratio of this introduction significantly in the affected countries. 
 
Finally, in many of the Central Eastern countries (e.g. Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary), and all of the Baltic 
countries, the implementation of the Third Energy Package in practice and a full liberalisation of the 
electricity markets are lagging behind. Only, after full unbundling and increasing competition, would 
it be possible to start developing the regulating market, which could make it more attractive for a 
wider range of customers to provide regulating and/or emergency reserves. In all of these countries, 
at least some of the prices are regulated, especially those of households and small consumers. 
 
The second group of Member States are in the process of enabling Demand Response through the 
retailer only.  This is an important choice – due to the fact that the customer will not be offered a 
clear value for their flexibility - rather they will receive this bundled with their electricity bill.  They 
either need to reject the entire package or accept. However it is difficult or impossible for them to 
know what they are in fact rejecting/accepting as they will very rarely (if ever) have a fully 
transparent offer151.  It also limits market offerings to those that are positive for the retailers in a 
given country – which is often not be the same as those which would benefit the consumer.   
 
These Member States limit aggregators to the role of service providers to retailers rather than 
independent parties providing independent offerings to consumers.  The Nordics, the Netherlands 
and to a certain degree Austria, are in this group.  Germany is considering enabling independent 
aggregation but a formal decision and key regulatory adjustments are yet to be made.  
                                           
 
151 This is not because the retailer will be looking to ’hide’ value – rather the fact that the customer engages in DR will 
impact several aspects of the retailer’s business model, their balancing costs, their company earnings from generation, 
network tariffs.  The DR offering is therefore joined to the cost of the customer’s electricity.  It is not transparent and 
separated.   
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The Nordics have put in place Smart Metering and a liquid wholesale market.  They have also 
performed regulatory reviews, which map market entry barriers for new entrant retailers and made 
dynamic pricing available to residential consumers.  They have also enabled full aggregation of 
consumer load. Prequalification for participating in a market is therefore measured at the 
aggregated pool level, rather than for each consumer individually- an important enabler of Demand 
Response. This is positive, however only retailers can provide aggregation services freely, and 
unfortunately the business model issues for retailers concerning Demand Response remain the same 
in the Nordics as anywhere else and therefore growth will continue to be slowed.  Also while the 
Finnish TSO and regulator have made progress in adjusting other technical modalities to allow 
Demand Response, Sweden and Denmark have not as yet opened the market sufficiently to allow 
market entry even for retailer driven DR.   
 
Table 21. Overview of current status within EU Member States: 
  
Ancillary services 
markets  open to 
participants 
Balancing 
markets 
open to 
participant
s 
Wholesal
e open 
Aggreg
ators 
Tech modalities 
adjusted 
RESULT 
Austria 
Most markets 
open to ALL with 
limitations for 
aggregators 
 retailer 
only 
 retailer 
only 
Retailer 
only 
Yes with 
significant barriers 
remaining  
Active participation of large industrial 
in balancing market.  
Belgium 
Most markets 
open to ALL 
 retailer 
only 
 retailer 
only 
Yes 
(under 
develop
ment) 
partial but 
innovative 
Active participation of large industrial 
and some commercial in balancing 
market. Limited retailer activity 
wholesale market 
Bulgaria 
No DR at the 
moment 
No No No No 
There is a major lag with liberalization 
and lack of competition 
Croatia No 
Legally yes, 
in reality 
no 
Legally 
yes, in 
reality no 
No (no 
conside
ration) 
No 
The energy sector is concentrated with 
one single company, liberalization 
progress is slow. 
Cyprus 
No DR at the 
moment 
No No No No 
Absence of competition in the energy 
sector 
Czech 
Republic 
No (though ripple 
control 
participates) 
Legally yes, 
in reality 
no 
Legally 
yes, in 
reality no 
No 
Significant 
technical barriers, 
CBA for SM is 
negative 
Suboptimal solution of ripple control 
remains as a major obstacle 
Denmark 
ALL (with limitation 
for aggregators) 
retailer 
only 
retailer 
only 
 retailer 
only 
Not yet sufficient 
to  function 
Little significant participation in any 
market by any group 
Estonia Unclear 
Yes, but 
not used 
Yes, but 
not used 
No 
Roll-out of SM by 
end of 2016 
No participation in any market by any 
group, although legally open  
Finland  
ALL (with limitation 
for aggregators) 
 retailer 
only 
 retailer 
only 
 retailer 
only 
Yes - partially 
Participation of large  industrial and  
commercial and some residential  in 
balancing market. Limited participation 
in wholesale through retailer.   
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Ancillary services 
markets  open to 
participants 
Balancing 
markets 
open to 
participant
s 
Wholesal
e open 
Aggreg
ators 
Tech modalities 
adjusted 
RESULT 
Sweden 
ALL (with limitation 
for aggregators) 
 retailer 
only 
 retailer 
only 
 retailer 
only 
 Not yet sufficient 
to  function 
Little significant participation in any 
market by any group 
France 
Most markets 
open to ALL 
ALL ALL Yes  
Yes with 
significant barriers 
remaining  
(Limited) participation of all consumer 
groups in all markets  
Germany 
retailer only 
(severe limitations 
aggregators) 
retailer 
only 
retailer 
only 
 retailer 
only 
 Not yet sufficient 
to  function  
No significant participation in any 
market by any group 
Greece 
One program open 
to large consumers 
only  
No  No  
No 
(under 
review)  
Yes  for one open 
program 
Participation of qualified large  
industrial in one balancing market 
program 
Hungary 
No (though ripple 
control 
participates) 
Legally yes, 
in reality 
no 
(competitio
n with 
ripple 
control) 
yes (but 
very 
difficult to 
get 
license) 
In 
theory 
possible
, no 
exampl
es 
partial 
One DR company on the wholesale, 
and 8 VPPs 
Ireland 
Two markets open 
to ALL 
retailer 
only 
retailer 
only 
Yes  partial 
Participation of large  industrial and 
commercial  in balancing market 
Italy  No (under review)  
In theory 
retailers 
are able 
In theory 
retailers 
are able 
No 
(under 
review) 
No (under review) 
No participation. (Single Existing 
program is not in full use and is not 
market based) 
Latvia Unclear Unclear Yes Unclear Not yet Participation in the wholesale market 
Lithuania Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Not yet 
No significant participation in any 
market by any group 
further support and encourage 
demand side resources such as 
Demand Response to participate 
alongside supply in wholesale and 
retail markets 
Luxembo
urg 
No 
Legally yes, 
but no 
participant
s 
Legally 
yes, but 
no 
participan
ts 
No No 
No DR used mainly due to 
technical/procedural reasons because 
of the interconnectedness with 
Germany 
Malta No No No No No 
No regulatory framework for 
participation of DR 
 
the 
Netherla
nds 
Most markets 
open to retailers 
only 
retailer 
only 
retailer 
only 
retailer 
only 
Yes 
Participation of industrial and 
commercial in balancing and limited 
wholesale 
Poland 
Two programs 
open to large 
consumers only 
In theory 
retailers 
are able 
In theory 
retailers 
are able 
no 
(Unreali
stic also 
for 
retail) 
 not sufficient to  
function 
Very limited participation in one 
balancing program by qualified large 
industrial consumers 
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Ancillary services 
markets  open to 
participants 
Balancing 
markets 
open to 
participant
s 
Wholesal
e open 
Aggreg
ators 
Tech modalities 
adjusted 
RESULT 
Portugal No 
In theory 
retailers 
are able 
In theory 
retailers 
are able 
no 
(Unreali
stic also 
for 
retail) 
No No participation 
Romania No 
Legally 
retailers 
are eligible 
Legally 
retailers 
are able 
Not 
even 
mentio
ned 
No No DR participation 
Slovakia N/A 
Legally ALL, 
but 
households 
Legally 
ALL, but 
household
s 
Legally 
ALL, but 
househ
olds 
No, which is a 
main barrier 
Very low DR participation, only large 
consumers 
Slovenia Yes, All Yes No Limited Partial 
The business case is not evident, thus 
DR is limited. Aggregation has been 
restricted. 
Spain 
No (no competitive 
programs)  
In theory 
retailers 
are able 
In theory 
retailers 
are able 
no 
(Unreali
stic also 
for 
retail) 
No  
No participation  (Single existing 
program is not in actual use and is not 
market based) 
the UK 
Markets open to 
ALL 
retailer 
only 
retailer 
only 
yes 
partial - semi 
functional 
(Limited) participation of all consumer 
groups in all markets  
 
 
Germany does not yet enable independent aggregation and has made little progress in adjusting 
technical modalities to allow market entry for demand side resources.  Added to this, the structure 
of their network fees still penalise (fines) large consumers who participate in the programs, while 
smaller consumers are never provided the opportunity as the metering infrastructure is not in place 
and/or the cost of entry is too high.   The government is aware of the issue and is performing a 
regulatory review. 
 
The Netherlands does not enable independent aggregation. However, it has succeeded in opening 
the balancing market to consumer participation through the BRP. Beyond the balancing market 
there is little activity today and little aggregated Demand Response in any Dutch market. 
 
The Austrian TSO and regulator have established innovative market structures, which encourage 
competitive consumer participation, and allows Demand Response to participate alongside supply in 
the ancillary services market.  They also have looked to open the market to new entrants by 
lowering the cost and risk of becoming a BRP.  This is not fully successful, but is an interesting 
solution and has enabled 4-5 new entrants to provide services.  The technical modalities in place still 
cause entry barriers, particularly in the area of punitive communication requirements (such as a 
requirement for a €10,000-€20,000 dedicated telephone line to each consumer) and onerous pre-
qualification procedures.   
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The third group of Member States that enables both Demand Response and independent 
aggregation includes Belgium, France, Ireland and the UK. Belgium and France have both defined the 
roles and responsibilities around independent aggregation.  
  
In France this work is completed and aggregators participate in every open market.  The 
standardised framework is described in the Methodology section of this document, it creates 
standardised processes which allow the aggregator/consumer direct access to market without 
requiring the permission or involvement of their potential competitor, the retailer.  The process 
defines: volume measurement criteria, data exchange procedures, and payment formulas to allow 
for smooth payment of sourcing costs to the retailer/BRP. Though issues remain, the system has 
created one of the most dynamic Demand Response markets in Europe.  
 
The technical modalities remaining in the balancing and ancillary services markets still cause entry 
issues and are under continued review by RTE, who has already made significant adjustments.  More 
complex issues remain within the FCR (Primary Control) and FRRa (Secondary Control) and Capacity 
market design.  In all three of these markets (for different reasons), EDF is or will be both the main 
buyer and provider of resources.  This causes obvious conflicts of interest issues and entry barriers 
for new entrant providers, though aggregators have contracted successfully with EDF to provide FCR 
and FRR resources.  Within the FCR and FRRa it would be possible for RTE to purchase the resources, 
as they are the party in charge of this market and the final user of the resource.  This would solve 
the structural issue.  The Capacity market design has several important elements encouraging and 
enabling Demand Response and aggregation, though the issue of a single main purchaser and 
provider is likely to remain.  
 
The Belgium Ancillary services markets are open to independent aggregators and Demand Response.  
The technical modalities have been adjusted to enable and encourage Demand Response within the 
ancillary services markets.  Access to the balancing and wholesale markets remains problematic.  
Discussions are underway to create a standardised process between aggregators and BRP/Retailers.  
When these are completed (2016) the path to market should significantly improve for consumers 
and aggregation service provides.  
 
In Great Britain the ancillary services market is open, and the regulator has allowed aggregators free 
access, despite the fact that the role is yet to be defined.  Therefore, both retailers and aggregators 
now actively provide services to residential, commercial and industrial consumers when this is 
possible within the given market structures. GB is also rolling out Smart Meters and encouraging 
both DSOs and retailers to create innovative services.  The market is dynamic with many small 
technological start-ups also benefiting for GB’s healthy financial market to establish companies and 
create innovative solutions152.   That said, the introduction of a Capacity Market structure which 
heavily favours generators, has been a significant set-back for Demand Response in GB.  Fair and 
open Capacity Markets can provider a critical source of investment stability for Demand Response, 
however due to the fact that the market structure in GB presents entry barriers, within every level of 
the market structure (from the structure of the auctions to the measurement of load) Demand 
                                           
 
152
 Access to capital is an important enabler of British start-ups, a critical resource that can be almost entirely missing in 
other EU Member States.   
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Response providers now have to compete with a generation fleet benefiting from approximately 1 
billion in subsidies that they do not receive.     
 
Demand Response providers and small independent retailers interviewed also voiced frustration at a 
lack of full representation during key meetings on market design. Similarly the STOR market 
structure was changed in a manner which lowered the earnings of consumers and encouraged the 
entrance of older generators. A large portion of demand side flexibility and approximately 9-10 
aggregators left the STOR market in 2014-15 as a result, lowering the creation of new demand side 
capacity. Aggregators interviewed voiced the hope that with the new government, a more 
constructive dialogue between providers and policy makers might be possible. Several aggregators 
are already successfully engaged with National Grid and providing Ancillary Services using everything 
from residential to industrial loads.  
 
The Irish market is centrally dispatched and therefore relatively simple to access for aggregators, as 
the TSO is in full control of the market they are able to ensure the retailer and BRP are not thrown 
out of balance by the Demand Response activation.  There are two ancillary service markets open, 
however the frequency market and the balancing and wholesale market are not yet accessible. 
Today technical modalities have yet to be fully adjusted in order to enable aggregation or DR.  This 
includes for example insisting that each consumer undergo an expensive pre-qualification process 
rather than measuring and qualifying the aggregated pool.   
 
 
Innovation and Best Practice  
Despite the barriers remaining today, in 2013 Europe was almost entirely shut to Demand Response.  
Significant progress has therefore been made between 2013 and 2015.  Europe’s energy market is 
unique, and there is the opportunity to create unique solutions combining competitive market 
structures with the decarbonisation agenda.  This review has provided new insights on key success 
criteria for Demand Response which are in line with and benefit from, Europe’s competitive market 
design.  Below is a list of positive developments in Member States.  No one Member State yet 
contains all of these elements, however they are complementary and could well be combined as a 
repeatable template for success.  
 
Template for enabling aggregated Demand Response:  
A rough template of a dynamic market structures, encouraging flexibility resources and Demand 
Response:  
 
Market Structure Elements and Aggregation:  
 Open Wholesale, Balancing, Ancillary Services and eventually, the Capacity markets.  
(France is the first and only Member State to open its wholesale market to aggregated 
Demand Response.)  
 Both Energy and Availability Payments Made in at least 1 ancillary services market: the 
customer is paid for providing capacity to the system. This allows for investment security 
and encourages participation. (Multiple Member States provide this) 
 Frequent auctions (Austria):  
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o Weekly auctions for capacity payments: the weekly bidding for the customer’s 
availability payment allows the customer to calculate their availability on a weekly 
basis taking into account factors such as vacations, orders, weather, etc. For 
example, tn an annual bidding process customers and aggregators have to bid 
according to their lowest availability level for the entire year.  The weekly bidding is 
therefore an important enabler.  
o Daily energy auctions – mean that the consumer can set the price for that day’s 
availability.  
 Appropriate Network Fees: efficiency is encouraged by not penalising consumers for 
participating in Demand Response, and changing their consumption profile.  For example, 
the Austrian DSOs separate balancing energy from normal consumption when calculating 
network charges, and charge for the balancing energy at a much lower rate.   
 DSOs encouraged to enable energy efficiency and Demand Response: in the GB the 
regulation surrounding the payment of DNOs has been fundamentally adjusted and they are 
now able to benefit from improving the efficiency of their systems, including through 
demand side program development.  This mechanism is unique to GB today but could be 
replicated in other Member States.  
 
 Matching Needs of Markets to Capabilities of Consumers:  
o Example Belgian Frequency Market: The market is divided into three parts, part 1 is 
a symmetrical program – suitable for generators.   
o Part 2 and 3 are asymmetrical programs, one for increasing and the other for 
decreasing consumption, a critical enabler of consumer participation as consumers 
will rarely be able to increase and decrease consumption symmetrically. 
o Part 2 and 3 are activated between + / - 100-200mHz allowing consumers to balance 
the larger changes in frequency.  This solves two issues – 1) consumer load is well 
suited for following large changes in frequency, often at a lower cost than 
generation 2) the larger shifts means that the consumer is activated less often.  This 
is an example of a market design which is moving away from a generation centric 
model and endeavouring to capture the strengths of both resources.  
 
 Aggregation: The standardised process between BRPs and aggregators is a significant 
enabler as it creates the framework by which aggregators can have a clear path to market 
(France, Belgium). This  Framework includes:  
o Volumes: Standardised processes for assessment of the traded energy153.  
o Compensation: For markets where there is a significant energy component 
(balancing and wholesale) a price formula to calculate the price for the transferred 
energy is needed. This is energy the retailer bought which the consumer does not 
consume because they are participating in Demand Response. There is widespread 
acknowledgement that the retailer does indeed lose income through the balance 
                                           
 
153 i.e. the transfer of energy between the BRP’s and the aggregator’s balancing groups following a Demand Response 
dispatch. 
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responsibilities during a Demand Response activation by an independent 
aggregator. 154  In the case of demand reduction, the aggregator pays the 
BRP/retailer; in the case of demand enhancement, the BRP pays the aggregator. This 
price formula should reflect as closely as possible the average sourcing costs of the 
energy transferred.  
o Data Exchange: A clear definition of what data needs to be provided to the BRP 
through the TSO, to ensure both the aggregator and the BRP can fulfil their 
obligations whilst not having to share commercially sensitive information. 
o Governance structure: An appeals process and an appeals body, in case any issues 
need to be resolved. 
 
Technical Modalities, which take into account the capabilities of participants:  
 Enable Full Aggregation of Consumer Load (Finland, Denmark, Sweden, BG, France...): 
Qualification for participating in a market is prequalified and measured at the aggregated 
pool level, rather than for each consumer individually. This is an important enabler as it 
allows the aggregated pool of consumer load to be treated as a single resource, maximising 
the group’s joint potential. It also allows the aggregator to act as mediator for the consumer, 
protecting them from onerous and complex technical pre-qualification measures. It is 
questionable that some TSOs in Europe are capable of accepting pre-qualification of the 
pooled load and others are not.  They should all accept it. If 4-5 can do it the others can as 
well, and this critical barrier could be removed from all Member States. 
 The baseline methodology is appropriate and realistic – based on consumer capabilities and 
metering data (Greece, GB, France among others)  
 The payment criteria is clear and transparent and pays a full price for services rendered 
(Greece, Austria, Belgium, France, GB, Nordics...)  
 Pay as Cleared: (this element is already included in the Network Codes today)  This means 
that all market participants are paid the clearing price for the market, even those that would 
have provided resources for less.  This has a benefit as the low cost resources multiply, 
gradually lowering the clearing price.  
 Granular Availability Requirements:  For example, the Austrian Secondary control market is 
split into three time periods meaning that a consumer available during the day can be paid 
for this availability and does not need to be available at night as well, for example.   
 Short Call Duration in the reserves markets: should be 1-2 hours in alignment with actual 
market requirements.   
 No minimum required size for consumer participation (Finland, Denmark, Sweden). 
                                           
 
154
 According to the market modelling of the SEDC, using the hourly market prices (winter 2013-14) - in France alone, 1 GW 
of Demand Response activated 500 hours a year would lose the French generators €469 million a year in reduced 
wholesale market revenues (due to the lowered clearing prices), while sourcing costs would come to only €27 million 
(according to EDFs own calculation methodology). At the same time the payment of this €27 million by French aggregators 
to the retailer would remove 85% of their margin for participating in the wholesale markets - effectively killing their 
business.  
Therefore there is reason to believe that the argument of large retailers insisting on the payment of sourcing costs is not 
over the €27 million a year but to protect against the €465 million of potential losses a year to the generation assets.   (In 
Germany the generation losses through the reduced clearing price would be €959 million a year against €27million for 
sourcing costs). The sourcing cost issue therefore justifies careful analysis 
  
134 
 
 Real-time prices in the balancing market communicated to consumers. This allows them to 
react to these prices and earn off of their ability to help balance the system. (the 
Netherlands) 
 The capacity payments within the capacity market support investment security and 
consumer engagement. (Ireland) 
 
No single Member State has succeeded in incorporating all the elements above in their markets. 
However these elements complement each other and bring about a constructive unity. They are in 
fact a repeatable template for realistic and positive enablers of Demand Response and Aggregation 
in Europe155.  Today this template is not communicated to regulators fully.  While some TSOs and 
regulators clearly understand Demand Response and aggregation well, and have even succeeded in 
encouraging growth, others require further information.   
TSOs and regulators in for example, Belgium, France, Austria, Great Britain and elsewhere, have 
been making a concerted effort to enable Demand Response to enter the markets within the 
competitive and de-regulated framework. Some of these solutions are innovative and capture the 
capabilities of demand side resources in a uniquely European manner.   What is now needed is for 
these solutions to be unified, communicated and replicated across Member States. The European 
Commission will play a critical role in this process.  
 
  
                                           
 
155
 The work of EG 3 within the Smart Grid Taskforce has also made important progress in creating a template.  That said, 
there would be a place for highlighting and repeating existing best practice, which are demonstrated and proven.  
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